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Applicant Person or company applying for a patent 
Censored sample Sample that excludes information for some 
observations 
EPO European Patent Office 
Highly cited patent Patent that is cited exceptionally often 
Home bias When an indicator favors entities residing in the 
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------Backward Reference in the focal patent to another patent 
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Patent family Set of related patents 
------DOCDB Patent family consisting of patents with equal 
technical content 
------INPADOC Patent family that attempts to group patents relating 
to the same invention 
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Patent opposition Process initiated at a patent office to prevent a 
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Populaire samenvatting 
 
“Als innovatie nauwkeurig gemeten, geclassificeerd en voorspeld zou kunnen 
worden; dan zou het uiteindelijk niet innovatief zijn ” 
Innovatie is de drijvende kracht voor onze kenniseconomie. Het is daarom 
belangrijk om te begrijpen hoe innovatie werkt en waar het vandaan komt. Ook 
zouden we graag willen weten hoe bedrijven, maar ook landen er op dit 
moment voorstaan ten aanzien van hun innovatieve capaciteiten. Om deze 
vragen te beantwoorden is het nodig om innovatie goed te kunnen meten. 
Normaal gesproken tellen we hiervoor octrooien, ook wel patenten genoemd. 
Maar er zit een enorm verschil in hun waarde, wat een simpele optelsom een 
onbetrouwbare indicatie van innovatie maakt. Daarom is het belangrijk om 
deze waarde te bepalen. De meest gebruikte methode hiervoor is het tellen 
van het aantal keer dat het octrooi geciteerd wordt door andere octrooien, ook 
wel octrooi citaties genoemd. Dit doctoraat is erop gericht om deze methode, 
onder de loep te nemen en, waar nodig, te verbeteren. Daarom zullen drie van 
de grootste problemen met de indicator worden besproken. 
Het eerste probleem is dat er veel verschillende manieren zijn om te bepalen 
welke octrooien welke ander octrooien citeren. Dit komt vooral doordat 
onderzoekers verschillende methodes en databronnen gebruiken. De 
resultaten van dit doctoraat latent zien dat de waardebepaling drastisch kan 
verschillen afhankelijk van de opzet die de onderzoeker gebruikt. Daarnaast 
wordt er in dit doctoraat ook bepaald welke methode leidt tot de beste 
waardebepaling en dat dit blijkt te verschillen voor octrooien uit verschillende 
landen. 
In de meeste gevallen wordt de waarde van een patent bepaald door 
simpelweg het aantal keer dat het is geciteerd bij elkaar op te tellen. Dit aantal 
citaties verschilt enorm tussen de octrooien, daarom wordt in het doctoraat de 
vraag gesteld of dit ook zulke grote verschillen in de waarde van de octrooien 
kenmerkt. Dit blijkt niet zo te zijn. Het is daarom de aanbeveling om de waarde 
van een octrooi te laten bepalen door de logaritme van de som van het aantal 
citaties, omdat deze functionele vorm de waarde verdeling beter benadert.   
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Tenslotte kunnen de ontvangen citaties nog worden gecategoriseerd 
afhankelijk van de eigenaar van de citerende octrooien. In dit geval wordt 
bekeken of de eigenaar hetzelfde is als die van het geciteerde octrooi, een 
‘zelf-citatie’, of niet. Het blijkt vervolgens dat zelf-citaties een indicatie zijn van 
de waarde die de eigenaar hecht aan het exclusieve monopoly dat wordt 
verkregen door het octrooi. Niet-zelf-citaties geven meer een idee van de 
waarde van het octrooi op de markt voor intellectueel eigendom, omdat ze een 
indicatie zijn van mogelijke doelwitten die kunnen worden aangeklaagd voor 
inbreuk op het patent.  Door deze typen citaties apart te bestuderen kunnen 
we een beter beeld krijgen van de strategieën van octrooi eigenaren. 
De resultaten beschreven in dit doctoraat zouden, als ze worden 
overgenomen, kunnen leiden tot een verbetering van het meten van de waarde 
van octrooien. Dit is niet alleen nuttig voor eigenaars van intellectueel 
eigendom maar ook voor een beter begrip van octrooien en de innovatie 
waarop ze gebaseerd zijn.   
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Popular abstract 
 
“If innovation could be accurately measured, classified and predicted;  
then it wouldn’t be innovative at all” 
Innovation is the driving force for our knowledge economy. It is therefore 
important to understand the inner workings of innovation as well as how it is 
generated. Additionally, it is important to know how companies and countries 
fare with respect to their innovative capacities. To measure this, as a rule, we 
simply count the number of patents filed by the relevant entity. But, there is a 
massive difference in the value of these patents, which makes this count an 
unreliable innovation indicator. Therefore, it is important to determine patent 
value. The most used indicators are obtained by counting the number of times 
the patent is referenced by other patents. This doctorate focusses on observing 
and, where necessary, improving this measure of determining patent value. 
Therefore, three important problems with the indicator will be discussed. 
The first problem concerns the numerous ways that are used to determine 
which patents cite which other patents. Different researchers use different 
methods, which is mainly due to the various data sources and methods 
available. The results presented in this doctorate show that the valuation of 
patents can differ greatly depending on the methodological choices made by 
the researcher. Additionally, this doctorate determines which methods provide 
the best value estimates, which are different when patents from different 
countries are used. 
Generally, patent value is determined by simply counting the number of times 
a patent is cited. The scores derived from this exercise differ greatly between 
patents. Therefore, this doctorate poses the question whether this is indicative 
of the large differences in value between patents. This appears not to be the 
case, leading to the recommendation of valuing patents using the logarithm of 
the count of their received citations, as this functional form better approaches 
the distribution of value within patents.  
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Finally, there is there is the notion that citations differ depending on the owner 
of the citing patent. Here, we determine if the owner is the same as the owner 
of the cited patent, in which case it is a self-citation. It is found that self-citations 
are an indication of the value that owners give to the temporary monopoly that 
the patent provides. Non-self-citations on the other hand are more an indication 
of the value of the patent in the market for intellectual property because they 
indicate potential targets that can be sued for infringing on the patent. By 
studying these types of citations separately, it is possible to better understand 
the strategies of patent owners.  
The results described in this doctorate could, when they are adopted, lead to 
improvements in the measurement of patent value. This is not only useful for 
owners of this intellectual property but also for a better understanding of 
patents and the innovation on which they are based.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Het aantal keren dat aan een octrooi wordt gerefereerd in andere octrooien, 
wordt over het algemeen gezien als een goede indicatie van zijn waarde en 
zijn innovatieve bijdrage. Maar er zijn drie cruciale problemen met deze 
indicator, beter bekend als octrooi citaties, die zijn gebruik hinderen en de 
validiteit van de studies, waarin hij wordt gebruikt, bedreigen. Deze doctors 
these zal deze problemen bespreken en oplossingen voorstellen.    
Het eerste probleem betreft de diverse methoden die gebruikt worden om 
octrooi citaties te berekenen. De resultaten in deze scriptie laten zien dat deze 
methoden substantiële verschillende indicatoren produceren en dat over het 
algemeen de indicatoren die gebaseerd zijn op patent families, d.w.z. groepen 
van gerelateerde patenten, aan te raden zijn. Het tweede resultaat in de 
scriptie is dat de functionele vorm van de relatie tussen octrooi citaties en 
octrooi waarde beter beschreven kan worden met een log lineaire vorm dan 
met de gebruikelijke lineaire vorm. Tenslotte, de relatie tussen octrooi citaties 
en octrooi waarde is vooral empirisch gevonden of gebaseerd op een analogie 
met academische citaties. In deze these wordt een nieuwe theorie beschreven 
die de waarde van octrooi relateert aan de juridische context van octrooi 
citaties.      
De resultaten van de thesis zouden, als ze worden overgenomen door 
onderzoekers die werken met octrooien, nuttig moeten zijn in het verbeteren 
van het meten van de relevantie van patenten. Hierdoor zou het begrip van 
innovatie en intellectueel eigendom moeten toenemen. 
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Abstract 
 
The number of times a patent is referenced by other patents is generally seen 
as a good indication of its value and its innovative contribution. However, there 
are three key issues with the practical application of this indicator, better known 
as patent citations, which obfuscate its use and thus threaten the validity of 
studies in which it is applied. This doctoral thesis will discuss and remedy these 
three problems.  
The first issue concerns the various methods that are in use to calculate patent 
citations. The results presented in this thesis indicate that these methods 
produce substantially different indicators and that, generally, indicators based 
on patent families, i.e. groups of related patents, present themselves as the 
preferred option. Next, it is found that patent citations and patent value are 
related through a log-linear relation, as opposed to the often-used linear 
relation. Starting from the legal and procedural role of citations, this thesis 
posits that patent citations relate to economic value albeit in two, distinctive, 
ways. These assertions are validated and empirically confirmed in this thesis. 
Overall, the results of this thesis are relevant to improve the measurement and 
understanding of patent citations. By doing so, this should further the 
understanding of innovation and intellectual property. 
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General introduction 
 
Why observe patent statistics? 
Innovation, the concept of technological change, is the primary driver of 
economic growth. Within the field of economics, innovation has been 
recognized as an important economic phenomenon due to the work of 
Schumpeter (1942). Many economic efforts recognized that innovation is the 
most transformative force of historical societal change (Mokyr,1992), as well 
as the engine of economic growth (Aghion and Howitt,1990). In recent years, 
there has been an even greater emphasis on the study of innovation because 
many see in it the key to sustained economic growth and enhanced company 
performance.  
In order to effectively understand innovation, it is necessary to accurately 
measure it. However, innovation, because of its very concept, i.e. the construct 
of change, is hard to quantify. One could observe innovation through its 
outcome by measuring the increase in performance after controlling for 
increases in initial production factors, i.e. by measuring changes in factor 
productivity (see for example De Loecker, 2007). This is however not always 
very satisfying, as changes in factor productivity can also occur due to a myriad 
of other processes, such as changing prices or demands (e.g. see De Loecker, 
2011), or advances in management. All of which are not necessarily indicative 
of technological change.   
Innovation thus tends to be measured indirectly through observing the creation 
and presence of inventions. After all, technological change can only be 
achieved when new concepts are adopted.  Therefore, the definition of 
innovation can be reformulated to link innovation to invention: innovation is the 
adoption of invention. Using this observation, the amount of inventions is then 
a reasonable proxy for the rate of innovation. This is even more so when 
invention measures can also capture a part of their adoption.  
Observing invention is an easier task than directly observing innovation, as 
inventions lend themselves better for accounting and quantitative measures. 
Inventions often have technological artefacts, such as products, descriptions 
and designs. Moreover, inventions can be traded, either directly through 
intellectual property, or indirectly due to the products which are based on the 
invention. Using these processes, a value can be attributed to most inventions. 
Finally, inventions can also be evaluated by their impact on society, amongst 
others through the value they represent. Therefore, the study of invention 
allows for a discussion of innovation. 
The occurrence of invention can be measured in several ways, for instance by 
observing the occurrence of new products and designs. This is however 
cumbersome as new products may not be registered and are often not 
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categorized in easily accessible data. Therefore, the most popular means of 
observing inventions is not directly, but rather by the intellectual property, in 
most cases patents, that protects them (Griliches, 1990).  Observing patents, 
and to a lesser extend trademarks, has the advantage of large, reasonably 
detailed databases that classify inventions, allowing them to be counted and 
classified. The main disadvantage is that large numbers of inventions are not 
patented as they either belong to the category of technology that is not 
patentable (e.g. services technologies), or they are not patented because there 
are better alternatives than patenting available (e.g. copy rights, trade secrets, 
relying on lead time). Therefore, patents statistics should always be viewed as 
relating to only a subset of the innovative activity in an economy.  
Observing innovative efforts through the counting of patents has been 
practiced since the second part of the 20th century. However, this practice has 
been criticized for mainly measuring innovation input (e.g. R&D investment), 
rather than output (Griliches, 1990). The main argument of this critique 
revolves around the timing of patent applications, which often happen before 
the final product or process is launched. Therefore, patents may be referring 
to long abandoned ideas that never reached the stage in which the innovation 
could be disseminated. Moreover, counting patent applications does not 
account for the large differences in the value of the different patented 
inventions, with many patents referring to marginal or unimportant inventions 
and a few to inventions with an extremely high value. Because of this skewed 
distribution it is difficult to accurately observe innovation by only counting the 
number of patents filed. It is for this reason that current scholars use other 
patent characteristics to qualify the patent counts (for an overview see 
Squicciarini, 2013). The most popular of these is the number of times a patent 
has been referenced as relevant prior art by later patents, better known as 
forward citations or patent citations.      
Patents as more than a measure of innovation 
Patents represent more than an indirect measure of innovation: patents provide 
the applicant with a temporary monopoly on producing the described invention.  
They are therefore important legal instruments in their own right.  
The theory behind granting these temporary monopolies rests on the possible 
market failures in innovation: to create an invention, its prospective owner may 
need to make considerable expenses. After the invention has been created, it 
may be easy for competitors to copy the invention.1 Subsequent competition 
between the original innovator and its imitators then drives down the price, and 
consequently the possible profit of the innovator, rendering the original 
innovator incapable of recouping their expenses that lead to the invention 
(Arrow, 1962). Rational innovators realize this before they start investing and 
will refrain from doing so in the first place. Therefore, the failure of the innovator 
                                                          
1 In practice imitation still requires a substantial investment. Mansfield et al. (1981) estimate that 
imitation costs in the range of 65% of the original expenses necessary to create the invention in 
the first place. 
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to appropriate the benefits of their invention leads to a suboptimal rate of 
innovation. 
Patents counter this process by giving the innovator a temporary monopoly to 
manufacture and sell their invention. Whenever the innovator detects other 
actors using the invention protectected by their patent (i.e. infringing)2, they 
may seek legal compensation as well as the cessation of the infringing 
activities. Moreover, through licensing the innovator may also charge others for 
the privilege of using their invention. Finally, the innovator may also sell the 
patent to endow others with the full rights of the patent. 
Patents have become more than a simple means of protecting an innovative 
effort: they have now become a part of sophisticated IP strategies that also 
involve other intellectual property. Patents facilitate markets for technology 
because they are relatively easy to trade, and they have even become methods 
of avoiding taxes (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012).  
The uses (and occasional abuses) of patents as intellectual property are still 
being investigated by many scholars. It is however important to consider that 
because of this thriving market of Intellectual property (IP), the relation between 
patent based statistics and information on innovative activities is far from 
perfect. Therefore, any scholar wishing to use patents needs to be aware of 
and, if possible, correct for strategic behavior of patent owners.  
Patent characteristics as a measure of value 
Patents possess a large amount of information due to the need of disclosure: 
to obtain a patent for an invention, an application needs to be filed with a 
description detailed enough that a skilled practitioner can recreate it from its 
description. In practice, patent descriptions are far from clear instructions due 
to the need for legally precise language, as well as the existence of strategic 
incentives for the applicant to limit disclosure of their invention.    
Nevertheless, patents remain a rich source of information on the inventions 
they protect. This information can be grouped into several categories. First 
there is information on the beneficiary of the patent, often referred as the 
applicant or assignee, as well as information on its inventors. Some offices 
(e.g. the United States Patent and Trade mark Office (USPTO)) also record the 
names of the examiners and patent attorneys involved with the patent 
application. Next there is the description, a text detailing the invention the 
patent should protect which is accompanied by a set of claims, short texts that 
outline the legal protection the patent provides. Finally, the patent is 
summarized in a short abstract.  
  
                                                          
2 It is important to note that the infringement doesn’t need to be intentional. Firms can be deemed 
to be infringing without even being aware of the patent they are infringing upon.  
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During the examination, i.e. the process in which the patent office determines 
the validity of the patent, more information is added. This involves assigning 
technological classes that categorize the invention as well as determining 
relevant prior art, i.e. references to other documents. 
Not all information is generally used in innovation research. It is often difficult 
to create datasets with full descriptions of patents and even then, it is hard to 
manipulate this information into meaningful economic constructs. Patent 
abstracts suffer from similar problems but due to their condensed nature and 
easier accessibility they are becoming more used in research (e.g. Magerman 
et al. (2010) review textmining methods involving patents). Finally, claims are 
often counted to identify the value of patents, yet the claim texts themselves 
are still not used.  
The patent characteristics that are often used are the information that ties 
patents to the owner of the invention, and in fewer instances also the inventors. 
Other frequently observed characteristics include the technological classes in 
which the patent is registered which are usefull for industry allocation. They 
can also be used to determine the patents broadness, i.e. the size of the 
technological space occupied by the patent. Broader patents are assumed to 
be more valuable since they likely protect larger inventions. The list of relevant 
prior art is often used to determine the technological antecedents of the 
invention, for instance by determining the number of academic sources present 
as an indication of the scientific contribution of the invention (Callaert et al., 
2006; Callaert et al., 2012). 
However, most patent qualifiers are determined by not only observing an 
individual patent but rather by determining the place of the patent in the larger 
technological space drawn by other patents.  For instance, researchers have 
used combinations of patent classes to find novel patents by identifying patents 
that combine a set of technological classes for the first time (e.g. Fleming, 
2007; Verhoeven et al., 2016). 
The most used qualifier stems directly from this idea: forward patent citations. 
This indicator is observed by counting the number of times a patent is 
referenced as relevant prior art by other patents. It is an interesting indicator 
because it represents the relevance attributed to the focal patent by outsiders. 
Moreover, it presents an interesting analogy to scientific citations, even though 
this may be deceiving. (Meyer, 2000).  
Patent citations as the indicator of patent value 
Despite the ever-growing number of patent value indicators, forward patent 
citations (also known simply as patent citations) remain the most often used 
indicator to assess the ‘value’ of a patent. Academic definitions of patent value 
are not very clear, as they can refer to the private value (Gambardella et al., 
2008), the social value (Trajtenberg, 1991; Carpenter et al., 1981), as well as 
to the knowledge value contained in the innovation (e.g. Hall et al., 2005; Jaffe 
et al., 1993, 2000; Macgarvie, 2006; Paci and Usai, 2009; Chen, 2017).  
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Patent citation indicators are widely used due to the availability of the data, and 
because it is the first quality indicator that has been validated as early as 1981 
(Carpenter et al., 1981). Patent citation indicators came into play not only to 
assess the value of a single patent document, but to estimate the inventive 
performance of larger entities such as companies (Hall et al., 2005), 
universities and even countries (Fritch et al., 2014). Patent citation indicators 
gradually replaced simple patent counts, as the former are deemed to reflect 
mere inventive input (i.e. R&D expenditure), rather than inventive output 
(Griliches, 1998).   
The use of patent citations in academic studies has increased drastically in 
recent years (see figure 1). The number of studies that actually uses patent 
citations to observe patent value has been increasing even more (Jaffe and de 
Rassenfosse, 2016). 
 
Figure 1: Yearly number of articles that mention “patent citation” in their title or 
abstract. Data extracted from Web of Science on 17-01-2017. 
 
Currently, patent citations are one of the best validated indicators of patent 
value, owing to the various validation efforts that have been made. These 
validation efforts of the patent citation indicator have been done in various 
ways, employing diverse value constructs as dependent variables and by using 
different sources of patent citation data. Table 1 provides an overview of 
important validation efforts, their methods and the results that were found.  
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Table 1: A selection of scientific works that relate patent citations (in different variations) 
to (various constructs of) patent value.  
Study Source 
Independent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Controls Method N Result 
Carpenter et 
al. (1981) 
USPTO Count 
R&D award 
given 
Year 
2-way 
ANOVA 
202 
31.38 F 
score 
Narin and 
Noma (1987) 
USPTO Count 
Financial 
performance 
N/A Correlation 17 
0.628 
correlation 
Trajtenberg 
(1990) 
USPTO 
Aggregated 
citations 
Innovative value 
on industry level 
N/A Correlation 10 
0.685 
correlation 
Albert et 
al.(1991) 
USPTO Groups 
Relative 
importance in 
industry 
Year/ 
company/ 
technology 
ANOVA 
77 in 8 
groups 
2.01 F score 
(only most 
cited group 
significantly 
different) 
Harhoff et al. 
(1999) 
USPTO Log(count) 
Replacement 
value of patent 
none OLS 192 
6.3% of 
variation 
explained 
Thomas 
(1999) 
USPTO Count 
Renewal 
decision 
ÌPC4, applicant 
type 
Various 
non 
parametric 
analyses 
189,359 
Significant 
correlation 
between 
patent 
citations and 
renewal 
Hall et al. 
(2005) 
USPTO Stock Tobins Q 
R&D, sales, 
year industry 
Non-linear 
model 
12188  
(1983 
with 
patents) 
3.2% of 
variation 
explained 
Hall et al. 
(2007) 
EPO Stock Tobins Q 
R&D, sales, 
year, industry 
Market eq. 
estimation 
1 779 Insignificant 
Bessen 
(2008) 
USPTO Count Renewal value 
Applicant, 
backward 
citations. 
Generality 
Originality 
OLS 48990 
4-7% of 
variation 
explained 
Gambardella 
et al. (2008) 
EPO Log(count) 
Replacement 
value of patent 
Year/country/ 
tech class3 
OLS 8 217 
1.4% of 
variation 
explained 
Chen and 
Chang (2010) 
USPTO 
Average 
citations per 
patent 
Market value of 
pharmaceutical 
company 
Sales, sales 
growth, other 
patent portfolio 
characteristics 
Fixed 
effects 
OLS 
370 
Citation 
indicators 
are highly 
significant 
Arts et 
al.(2013) 
USPTO 
Groups of 
highly cited 
Importance of 
invention 
Year/USPC 
class 
Logistic 
analyses 
74 072 
Citation 
indicators 
are highly 
significant 
 
Table 1 shows that patent citations have a significant correlation with patent 
value: significant results were found in almost all studies reviewed. This is an 
interesting achievement, considering that so many different dependent 
variables, as well as many different estimation methods, were used. 
The first studies presented in the table, show a large explanatory power, but 
used smaller samples and considered fewer control variables. Later and larger 
validation efforts, such as Gambardella et al. (2008) and Hall et al. (2005) 
provide a more nuanced picture: patent citations are still a significant indicator 
of economic value but only explain a small part of the variance in the quality 
indicator, ranging between 2-4% percent.  Moreover, most validation studies 
only pick up significant effects for groups of highly cited patents, as patent 
citations do not appear to perform well for patents with a lower valuation. Patent 
                                                          
3 30 classes of the ISI-INPI-OST classification 
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citations are therefore an indicator with a consistent but mediocre performance. 
This was already observed by Gay and Le Bas (2005), and Gittelman (2008). 
Recently, there has been growing concern that patent citations are not so 
consistent as the validation studies in table 1 indicate. For instance, patent 
citations may be constructed using different sources, and different aggregation 
techniques. This may substantially alter the performance of patent statistics as 
they may be biased regarding the country in which the patent originates 
(Criscuolo, 2006).  
Unfortunately, the challenges of the citation indicator are not confined to 
determining the best method to compute it. It is also important to determine the 
functional form with which the indicator relates to measures of value. This 
functional form can deviate from its simplest linear functional form, due to 
issues such as preferential attachment .in which a patent that is cited more 
gets an even higher chance of being cited (Hung and Wang, 2010). This poses 
then two problems: first, the noise in the indicator is related to relatively random 
occurrences in the time just after the application has been filed; second, this 
introduces a non-linearity in the relation between citations and quality, which is 
problematic if we proxy quality using a linear indicator of patent citations. 
Another reason to deviate from the linear form is the existence of large outliers 
in the distribution. To prevent these outliers from influencing their analysis, 
many scholars opt to use a log-linear functional form. There is, however, very 
little empirical evidence to guide scholars in making the optimal choice.  
Furthermore, not all citations are equal. Some scholars choose to incorporate 
patent citations to family members or equivalents (e.g. Gambardella et al., 
2008). The general assumption is that citations made to the equivalents of a 
patent are of equal stature as those made directly to the patent itself. This 
assumption may appear reasonable for patents that have the same technical 
content, i.e. the DOCDB patent family, but becomes more problematic for 
INPADOC family members that have a looser relation with each other. When 
multiple data sources are used, scholars can also use patent citations from 
other offices than the focal office of the application. Since citation practices 
differ between different patent offices it is not unlikely that a citation from a 
USPTO patent has a different meaning than one of an EPO patent. Moreover, 
it is unclear if having a large impact in the European patent system should be 
equated to having a large impact in the United States patent system.     
Finally, as with academic publications, one must also always be vigilant of self-
citations. In the case of patents, these are generally defined as citations that 
come from patents with the same applicant. They are then not an external 
indication of the impact of the invention but rather an indication that the 
invention is being used in an ongoing project (Narin et al.,1987), or that 
subsequent innovation is built on it (Belenzon, 2012). Given the frequent 
occurrence of measures that correct for the existence of self-citations in 
scientific publication data, it is remarkable that few studies take patent self-
citations into account. 
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The current literature does not provide enough guidance, by means of large 
validation exercises, on the concerns of the preceding paragraphs. This lack 
of validation is detrimental for empirical research, since there may be better 
alternatives to accepted practices such as the use of different patent citation 
indicators and the use of the logarithmic transformation. It is also detrimental 
when it concerns the use of potential newer methods such as using self-
citations, or using family based citations. 
An overview of this thesis 
This doctoral thesis explores the relation between patent citations and patent 
value. Such an analysis is long overdue due to the large use of patent citations 
to approximate (several constructs of) patent value on the one hand, and the 
low correlation between these two concepts on the other. This low correlation 
indicates that more progress can be made to relate patent citations to patent 
value. Moreover, the high number of studies that employ patent citations 
indicates that patent citation research is a general-purpose tool: even small 
advances here can lead to substantial improvements down the line because 
many researchers can profit from them. 
Three major problems can be identified with the current use of patent citations 
in innovation research. The first problem concerns the use of patent family 
based patent indicators. Patent families (i.e. groups of related patents in 
different offices) could be a better representation of inventions than individual 
patents. Therefore, patent citations aggregated at this level could be a major 
improvement in the accuracy of determining patent value. However, there is no 
research available that evaluated the impact of using these family based 
indicators. Therefore, in this thesis two chapters will be devoted to this issue. 
In the first chapter I evaluate the differences that exist between the different 
patent citation indicators. This chapter shows sufficient grounds for concern, 
leading to chapter 4, which consists of an evaluation that determines the best 
patent citation indicator to explain patent value.   
The second problem is that of the functional relation between patent citations 
and patent value. Researchers tend to choose between a linear and a log-
linear functional form but neither of these forms have been validated. 
Therefore, the second chapter presents an evaluation on the benefits of 
choosing a log-linear over a linear functional form to relate patent citations to 
patent value. 
The third identified problem is that it is still not fully clear why patent citations 
should correlate with patent value. Most explanations center around the 
invention that relates to the cited patent, or on the knowledge spillovers that 
patent citations should represent. However, most of these explanations are 
based on a lot of assumptions about the relation between patents and 
innovation. Moreover, they fail to consider the inherent legal character of 
patents and patent citations.  In chapter 3, I therefore advance a new 
mechanism in which patent citations signal potential litigation, license or 
acquisition opportunities (i.e. a ‘market value’) for patent holders. This market 
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value can then be contrasted with the productive value, i.e. the added profits 
of the patent owner’s products due to the monopoly provided by the patent, to 
arrive at a comprehensive and testable framework that explains decisions by 
patent owners.          
In conclusion, this PHD thesis contributes to our understanding of one of the 
most used indicators of innovation, and will (hopefully) facilitate better research 
practices in the future. Below is provided a short overview of the individual 
chapters of this thesis. 
Chapter 1: Patent citations: one size fits all? 
Aggregating patent citations in different ways is found to create substantially 
different indicators, as measured by the correlation structure between them. 
Moreover, they also identify different ‘highly cited patents’. Therefore, favoring 
one way of calculating a citation indicator over another has non-trivial 
consequences and, hence, should be given explicit consideration. 
This chapter has as co-authors: Dennis Verhoeven, Lin Zhang and Bart Van Looy, and was 
published in Scientometrics in 2016 
 
Chapter 2: The log-linear relation between patent citations and 
patent value 
In this chapter, I present the results of an analysis concerning patent citation 
and patent renewal data, thereby advancing a log-linear relation between 
patent citations and patent value. A complementary analysis related to the 
patent portfolios of firms, confirms that modelling the relation between patent 
citations and firm value benefits from the adoption of the log-linear form. 
This chapter is single authored and published in Scientometrics (2017) 
 
Chapter 3: Patent citations and a framework of the productive 
and market value of patents 
This chapter introduces a new possible mechanism to relate patent citations to 
patent value in which patent citations signal potential litigation, license or 
acquisition opportunities (i.e. a market value) for patent holders. This value is 
complementary to the productive value of a patent, which is defined as the 
additional value provided by the patent by protecting the innovative efforts of 
its owner. This value can be estimated by observing self-citations. After 
validating that patent citations measure these constructs, a further analysis 
shows that patent owners tend to value productive value early in the patent life, 
while market value gains more prominence in later stages. 
This chapter has Bart Van Looy as co-author, and parts of this paper were presented at the 
following conferences: DRUID (2015), DRUID (2016) and Academy of Management (2017).  
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Chapter 4: Which patent citation indicator performs best at 
approximating patent value? 
This chapter is a follow up to the results found in chapter 1, and it investigates 
whether using family based patent citation indicators leads to a stronger 
relation between patent citations and patent value. The results are 
unfortunately mixed, with patent family indicators only sometimes 
outperforming the traditional patent citation indicators. Therefore, a deeper 
investigation is performed, which shows that patent citations to patent family 
members are mostly valued less than patent citations directly to the patent 
itself. Moreover, patent citations to certain family members may even indicate 
competition and crowding out effects. These insights then allow for the creation 
of a composite indicator, which outperforms any of the more traditionally used 
indicators. 
This chapter has Bart Van Looy as co-author, and parts of this paper were presented at the 
DRUID (2015) and DRUID (2016) conferences, as part of a composite paper.       
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Abstract 
The number of citations that a patent receives is considered an important 
indicator of the quality and impact of the patent. However, a variety of 
methods and datasources can be used to calculate this measure. This paper 
evaluates similarities between citation indicators that differ in terms of (a) the 
patent office where the focal patent application is filed; (b) whether citations 
from offices other than that of the application office are considered; and (c) 
whether the presence of patent families is taken into account. We analyze the 
correlations between these different indicators and the overlap between 
patents identified as highly cited by the various measures. Our findings reveal 
that the citation indicators obtained differ substantially. Favoring one way of 
calculating a citation indicator over another has non-trivial consequences 
and, hence, should be given explicit consideration. Correcting for patent 
families, especially when using a broader definition (INPADOC), provides the 
most uniform results. 
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Introduction 
 
The number of times that patents are cited by other patents1 can be used to 
complement the mere counting of patented inventions, in order to address the 
differences in value and impact between inventions. The idea of using patent 
citations as an indicator is relatively old and appears to have originated from 
Seidel in 1949 (Karki, 1997). However, the first systematic empirical 
investigations only emerged in the 1980s, with Carpenter et al. (1981) showing 
that patents related to industry awards are cited more frequently. 
A patent can be cited for various reasons: an inventive step, its industrial 
relevance, to qualify novelty, or to provide additional relevant information to 
situate the claims advanced in the patent document. Patents that are cited 
(more often) are considered more important and valuable than patents that are 
not used (or used infrequently) to qualify subsequent technological activity. 
Therefore, one can approximate an individual patent’s importance by the 
number of times it is cited. This argument is empirically supported by the work 
of Albert et al. (1991), Arts et al. (2012), and Gambardella et al. (2008), who 
show that patent citations correlate significantly with the value of the individual 
patent. Likewise, Hall et al. (2005), Narin et al. (1987), Neuhäusler et al. (2011), 
and Trajtenberg (1990) find a positive correlation between firm performance 
and the total number of forward citations that their patents receive, even after 
correcting for firm size. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) have determined 
that patent citations are correlated with other indicators of patent quality, which 
in turn are correlated with variations in firm value. Additionally, Neuhäusler and 
Frietsch (2012), and Frietsch et al. (2014) show that forward patent citation 
counts are strongly correlated with export volume.  
While (front page) patent references are ultimately included by examiners, a 
number of researchers conceive citations as an approximation of knowledge 
flows: (Hall et al., 2005; Jaffe et al., 1993, 2000; MacGarvie, 2006; Paci and 
Usai, 2009). When this perspective is adopted, the number of patent citations 
received indicates the subsequent influence or impact of the knowledge implied 
in the patented invention. 
A major advantage of using patent citations as an indicator of inventive quality, 
either conceived as value or impact, pertains to the relative simplicity of the 
measure: it merely requires counting the number of citations a patent receives. 
Since a large number of patents receive citations2, this measure allows for the 
construction of enriched indicators both on the patent level and on more 
aggregate levels (e.g. firm, industry, country). Currently, patent citations are 
considered an important indicator of the innovative output of companies (e.g. 
Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). They also enable statistics and rankings that 
                                                          
1 Often referred to as patent citations, forward citations or patent citation count. We will use 
these terms throughout this paper. 
2 Up to 88 % of applications score a non-zero citation count on at least one of the citation 
indicators we computed. 
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can be used to determine the innovative performance of countries (e.g. 
Chakrabarti, 1991; Criscuolo and Verspagen, 2008; Neuhäusler and Frietsch, 
2012). 
While these, and related studies, point to the relevance of counting the citations 
received by patent documents, the method of measuring this count is not 
singularly defined. Despite the simple conceptualization of the measure, 
calculating citation indicators involves a number of methodological decisions 
that, in turn, result in a variety of possible citation indicators. The first decision 
is to choose the data source from which to compile patent citations, given that 
patent systems are geographically bounded (e.g. US, EU, Japan, China). Since 
patent citations to one patent system can stem from different geographic areas, 
the second decision is to choose the source from which citations to the focal 
set of patents will be included. Finally, given the possible existence of multiple 
patent documents pertaining to a single invention, a viable option is to treat 
equivalent patent documents as one patent family, which will also affect citation 
counts. Currently, there are three different approaches to these decisions in 
the literature.  
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) set up a data platform 
that contains only patents filed at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO). This data has been available as early as 2001 (Hall et al., 
2001). Additionally, the first analyses on patent citations relied on data from 
USPTO documents (e.g. Carpenter et al., 1981; Narin et al., 1987). The NBER 
database is still widely used as the high number of recent citations to the source 
paper from Hall et al., (2001)3 attests. 
A second set of studies has been conducted using European Patent Office 
(EPO) patent documents. European patent data is noticeably different from 
USPTO data: the EPO patents cover a different geographic area; they are 
heterogeneous in terms of the countries where they are filed; and finally, 
examiners tend to include fewer citations than their colleagues from the 
USPTO. Citation data from EPO patents have been compiled since 2003 
(Webb et al., 2005) resulting in several EPO-based patent citations studies 
(e.g. Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004; Neuhäusler et al., 2011; Schoenmakers and 
Duysters, 2010). Finally, some researchers have opted to go beyond the use 
of data stemming from a single source (patent office) and take into account the 
presence of patent families (hence, considering the equivalents of an invention 
that are present in multiple patent systems when calculating citations). This 
seems especially appropriate in correcting for ‘home biases’ (Criscuolo, 2006) 
and in providing a more encompassing view of the impact of an invention. 
Examples of this approach can be found in the work of Gambardella et al. 
(2008), Graham and Harhoff (2006), Magerman et al. (2011), and Neuhäusler 
and Frietsch (2012). 
 
                                                          
3 This paper needs to be cited when the NBER database is used. 
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When using a patent citation indicator, it is implicitly assumed that different 
calculation methods of this indicator will, in general, yield similar results. 
However, this may not necessarily be the case: patent citations from different 
offices may reflect ‘national’ impact rather than ‘global’ impact. Additionally, 
patent offices focus on their own geographical jurisdiction, which may result in 
a ‘home bias’ when looking at patent citations (Criscuolo, 2006). Finally, offices 
and, hence, examiners’ practices vary in terms of the average number of patent 
citations included: USPTO patent documents display (on average) more 
citations than EPO patent documents. This, in turn, can lead to a situation 
whereby citation indicators—derived from different computational choices—do 
not reflect the same information (Alcácer and Gittelman, 2006). For these 
reasons, it makes sense to assess the effects of the methodological choices 
that researchers face when assessing patent quality through forward citations. 
To the best of our knowledge, no systematic analysis of this kind has been 
performed. This paper will assess the extent to which different methods yield 
(dis)similar results. Hence, we pose our research question as follows: 
Do citation counts that are computed by different methods reveal similar 
information? 
This question can be further refined by adopting the distinction between 
technological improvements of an incremental nature vis-à-vis inventions 
implying a more radical departure from what was previously possible (Baumol, 
2004; Dosi, 1982). Accordingly, researchers have operationalized these 
‘breakthrough’ inventions by identifying patents receiving exceptionally high 
numbers of forward citations (e.g. Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Chakrabarti, 
1991; Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2010). Since citation counts may depend 
on computational choices, it is of particular interest to compare different 
methods with respect to identifying highly cited patents. This leads to the 
following extension of the research question: 
To what extent do different calculation methods affect the identification of 
highly cited patents? 
In the remainder of this paper, we answer our first question using correlation 
and cluster analyses, which compare different methods to calculate citation 
counts of patent applications. To answer the second research question, we 
compute the degree of overlap observed between patents that are identified as 
highly cited by various methods. We start with a systematic discussion of the 
different computational choices, resulting in a set of indicators that this study 
then compares. We then present the empirical findings that we obtained and 
discuss their implications. Overall, our findings signal non-trivial differences 
among the variety of approaches envisaged. 
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Overview of the methodological choices 
when computing patent citation indicators 
 
When counting patent citations, different choices need to be made. These 
choices pertain to the patent system (or protocol) in which the receiving and 
citing patent documents reside. The presence of patent families could also be 
taken into account. In this section, we discuss the general choices that are 
available when counting forward citations.  
The patent office 
The patent system in which the patent resides may affect the way in which the 
patent is cited. This is due to two reasons: the home bias and the inherent 
difference between the patent systems. A home bias, as discussed in the 
introduction, implies that patent examiners cite more prior art present in their 
own jurisdiction4 (Michel and Bettels, 2001). In addition, while patent systems 
are largely similar in terms of subject matter and application procedures, they 
nonetheless differ in several ways. Not only are there observable differences 
in terms of subject matter - between the USPTO and the EPO concerning the 
costs incurred (van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and François, 2009) - but 
practices such as the ‘duty of candor’5 in the US lead to an increase in 
references being included in patent documents, which may have an impact on 
citation-based indicators. 
Selection of the citing patents 
The second choice a researcher faces relates to selecting the patent 
documents that cite the focal patent. One can choose to count either the 
citations that an entity (application or patent family) receives from patents in 
the same patent office (e.g. EPO, USPTO), or to include citations from patents 
present in other patent systems. The reason this distinction is worth 
investigating is twofold.  
First, we note that many researchers restrict themselves to a single source, 
which is often the EPO or the USPTO system, as noted in the introduction. This 
implies they only count citations that patent applications receive from 
documents residing in the chosen system. Therefore, it is interesting to 
examine the effects of this restriction: does restricting citations to the office of 
the focal application significantly alter the results?  
Second, most documents tend, largely, to cite patent documents from within 
their chosen ‘system’, due to the examining process (Michel and Bettels, 2001). 
                                                          
4 We show this later in Table 4. 
5 The ‘duty of candor’ rule requires that applicant and inventors involved in a patent application 
must disclose all known information which may adversely affect the probability of obtaining a 
granted patent. 
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This is not unexpected since patent examiners should have an overriding 
concern for the validity of the application within their own jurisdiction. At the 
same time, when specific procedures are in place, differences can become 
more pronounced. The case of USPTO is apposite in this respect. When 
applying to the USPTO, applicants have a so-called duty of candor, requiring 
them to disclose to the examiner any knowledge of prior art, even if this 
information could lead to the application being disqualified. Patent examiners 
then select from these references and/or add other references deemed 
relevant. However, USPTO examiners are most familiar with USPTO patents. 
In the case of foreign applicants, references stemming from prior art located 
outside the American patent system may be advanced relatively more 
frequently by such applicants. Indeed, Sampat (2004) observed that, in 
approximately 70 % of patents, references to foreign patents are initially 
advanced by the applicant (see Azagra-Caro et al., 2011 in this respect). 
Correcting for patent families 
Patents that represent and/or build on the same invention can also be grouped 
into so-called ‘patent families’. It makes sense to correct citations for the 
presence of families since other patents can make reference to multiple family 
members besides the initial, focal application. If the researcher feels that such 
a citation is just as valuable as a direct citation of the initial patent application, 
then a correction based on the patent family seems appropriate. In general, 
this involves adding citations from family members to the citation count of the 
focal application itself. A case study by Nakamura et al. (2015) shows that 
accounting for patent families can improve analyses based on patent citations.  
There are different definitions of the patent family: in this paper, we consider 
two. Martínez (2011) defines them as the extended patent family (INPADOC)6 
and the examiner’s technology-based family (DOCDB).7 The DOCDB definition 
centers on finding the closest equivalents of a patent document in other offices. 
These documents are usually characterized by having the same priority 
applications.8 The INPADOC definition is less strict and is used to find 
documents protecting the same invention, including documents with a 
somewhat different priority profile (Albrecht et al., 2010). The members of 
INPADOC patent families share priority applications with at least one other 
member of the family. Therefore, patents that are members of the same 
DOCDB patent family should also be members of the same INPADOC patent 
family, since all DOCDB patent family members have the same priority 
                                                          
6 INPADOC is an abbreviation for INternational PAtent DOCumentation, the patent data 
collected but not generated by the EPO (2014). It is also used to denote the extended patent family 
in the EPO PATSTAT databases. 
7 DOCDB is the EPO master documentation database (Martínez, 2011). It is also used to denote 
the examiner’s technology-based patent family in the EPO PATSTAT databases. 
8 Albrecht et al. (2010) define the DOCDB patent family as patent applications that have an equal 
‘priority picture’: this can, under certain circumstances, include the priority application itself. 
Additionally, this family is corrected to include applications that have the same technical content 
but have been excluded due to a ‘discrepancy in the priority picture’ Albrecht et al. (2010: 283). 
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applications.9 However, it is possible that two members of the same family 
share no priority applications. This can occur when they both share a priority 
application with a third member of the family (Lingua, 2005). In this study, both 
family definitions will be adopted and assessed. 
Data and methods 
 
Data used 
We used patent data from the October 2011 version of the EPO PATSTAT 
database. From this data, we extracted indicators for patent applications 
belonging to the EPO and the USPTO, as well as applications that were filed 
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) route. We chose these 
applications for two reasons: first, most research that employs patent citation 
data uses patents from at least one of these three systems (or routes, in the 
case of PCT applications); second, the data provided by these offices from the 
USPTO and the EPO is relatively complete in PATSTAT, compared to other 
offices (also included in PATSTAT). In the remainder of this paper, we shall 
refer to different origins by designating documents as EPO, USPTO and PCT 
patent applications. 
The focal applications for which the indicators were calculated have been 
cleaned to remove - amongst others - duplicates caused by untraceable 
priorities and citations, incorrect conversions of patent numbers, and several 
issues caused by changes in the USPTO system in 2001.10 In addition, we only 
considered USPTO applications that were granted. This is due to the 
observation that USPTO applications that did not lead to a granted patent are 
not completely covered by PATSTAT. 
After the cleaning exercise, we were left with 8,658,272 focal applications from 
which 4,397,304 were applications filed at USPTO, 2,343,707 applications filed 
at EPO and 1,917,261 applications filed via the PCT route. The filing dates 
range from the 2nd of January, 1970, to the 6th of May 2011. However, it 
should be noted that the cleaning activity led to the removal of a large number 
of applications: 3,319,894 applications from the USPTO (mainly because no 
granted equivalent was yet present); 10,567 applications from the EPO, and 
11,335 PCT applications.  
 
 
                                                          
9 This statement holds for the vast majority of patent applications in the EPO PATSTAT database; 
there is a small minority of patents (0.09 % of DOCDB patent families) that do not fulfill this 
criterion due to discrepancies in their priority picture. However, these families do not affect the 
analyses presented later in this paper. 
10 These imply changes in publication types; patent duplicates that occur before and after 2001; 
and applications that are not available before 2001 but partly available thereafter. 
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With regard to the citing applications, we used all patent documents available 
in the 2011 October version of PATSTAT. We excluded only artificial 
applications.11 Therefore, the cited applications involved more cleaning than 
the citing applications. This was carried out because we wanted to keep the 
citation indicators as close as possible to those obtained when using currently 
available databases (notably PATSTAT). Consequently, we did not correct all 
recently known issues that exist in patent citation indicators.12 
The patent citation indicators and their definitions 
We performed four different permutations to calculate our indicators. These are 
based on patent origin, citation origin and a twofold family correction (see 
previous section). We have chosen these permutations in the belief that they 
represent virtually all possible permutations that researchers are likely to 
consider when working with patent citations. In this section, we explain how 
these permutations are used. 
Starting with patent origin, we compare indicators resulting from three different 
data sources: EPO, USPTO, and applications filed through the PCT route. We 
use this data because the vast majority of publications dealing with patent 
citations use indicators drawn from these sources. Next, we distinguish two 
groups of indicators based on the source of the citation. This is done by 
comparing the number of citations received from applications in the office of 
the focal application, and the number of citations that were received 
irrespective of the patent office.13 We will denote those indicators with a 
restricted source of citations by adding ‘within office’ to the indicator name.  
A third permutation deals with applying a correction for citations received by 
family members of the focal application. Each family indicator is, therefore, 
replicated for each patent office. For the patent family definition, we compare 
both the INPADOC and DOCDB definitions. We denote patent citation 
indicators that correct for patent family on the cited side (i.e. an indicator that 
counts all applications that cite the family of the application) by including ‘cited 
family count’ in their name. It is possible that a number of citations originate 
from applications that are part of the same patent family. It can be argued that 
these citations are mere duplicates since the patent is cited twice by the same 
invention. This could then create a bias towards citations received from larger 
patent families, since it is inherent that the size of the family increases the 
probability of two or more of its members citing the same patent.  
 
                                                          
11 These are added to the database to maintain logical links and do not actually represent any 
patent applications. 
12 An example of this pertains to the well-known issue that EPO references other patents by 
referring to the references of their PCT equivalents via a non-patent reference in PATSTAT. This 
has been noted in Harhoff et al. (2003) and Neuhäusler et al. (2011). 
13 In the case of applications filed through the PCT, other applications that followed this route 
were taken. 
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Therefore, as a final, fourth permutation, we correct for this bias by counting 
not the number of patent applications but rather the number of patent families 
that cite the focal family. We denote patent citation indicators that have this 
correction by replacing ‘cited family count’ with ‘full family count’ in their name. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the prefixes for the indicators used in this 
paper. 
Table 1: Simplified table of naming indicators. All indicator names consist of a number of 
prefixes and the word count. This table explains the origins of each prefix. Full definitions for 
each indicator can be found in Table 2. 
Origin of 
the Prefix 
Office of 
the focal 
patent 
Application 
or patent 
family 
If patent 
family 
correction 
only applied 
on the cited 
side 
If patent 
family 
correction 
applied on 
both sides 
If only 
citations 
from the 
office of the 
focal 
application 
are used  
Possible 
prefixes 
EPO 
USPTO 
PCT 
Application 
DOCDB 
INPADOC 
Cited family Full family Within office 
 
This leads to a total of ten different indicators for each office: two indicators 
based on the application, four indicators based on the DOCDB family, and four 
indicators based on the INPADOC family. To keep the list of indicators 
tractable, we provide names and definitions for each indicator in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Indicators and their definitions. These indicators are calculated for focal applications 
at the EPO, USPTO and PCT. 
Patent 
Family 
Patent citation 
indicator 
Definition 
N/A Simple count 
Number of citations a patent application receives from 
all other patent applications, irrespective of their 
publication office.  
N/A Simple in count 
Number of citations a patent application receives from 
patent applications which were published in the same 
office as the focal application. 
DOCDB Family cited 
Number of citations the DOCDB patent family of the 
focal application receives from all other patent 
applications, irrespective of publication office. 
DOCDB Family in cited 
Number of citations the DOCDB patent family of the 
focal application receives from patent applications 
which were published in the same office as the focal 
application.  
DOCDB Full Family count 
Number of citations the DOCDB patent family of the 
focal patent receives from all other DOCDB patent 
families, irrespective of publication office. 
DOCDB 
Full Family in 
count 
Number of citations the DOCDB patent family of the 
focal patent receives from patent applications, which 
were published in the same office as the focal 
application. This count is corrected for DOCDB patent 
family on the citing side. 
INPADOC Family cited 
Number of citations the INPADOC patent family of 
the focal application receives from all other 
applications, irrespective of publication office. 
INPADOC Family in cited 
Number of citations the INPADOC patent family of 
the focal application receives from other patent 
applications which were published in the same office 
as the focal application. 
INPADOC Full Family count 
Number of citations the INPADOC patent family of 
the focal patent receives from all other INPADOC 
patent families, irrespective of publication office. 
INPADOC 
Full Family in 
count 
Number of citations the INPADOC patent family of 
the focal patent receives from other patent 
applications, which were published in the same office 
as the focal application. This count is corrected for 
INPADOC patent family on the citing side. 
 
We computed descriptive statistics for the indicators in Table 2; these are listed 
in Table 3. From these descriptive statistics, we can derive two main 
conclusions. The first is that a large number of patents receive at least one 
citation. However, the rate of patents with a non-zero citation count varies 
considerably, from 25 % (EPO application count within office) to 88 % (USPTO 
INPADOC full family count and USPTO INPADOC cited family count). 
Therefore, the distribution of the citation indicator varies from highly truncated 
to a more continuous spectrum. Second, we observe that the indicators vary 
greatly with respect to their averages and standard deviations. The average of 
the EPO application count within office is about 45 times smaller than the 
average of the USPTO INPADOC cited family count.  
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To perform the correlation analysis of the citation indicators, we use only 
applications that receive at least one citation for any of the indicators 
considered. In practice, this definition translates into selecting only those 
applications that receive at least one citation on the DOCDB level or the 
INPADOC family level. Consequently, other indicators can still have a score of 
0. This was done in order to better assess the information contained in the 
citation counts. Its effects are quite substantial since - depending on the office14 
- a considerable share of patents in our sample have no citations, resulting in 
identical scores (0) for all indicators. The inclusion of applications that are 
never cited would have an inflating effect on the correlation and is, therefore, 
undesirable. 
 
  
                                                          
14 The exact figures are: 21 % for EPO applications, 12 % for USPTO applications, and 37 % for 
PCT applications. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the indicators that were computed for this paper 
Focal 
patent 
source 
Patent 
Family 
Patent citation 
Indicator 
Number of 
observations 
Forward citation statistics 
Average Standard 
deviation 
Median  Nonzero  
EPO N/A Simple count 2,343,707 1.92 5.10 0 38% 
EPO N/A Simple in count 2,343,707 0.57 1.55 0 25% 
EPO DOCDB Family cited 2,343,707 9.03 20.88 3 75% 
EPO DOCDB Family in cited 2,343,707 1.07 2.51 0 41% 
EPO DOCDB Full Family count 2,343,707 7.28 16.21 3 75% 
EPO DOCDB Full Family in count 2,343,707 1.03 2.33 0 41% 
EPO INPADOC Family cited 2,343,707 17.05 84.56 4 79% 
EPO INPADOC Family in cited 2,343,707 1.76 8.37 0 45% 
EPO INPADOC Full Family count 2,343,707 11.21 47.77 3 79% 
EPO INPADOC Full Family in count 2,343,707 1.58 6.43 0 45% 
USPTO N/A Simple count 4,397,304 9.91 18.22 5 82% 
USPTO N/A Simple in count 4,397,304 8.46 16.35 4 79% 
USPTO DOCDB Family cited 4,397,304 13.05 24.66 6 86% 
USPTO DOCDB Family in cited 4,397,304 10.20 21.08 5 82% 
USPTO DOCDB Full Family count 4,397,304 10.85 19.48 6 86% 
USPTO DOCDB Full Family in count 4,397,304 8.97 17.31 4 82% 
USPTO INPADOC Family cited 4,397,304 25.95 129.50 8 88% 
USPTO INPADOC Family in cited 4,397,304 19.73 102.23 6 84% 
USPTO INPADOC Full Family count 4,397,304 16.95 72.90 6 88% 
USPTO INPADOC Full Family in count 4,397,304 13.54 58.94 5 84% 
PCT N/A Simple count 1,917,261 1.90 5.63 0 41% 
PCT N/A Simple in count 1,917,261 0.58 1.55 0 27% 
PCT DOCDB Family cited 1,917,261 5.73 16.38 1 59% 
PCT DOCDB Family in cited 1,917,261 1.10 2.49 0 41% 
PCT DOCDB Full Family count 1,917,261 4.63 12.73 1 59% 
PCT DOCDB Full Family in count 1,917,261 1.09 2.46 0 41% 
PCT INPADOC Family cited 1,917,261 13.22 87.36 2 63% 
PCT INPADOC Family in cited 1,917,261 2.46 15.88 0 46% 
PCT INPADOC Full Family count 1,917,261 8.63 50.28 1 63% 
PCT INPADOC Full Family in count 1,917,261 2.31 14.11 0 46% 
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The distribution of citations 
To better understand the behavior of the patent citation indicators, we compiled 
an overview of the origin and destination of citations, shown in Table 4. This 
table reveals that the USPTO is the main supplier of citations in the patent 
system. Not only does the vast majority of citations to USPTO entities come 
from the USPTO itself, but the USPTO also supplies most citations to other 
documents. There are more USPTO citations to EPO documents than EPO 
citations to USPTO documents. A similar pattern emerges for PCT documents.  
Correcting for patent family remedies this to some extent at the same time, 
USPTO documents remain dominant since they account for the most citations 
overall. In the case of the EPO, INPADOC families with an EPO member 
receive 6.4 times more citations from USPTO documents than from EPO 
documents. 
Note that the large majority of all citations stem from either USPTO, EPO or 
PCT documents; very few citations come from other offices such as the 
Japanese Patent Office (JPO) or the Chinese Patent Office (SIPO). It is 
interesting to observe that, from the remaining citations, the vast majority are 
from applications at the national level of the EPO. These citations may indeed 
represent a duplication of EPO patents, or they may be applications that were 
filed at only a single national office instead of the EPO, due to the costs of the 
EPO process - as noted by van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and François 
(2009). 
Table 4: Origin and destination of citations. Citations are calculated as originating from 
applications from any office in the PATSTAT database to applications at the EPO, USPTO and 
PCT. Family correction implies that the citation is made to the patent family of applications at 
the EPO,USPTO and PCT. The citations are expressed in percentages of all citations to the 
(patent family of) applications at the focal office. 
 
Family 
Correction 
Focal 
office 
EPO 
US 
PTO 
PCT 
EPO 
(National 
office)15 
Other Total 
Total 
citations 
received 
None EPO 
31.35% 36.14% 19.84% 12.31% 0.36% 
100% 
4,501,136 
None USPT
O 
4.22% 85.28% 6.62% 3.74% 0.15% 
100% 
43,566,925 
None PCT 
13.30% 31.33% 24.07% 30.72% 0.58% 
100% 
3,635,340 
DOCDB  
family 
EPO 
12.03% 64.16% 14.58% 8.85% 0.39% 
100% 
21,160,972 
DOCDB  
family 
USPT
O 
6.45% 78.18% 8.54% 6.61% 0.22% 
100% 
57,379,697 
DOCDB  
family 
PCT 
8.10% 52.14% 16.06% 23.40% 0.30% 
100% 
10,994,350 
INPADOC 
family 
EPO 
10.33% 66.25% 15.17% 7.94% 0.31% 
100% 
39,950,651 
INPADOC 
family 
USPT
O 
6.99% 76.09% 10.69% 6.01% 0.22% 
100% 
114,120,819 
INPADOC 
family 
PCT 
7.31% 56.65% 15.93% 19.86% 0.25% 
100% 
25,338,999 
                                                          
15 Patent offices that are located in the geographical area that is covered by the EPO.  
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Patent families 
In this paper, we deploy two different family definitions: the DOCDB and the 
INPADOC definitions. We have compiled some descriptive statistics to 
understand the effects of correcting for patent family. These statistics are 
shown in Table 5. Here, we can see that a large number of patent families exist 
in the database. Note that, even though these families need at least one EPO, 
USPTO or PCT application, they may also have applications from other offices. 
From these patent families, only between 21 and 35 % consist of a single 
patent application. Most patent families have at least two or more members. 
Finally, we see that a large number of patent families are equal for either family 
definition, even after excluding singleton families, which are equal by definition. 
Table 5: Statistics of INPADOC and DOCDB families in our applications 
Family Number of families 
% 
Singletons16 
Average 
number of 
members 
Overlap 
between 
both family 
definitions 
% 
Overlap17 
% 
Overlap18 
INPADOC 5,309,452 21% 2.64 4,179,052 79% 73% 
DOCDB 6,017,825 35% 2.01 4,179,052 69% 63% 
 
 
  
                                                          
16 Families with only one member 
17 Including singletons 
18 Excluding singletons 
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Results of the correlation analysis 
 
The effects of expanding the sources of citing patents 
and correcting for patent family 
We first determined the effect of correcting for family and citation origin for each 
office separately. For this purpose, we compared the ‘application count within 
office’ indicator with all other indicators in the office of the focal application. 
This was done for two reasons: first, the indicator is the most basic (i.e. it is 
uncorrected for family and only uses citations from its own office); second, it is 
the indicator that is most widely used - the NBER citation indicator is the 
USPTO ‘application count within office’, while the aforementioned scholars who 
utilize EPO data often use the EPO ‘application count within office’. The results 
of this exercise are presented in Table 6. The full correlation table can be found 
in ‘‘Appendix 1’’. 
Table 6: Correlation with the simple in count indicator for each office.  
All correlations are significant at the 0.001 level. 
Family Compared indicator EPO USPTO PCT 
N/A Simple count 0.79 0.99 0.77 
N/A Simple in count 1 1 1 
DOCDB Family cited 0.34 0.84 0.35 
DOCDB Family in cited 0.64 0.86 0.72 
DOCDB Full family 0.33 0.84 0.34 
DOCDB Full family in  0.65 0.86 0.72 
INPADOC Family cited 0.09 0.23 0.14 
INPADOC Family in cited 0.20 0.25 0.19 
INPADOC Full family 0.12 0.25 0.16 
INPADOC Full family in  0.26 0.28 0.22 
 
Table 6 shows that there is a substantial effect of citation origin (i.e. all citations 
vs. only those from within the office) on the patent citation indicators. This can 
be seen when inspecting the correlation of the ‘application count within office’ 
indicator with the ‘application count indicator’. This effect is more pronounced 
for EPO and PCT indicators, with correlations of 0.77–0.79, than for their 
USPTO equivalent, which is less sensitive in this respect (see the correlation 
of 0.99). Given the citation information presented in Table 4, this should come 
as no surprise. 
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Correcting for patent family introduces considerable differences. The effects of 
this correction are more outspoken in the EPO and PCT systems than in the 
USPTO system: where the USPTO ‘application count within office’ has a 
correlation of 0.84 with the DOCDB family-corrected indicator, the equivalent 
correlations for EPO and PCT are situated around 0.33. Correcting for the 
INPADOC patent family has an even stronger effect than correcting for the 
DOCDB patent family. Finally, we see that correcting for patent family on the 
citing side has a relatively small effect. The values in Table 6 are almost equal 
for the cited family count and the full family count indicators. The tables in 
‘‘Appendix 1’’ confirm this conclusion: the correlations between cited family 
count and full family count indicators are very close to 1 for both the DOCDB 
and the INPADOC family definitions. 
 
The effect of using different sources (for patent 
documents present in all three systems) 
For an inter-office comparison, we calculated the correlation for DOCDB patent 
families from which applications were filed at the EPO, the USPTO, and 
through the PCT route. This was done because the DOCDB family is based on 
the technical equivalence of the documents. Therefore, we can assume that 
the different elements in the DOCDB family are documents describing the 
exact same invention in different jurisdictions. Because of this equivalence, a 
direct comparison focusing on the source document is feasible. 
Again, we considered only patents that had at least one citation in their largest 
(i.e. INPADOC) family. However, we found that all DOCDB patent families with 
applications in all three offices fulfilled this criterion. Therefore, this restriction 
did not change the analysis. These considerations led to the comparison of 
citation indicators for 388,512 DOCDB families. The full correlation matrix is 
presented in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. Here, we extracted the correlations that compare 
the different sources of patent data. These are listed in Table 7. 
Table 7: Correlations between equal indicators derived from different sources. These 
correlations were calculated on the basis of 388,512 DOCDB families and are significant at the 
0.001 level. 
 
Simple 
count 
Simple in 
count 
DOCDB INPADOC 
Famil
y 
Cited 
Family In 
cited 
Full 
Famil
y  
Full 
Famil
y  in 
Famil
y 
Cited 
Famil
y In 
cited 
Full 
Famil
y 
Full 
Famil
y 
in 
EPO-
USPTO 
0.12 0.09 1 0.71 1 0.75 1.00 0.80 1.00 0.83 
EPO- 
PCT 
0.11 0.04 1 0.91 1 0.91 1.00 0.91 1.00 0.91 
USPTO-
PCT 
0.30 0.20 1 0.78 1 0.81 1.00 0.93 1.00 0.95 
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Table 7 shows that correlations for the basic indicators obtained for the same 
family but derived from relying on different offices are very low. The correlation 
between the EPO ‘application count within office’ and the USPTO ‘application 
count within office’ is only 0.09. Using citations from outside the office of the 
focal application (‘application count’) remedies this slightly by raising the 
correlation to levels ranging from 0.11 to 0.30.  
Correlations observed when correcting for the DOCDB and INPADOC families 
are considerably higher. This is naturally the case for the DOCDB cited family 
count and the DOCDB full family count since the applications are all part of the 
same family. The INPADOC cited family count and the INPADOC full family 
count indicators also have coefficients of 1, as shown in Table 7. This is due to 
the fact that applications that are members of the same DOCDB family are also 
members of the same INPADOC family. Interestingly, correcting for patent 
family increases compatibility, even when only citations from the office of the 
focal application are counted. Therefore, even when there is only application 
data from one patent office, correcting for the patent family of the focal 
applications is an interesting method for increasing compatibility with data from 
other patent offices. 
Clustering the patent citation indicators 
We performed a cluster analysis on the patent citation indicators by using the 
correlation table listed in ‘‘Appendix 2’’, i.e. pertaining to patent documents that 
have equivalents in all different systems under study. To define clusters, we 
performed a divisive cluster analysis, based on factor analysis (see ‘‘Appendix 
3’’ for a technical description). Since the analysis compares patent applications 
with the counterparts of their DOCDB patent family, the indicators ‘DOCDB 
cited family count’ and the ‘DOCDB full family count’ give equal values 
regardless of the office of the focal application. Therefore, they are replaced by 
the general indicator. This is also carried out for the corresponding INPADOC 
family indicators since DOCDB family members are also part of the same 
INPADOC family: the INPADOC family is by definition larger. Including all 
INPADOC indicators would thus be redundant. The resulting indicators are 
denoted by the ‘ALL’ notation. The identified clusters are reported in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Result of clustering the patent citation indicators. 
Source Family Indicator Cluster 
R2 within 
cluster 
R2 closest 
Cluster 
ALL INPADOC CITED INPADOC 0.9636 0.3586 
ALL INPADOC FULL INPADOC 0.9758 0.3918 
EPO INPADOC Family in cited INPADOC 0.789 0.7103 
EPO INPADOC Full Family in count INPADOC 0.7857 0.7261 
PCT INPADOC Family in cited INPADOC 0.9923 0.4306 
PCT INPADOC Full Family in count INPADOC 0.9948 0.4448 
USPTO INPADOC Family in cited INPADOC 0.9352 0.3164 
USPTO INPADOC Full Family in count INPADOC 0.9545 0.3606 
EPO DOCDB Family in cited DOCDB B 0.9795 0.4549 
EPO DOCDB Full Family in count DOCDB B 0.9816 0.4747 
PCT DOCDB Family in cited DOCDB B 0.9808 0.599 
PCT DOCDB Full Family in count DOCDB B 0.9805 0.602 
PCT N/A Simple count PCT 0.9486 0.203 
PCT N/A Simple in count PCT 0.9486 0.2062 
USPTO N/A Simple count USPTO 0.9998 0.2108 
USPTO N/A Simple in count USPTO 0.9998 0.2041 
EPO N/A Simple count EPO 0.9536 0.2817 
EPO N/A Simple in count EPO 0.9536 0.2909 
ALL DOCDB CITED DOCDB A 0.9891 0.6409 
ALL DOCDB FULL DOCDB A 0.9804 0.6734 
USPTO DOCDB Family in cited DOCDB A 0.9737 0.5847 
USPTO DOCDB Full Family in count DOCDB A 0.993 0.5187 
 
We have created a graphical depiction of the variables and their relation to one 
another using multidimensional scaling. The result is shown in Fig. 1. The 
cluster analysis shows that citation indicators that are from different offices (the 
‘application count’ indicators) are significantly different: the corresponding 
USPTO, EPO and PCT indicators are all grouped into different clusters. This 
indicates that, when using indicators from USPTO, EPO and PCT sources only, 
one is relying on different information.  
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Correcting for patent family substantially increases compatibility. The 
indicators that are based on the DOCDB family are grouped into only two 
clusters (clusters DOCDB A and DOCDB B) that appear close to each other 
(see Fig. 1). It is interesting to note that the USPTO DOCDB family indicators 
are clustered together with the overall family indicators. This is understandable 
given the large number of citations that originate from the USPTO system. 
Finally, we see that the INPADOC indicators are all grouped together in one 
cluster (cluster INPADOC). Therefore, we conclude that correcting for the 
INPADOC patent family results in more similar information across patent 
systems. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Depiction of the differences between citation indicators on a 2D plane by 
multidimensional scaling. The dissimilarity between indicators, as defined by 1-R2, is 
represented by the distance between them. Cluster numbers are related to clusters as described 
in Table 7. 
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Robustness tests 
We performed several robustness tests to verify the results of the correlation 
analysis under different assumptions and settings. These tests were performed 
both on the level of the individual sources of the applications (EPO, USPTO 
and PCT) and the combined set, unless otherwise indicated. 
Using a full factor analysis 
We performed a full factor analysis on the indicators. We used the principal 
component method and rotated the solution using the Quartimax algorithm, 
since this is the most capable method of assigning indicators to different 
factors. This led to five factors with an eigenvalue larger than 1. We grouped 
indicators that had loadings higher than 0.5. on the same factor. This analysis 
resulted in similar conclusions to the cluster analysis: all indicators that relate 
to patent applications are grouped according to office. However, the family 
indicators were grouped differently: there was one factor that had all family 
related indicators, with the exception of the EPO and the PCT DOCDB 
indicators, which were grouped separately. Thus, a factor analysis groups 
clusters 1 and 6. We can, therefore, derive the same conclusions as in the 
cluster analysis: patent citation indicators that relate to equal applications are 
different from each other, especially when they are related to applications from 
different patent offices. Family indicators are more similar, but the difference 
between DOCDB and INPADOC indicators remains present. 
Inclusion of uncited applications 
In our main analysis, we excluded patent applications that had zero citations 
on any indicator. This was carried out in order to improve the precision of the 
analysis. When we included the uncited applications, we found that the 
correlation of the different indicators increased slightly. However, this increase 
was small and equally distributed across the different correlation coefficients 
between the citation indicators. Consequently, we conclude that the inclusion 
of applications with zero citations does not substantially change the 
conclusions of the preceding section. 
Using only granted applications 
The main analysis of the paper pooled different kinds of patent application. It 
could be that the citation patterns of applications leading to a grant are different 
from those of other applications. Since granted patent applications are more 
valuable, researchers could opt to use only those in their analysis. Hence, it is 
important to determine if our results hold when only considering granted 
applications.  
Patent applications that follow the PCT route cannot be granted (as PCT 
documents), since the WO is not a patent office with a territory over which it 
exercises patent grants. Since we only used granted patent applications from 
the USPTO, the USPTO indicators will not be affected by this step. Therefore, 
the analysis will only affect the EPO patent applications. For the overall 
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analysis, we included the PCT and USPTO documents to derive a close 
comparison with the main analysis.  
Using only granted applications from the EPO does not substantially change 
the correlation between the different indicators. Correlations between 
indicators on EPO and USPTO documents varied little with the main analysis. 
This then resulted in the same clusters being returned by the cluster analysis. 
Nor were the inter-office correlations substantially different. Thus, we conclude 
that our findings remain similar when including only granted applications.  
Using log citations instead of normal citations 
Many researchers include not the raw patent citation count but rather the 
logarithm of the citation count to account for the skewed distribution of patent 
citations. Therefore, we have also computed the indicators using the following 
transformation: 
𝐼∗ = ln(𝐼 + 1)  
whereby 𝐼 is any of our citation indicators and 𝐼∗  is its transformed form. We 
have computed correlations between all transformed indicators. This 
transformation yields indicators that are more similar to each other. This is 
because the difference between low and extremely high scores is diminished. 
Hence, all correlations are substantially improved. This leads the clustering 
algorithm to select fewer groups. In particular, all DOCDB indicators are now 
grouped together. All other groups are equal. So, we conclude that, even 
though the log transformation improves the correlations, this improvement is 
not sufficient to remove any significant differences that we found in the main 
analysis. 
Using only patent data from before 2000 
The main analysis was performed on patent data that cover the time period 
1980–2011. Consequently, there are numerous patents that have not yet 
received (all of their) citations. Since different patent systems may well 
experience different time lags, this could create a difference in citation data that 
is due to these time lags, as opposed to an inherent difference in information. 
In order to control for a potential time lag effect, we repeated the correlation 
analysis using only patent applications that were filed before 2000.  
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For our complete analysis, we only compared patent families from which at 
least one patent in each office had a filing date before 2000. We find that 
indicators for patents filed before 2000 behave in a similar, albeit not identical, 
way to the main analysis. The major difference is that the correlations between 
family-based indicators, most notably those based on INPADOC, increase 
substantially. This was most pronounced when we computed the full correlation 
matrix over the three sources of patent data. Because of this, the cluster 
solution was altered with a reduced number of clusters: one large cluster with 
all family based indicators, thereby combining clusters INPADOC, DOCDB A 
and DOCDB B from the main analysis; and three small clusters with application 
counts from each office, equal to clusters EPO, USPTO and PCT from the main 
analysis. Consequently, we can conclude that family-based indicators are more 
similar in this sample, while non-family-based indicators remain very different 
from each other and from the family-based indicators. 
 
Highly cited patents 
 
Set-up of the analysis 
We identified the groups of highly cited patents according to two different 
criteria: the top 100 patents in terms of citations received, and patents that 
score more than 5 standard deviations (SD) above the mean number of 
citations of all patents under study.19 Highly cited patents were identified, 
reflecting the unit of analysis of the respective indicators (patent application, 
DOCDB patent family, INPADOC patent family). 
The effects of expanding the sources of citing patents 
and correcting for patent family 
The main observation from the analysis is that commonality between sets of 
highly cited patents, identified via different indicators, is rather low. This is the 
case, whether one considers the top 100 cited patents, or whether one 
considers patents receiving more than 5 standard deviations of citations than 
average.  
Table 9 reports the results obtained in calculating how many identical patent 
applications are identified when adopting different choices with respect to 
calculating citations. The reference group consists each time of the patent 
documents identified by applying the ‘application count within office’ indicator: 
citations to the focal document within the patent system of the focal document. 
 
                                                          
19 The size of the groups of highly cited patents identified by the 5 SD outlier criterion varies 
between 765 and 35,145 depending on the source office and indicator specification. 
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Table 9: Qualified communalities between the simple in count indicator and other 
indicators from the same office. Fractions are computed as the amount of overlap divided by 
the maximum amount of possible overlap. Top 100 refers to the 100 most cited patents, and 5 
sd. refers to patents present in the 5 standard deviation outlier of the distribution. 
Family Indicator 
EPO USPTO PCT 
Top 100 5 sd. Top 100 5 sd. Top 100 5 sd. 
N/A Simple count 0.31 0.52 0.89 0.94 0.37 0.52 
N/A Simple in count 1 1 1 1 1 1 
DOCDB Family cited 0.04 0.18 0.76 0.83 0.06 0.16 
DOCDB Family in cited 0.31 0.55 0.81 0.89 0.40 0.54 
DOCDB Full family 0.05 0.18 0.75 0.82 0.06 0.15 
DOCDB Full family in 0.28 0.55 0.80 1.00 0.38 0.54 
INPADOC Family cited 0.04 0.18 0.30 0.72 0.07 0.19 
INPADOC Family in cited 0.20 0.45 0.35 0.78 0.18 0.41 
INPADOC Full family 0.04 0.18 0.28 0.66 0.06 0.17 
INPADOC Full family in 0.20 0.45 0.29 0.71 0.16 0.40 
 
From Table 9, we can derive several conclusions. First, we observe that 5 
standard deviation outliers of indicators are in general more similar than the 
top 100 scores. Second, the table resembles the pattern in Table 8: we observe 
low levels of overlap for EPO and PCT documents while, for USPTO 
documents, the overlap is consistently higher. Third, we again observe that 
both the correction for citation origin and the correction for family have a 
considerable effect on the indicators. In the case of the EPO and the PCT, we 
find that the patents identified in the top 100 of the ‘application count within 
office’ indicator and those identified by the family corrected indicators hardly 
overlap.  
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Even though the commonality improves for the 5 SD outlier and for the USPTO 
indicators, we conclude that the differences are non-trivial. Differences are 
larger for INPADOC than for DOCDB indicators. 
The effect of using different sources of patent data 
In this analysis, we focused on comparing similar indicators from each office 
with each other. Table 10 presents the result of this analysis. It is important to 
note that there are two mechanisms by which a highly cited patent does not 
appear in another patent system. It could be because its family members did 
not receive a sufficient number of citations, or because it did not have family 
members present in the other patent system.  
In concordance with the results from the previous analysis, we see that using 
the top 100 rank criterion results in a similar overlap pattern as using the 5 SD 
outlier criterion. However, the qualified overlap scores are generally lower 
when using the top 100 rank criterion. Overlaps between indicators that score 
applications on the citations they receive from within their own offices are very 
low. This is only slightly improved when citations from other offices are included 
(moving from ‘application count within office’ to ‘application count’ yields, at 
best, an increase of 3 % for the top 100).  
The use of citation indicators that correct for families drastically increases 
overlap scores between offices. While the use of DOCDB corrected indicators 
results in qualified overlaps of around 50 %, the highest overlap scores are 
obtained when INPADOC family corrected citation indicators, which use all 
citations, are used. 
Table 10: Comparison between indicators at different offices. Commonality measures were 
computed by dividing the number of common members of highly cited groups by the maximum 
number of common members possible. 
Family Indicator USPTO – EPO USPTO – PCT EPO - PCT 
  
Top 
100 
5 sd. 
outlier 
Top 
100 
5 sd. 
outlier 
Top 
100 
5 sd. 
outlier 
N/A 
Simple 
count 
0.02 0.09 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.02 
N/A 
Simple in 
count 
0.02 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.01 
DOCDB 
Family 
cited 
0.48 0.72 0.34 0.49 0.57 0.54 
DOCDB 
Family in 
cited 
0.08 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.19 
DOCDB Full family 0.45 0.70 0.30 0.46 0.56 0.53 
DOCDB 
Full family 
in 
0.09 0.24 0.16 0.24 0.14 0.19 
INPADOC 
Family 
cited 
0.88 0.99 0.78 0.92 0.84 0.74 
INPADOC 
Family in 
cited 
0.40 0.37 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.33 
INPADOC Full family 0.85 0.99 0.76 0.87 0.85 0.73 
INPADOC 
Full family 
in 
0.35 0.36 0.43 0.40 0.44 0.34 
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Conclusion 
 
We set out to determine the (dis)similarity between different citation indicators. 
We achieved this by computing a set of commonly and less commonly used 
citation indicators and comparing them with one another. We relied on 
correlation and cluster analysis to assess (dis)similarities; in addition, we 
examined which highly cited patents were identified by different indicators. The 
results showed substantial dissimilarities between the various patent citation 
indicators. 
The correlation and cluster analysis demonstrated that there are large 
differences in the information revealed by patent citations, depending on which 
indicator is used. First, a significant effect was present when comparing 
indicators that use citation information from all offices versus indicators that 
only use ‘within office’ citations. Second, indicators computed over different 
entities (patent application, DOCDB patent family, INPADOC patent family) 
display only modest levels of commonality. Finally, these effects are most 
pronounced for EPO and PCT patents. The USPTO indicators tend to be more 
similar, except when the INPADOC family is corrected for. 
Cluster analysis revealed distinctive clusters for each office. Most family 
corrected indicators, whether they encompass all citations or not, were 
grouped in clusters reflecting the family definition. Only the indicators based on 
the DOCDB patent family definition were split into two clusters. Therefore, we 
conclude that patent citation indicators based on families are more comparable 
to each other, even when information from only one office is used. This 
conclusion remains robust under all tests that were performed. 
The analysis of highly cited patents provides a similar picture. Correction for 
the family and the citation origin results in significant effects and leads to larger 
commonality between different indicators. Commonality is higher when 
adhering to the indicator reflecting ‘5 standard deviation’ outliers compared to 
relying on the indicator consisting of the 100 most cited patents. The only 
indicator resulting in almost complete congruence pertains to the INPADOC 
corrected indicators.  
Since this paper has established clear differences between different citation 
indicators, it may inspire additional research on the underlying drivers of these 
differences. Future efforts should be made to examine the origins of these 
differences. Are they fully explained by different practices in the different offices 
or do they indicate a separated impact from the regions over which these 
offices grant patents? A similar effort should be focused on the family 
indicators. While it appears that they give unbiased information of the global 
impact of an innovation, this may not be completely true: family indicators 
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correlate more with USPTO indicators than with their EPO or PCT 
counterparts. We suggest that this could be due to the higher number of 
citations that are present in the USPTO system, thus biasing the family 
indicators towards the greater importance of citation activity in the US. 
Therefore, efforts could be undertaken to examine the magnitude of this 
possible bias and, if necessary, derive an unbiased global patent citation 
indicator. Finally, the INPADOC patent family definition could be further 
investigated: while the DOCDB definition is clear and often used, this is not the 
case for the INPADOC patent family definition.  
The observation that different indicators display low levels of commonality 
implies that choices with respect to citation indicators are non-trivial. As a 
result, we suggest researchers become more aware and explicit in deciding 
which citation indicator to use. This choice should ultimately be guided by the 
underlying research question. At the same time, our results may also inspire 
further research into assessing the consistency of results obtained when 
deploying different citation indicators. If the intention is to strive for an indicator 
that is not sensitive to design choices, the INPADOC corrected indicator is 
clearly the prime candidate since it implies commonality approaching 100 %. 
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Appendix 1: Correlation between indicators 
from the same office 
 
Table 11: Correlation of indicators of patents filed at the EPO. 
 
Family Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 N/A Simple count 1          
2 N/A 
Simple in 
count 
0.79 1         
3 DOCDB Family cited 0.40 0.34 1        
4 DOCDB 
Family in 
cited 
0.51 0.64 0.66 1       
5 DOCDB Full family 0.39 0.33 0.99 0.65 1      
6 DOCDB Full family in  0.52 0.65 0.66 0.99 0.65 1     
7 INPADOC Family cited 0.12 0.09 0.36 0.26 0.35 0.25 1    
8 INPADOC 
Family in 
cited 
0.17 0.20 0.28 0.39 0.28 0.38 0.88 1   
9 INPADOC Full family 0.14 0.12 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.30 0.91 0.77 1  
10 INPADOC Full family in  0.23 0.26 0.35 0.47 0.35 0.48 0.81 0.89 0.87 1 
 
 
Table 12: Correlation of indicators of patents filed at the USPTO 
 
Family Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 N/A Simple count 1          
2 N/A 
Simple in 
count 
0.99 1         
3 DOCDB Family cited 0.85 0.84 1        
4 DOCDB 
Family in 
cited 
0.85 0.86 0.99 1       
5 DOCDB Full family 0.84 0.84 0.99 0.98 1      
6 DOCDB Full family in  0.85 0.86 0.98 0.99 0.99 1     
7 INPADOC Family cited 0.23 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.30 1    
8 INPADOC 
Family in 
cited 
0.25 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.99 1   
9 INPADOC Full family 0.25 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.95 0.94 1  
10 INPADOC Full family in  0.27 0.28 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.94 0.95 0.99 1 
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Table 13: Correlation of indicators of patents filed at the PCT 
 
Family Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 
N/A Simple count 1          
2 
N/A 
Simple in 
count 
0.77 1         
3 
DOCDB Family cited 0.52 0.35 1        
4 
DOCDB 
Family in 
cited 
0.61 0.72 0.69 1       
5 
DOCDB Full family 0.49 0.34 0.99 0.68 1      
6 
DOCDB Full family in  0.61 0.72 0.69 1.00 0.68 1     
7 
INPADOC Family cited 0.21 0.14 0.29 0.23 0.29 0.23 1    
8 
INPADOC 
Family in 
cited 
0.20 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.20 0.28 0.88 1   
9 
INPADOC Full family 0.22 0.16 0.32 0.26 0.32 0.26 0.93 0.82 1  
10 
INPADOC Full family in 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.23 0.31 0.84 0.94 0.88 1 
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Appendix 2: Correlation between indicators 
from different offices 
 
Table 14: Correlation coefficients of indicators pertaining to patents filed both at the EPO 
(columns) and the USPTO (rows) 
 Family Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 N/A Simple count 0.12 0.09 0.27 0.28 0.17 0.18 
2 N/A Simple in count 0.12 0.09 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.18 
3 DOCDB Family in cited 0.11 0.06 0.71 0.72 0.81 0.82 
4 DOCDB Full Family in count 0.12 0.07 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.83 
5 INPADOC Family in cited 0.01 0.00 0.39 0.40 0.80 0.80 
6 INPADOC Full Family in count 0.02 0.00 0.43 0.45 0.82 0.83 
 
 
Table 15: Correlation coefficients of indicators pertaining to patents filed both at the EPO 
(columns) and the PCT (rows) 
 Family Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 N/A Simple count 0.11 0.07 0.47 0.47 0.33 0.33 
2 N/A Simple in count 0.07 0.04 0.34 0.33 0.22 0.22 
3 DOCDB Family in cited 0.16 0.10 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.82 
4 DOCDB Full Family in count 0.16 0.10 0.91 0.91 0.82 0.82 
5 INPADOC Family in cited 0.03 0.01 0.54 0.55 0.91 0.91 
6 INPADOC Full Family in count 0.04 0.01 0.55 0.56 0.92 0.91 
 
Table 16: Correlation coefficients of indicators pertaining to patents filed both at the 
USPTO (columns) and the PCT (rows) 
 Family Indicator 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 N/A Simple count 0.30 0.29 0.37 0.38 0.11 0.13 
2 N/A Simple in count 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.06 
3 DOCDB Family in cited 0.31 0.30 0.78 0.81 0.48 0.52 
4 DOCDB Full Family in count 0.31 0.30 0.78 0.81 0.48 0.52 
5 INPADOC Family in cited 0.10 0.10 0.78 0.76 0.93 0.94 
6 INPADOC Full Family in count 0.10 0.11 0.79 0.78 0.94 0.95 
 
  
60 
 
Appendix 3: Variable cluster method 
 
This appendix explains the cluster algorithm that was used to cluster indicators. 
This method is an implementation of the VARCLUS procedure in the SAS 
software package (SAS Institute, 2008). What follows are excerpts from the 
SAS manual (SAS Institute, 2008: 7461–7463) explaining the logic of the 
underlying procedure. Our specific settings are detailed in italics. Options not 
related to our analysis have been omitted. 
‘The VARCLUS procedure divides a set of numeric variables into disjoint or 
hierarchical clusters. Associated with each cluster is a linear combination of 
the variables in the cluster. The linear combination used here consists of the 
first principal component. (…) The first principal component is a weighted 
average of the variables that explains as much variance as possible. 
(…) The VARCLUS procedure tries to maximize the variance that is explained 
by the cluster components, summed over all the clusters. The cluster 
components are oblique, not orthogonal, even when the cluster components 
are first principal components. In an ordinary principal component analysis, all 
components are computed from the same variables, and the first principal 
component is orthogonal to the second principal component and to every other 
principal component. In the VARCLUS procedure, each cluster component is 
computed from a different set of variables than all the other cluster 
components. The first principal component of one cluster might be correlated 
with the first principal component of another cluster. Hence, the VARCLUS 
algorithm is a type of oblique component analysis. 
We use the correlation matrices as input for the principal component analysis 
used in the VARCLUS procedure (…) The VARCLUS algorithm is both divisive 
and iterative. By default, the VARCLUS procedure begins with all variables in 
a single cluster. It then repeats the following steps: 
1. A cluster is chosen for splitting. Depending on (…) the largest eigenvalue 
associated with the second principal component (…) 
2. The chosen cluster is split into two clusters by finding the first two principal 
components, performing an orthoblique rotation (raw quartimax rotation on the 
eigenvectors; Harris and Kaiser 1964), and assigning each variable to the 
rotated component with which it has the higher squared correlation. 
3. Variables are iteratively reassigned to clusters to try to maximize the 
variance accounted for by the cluster components.  
(…) VARCLUS stops splitting when every cluster has only one eigenvalue 
greater than one, thus satisfying the most popular criterion for determining the 
sufficiency of a single underlying dimension.’ 
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Introduction 
 
Forward patent citations are a ubiquitous indicator of the impact and value of 
patents and, by extension, patent portfolios. Forward citations - i.e. the number 
of times a patent is deemed relevant prior art by the examiners and/or 
applicants of later patents - have obtained this position in part due to the 
extensive validation of this indicator. Validation efforts progressed from early 
small-scale studies (Carpenter et al., 1981; Trajtenberg, 1990) to larger studies 
involving large patent sets (e.g. Bessen, 2008; Hall et al., 2005; Gambardella 
et al., 2008). Moreover, patent citations have been found to correspond to 
several constructs of value: innovative value (Albert et al., 1991; Arts et al., 
2013; Carpenter et al., 1981; Trajtenberg, 1990), private value (Harhoff et al., 
1999, 2003; Gambardella et al., 2008) and market value (Belenzon, 2012; Hall 
et al., 2005).  
However, several authors have signaled a disturbing lack of explanatory power 
when using patent citations to explain patent value (e.g. Gay and Le Bas, 2005; 
Gittelman, 2008). Furthermore, the distribution of patent citations is skewed 
and often involves outliers. Consequently, log-linear transformations have 
been advanced as a solution (e.g. Harhoff et al., 1999; Gambardella et al., 
2008). Moreover, a non-linear approach may be required because of the 
specificities of the patent citation network. For instance, Hung and Wang 
(2010) found that patent citations follow a rule of preferential attachment. This 
phenomenon, as first outlined by Barabási and Albert (1999), entails in this 
case that patents more frequently cite patents that have already been cited, 
regardless of quality considerations. Therefore, later citations could have a 
lesser value, thus indicating that patent citations do not scale linearly with 
patent value.  
In most studies that involve patent data, patents statistics are grouped. This 
can be undertaken on the level of a firm’s patent portfolio (e.g. Hall et al., 2005), 
or on national levels (e.g. Neuhäusler and Frietsch, 2012). If patent value does 
not scale linearly with the sum of patent citations on the individual level, this 
would also have implications for the group level. Consequently, patent 
portfolios would have to be calculated differently; simply taking the sum of 
patent citations to patents in the portfolio would be inadequate. The continued 
relevance of patent citations as an important measure of value, as noted in 
Jaffe and de Rassenfosse (2016), increases the importance of better 
understanding the relation between patent citations and patent value. This will 
help in analyses where patent value is modeled as a dependent variable, used 
as an independent variable, or used as a control. Improvements in using patent 
citations as a proxy for patent value may also benefit research on patent 
portfolios and, by extension, modeling the innovative performance of large 
actors such as firms and countries. Moreover, it secures a better insight into 
the processes by which patent citations have come to be correlated with patent 
value.  
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In this paper, the relevance of a log-linear relationship is demonstrated by 
relating patent citations to patent renewal data. This is undertaken for patents 
from both the European Patent Office (EPO) and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO), because they have different renewal 
characteristics. Consequently, comparing the analyses of patents from these 
offices will provide robustness to the results. In a complementary analysis, the 
derived functional form is assessed by analyzing the value of firm portfolios in 
an adapted replication of Hall et al. (2005). The results reveal a substantial 
increase in explanatory power that may occur when adopting a model 
specification that reflects the log-linear relationship. 
Measuring the relation between citations 
and renewal 
 
In this analysis, the relationship between patents citations and patent value -
as indicated by the decision of patent owners to pay maintenance fees (i.e. 
patent renewal) - is assessed. Patent renewal can be considered an indicator 
of private patent value (Pakes and Schankerman, 1984; Pakes, 1986; Lanjouw 
et al., 1998; Harhoff et al., 1999; Thomas, 1999; Hegde and Sampat, 2009; 
Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Van Zeebroeck, 2008; de Rassenfosse 
and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2013; de Rassenfosse and Jaffe, 2014), 
since renewal reflects an economic decision on the part of the patent owner. 
In other words, it registers a minimal private value that the owner assigns to 
the patent.  
Patent data is obtained from the European Patent Office (EPO) PATSTAT fall 
2013 database, and complemented with renewal data as observed in fee 
payments to the relevant patent office, from its spring 2014 counterpart. The 
sample was constructed to allow a comparison between EPO and United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) patent applications. Therefore, 
only DOCDB20 patent families with granted applications at both the EPO and 
the USPTO have been included. Using patent applications from 1981 to 2000, 
the sample includes 547365 granted EPO applications and 571816 granted 
USPTO applications. To better allow a comparison between results obtained 
for the EPO patents and the USPTO patents, patent citations are observed as 
citations made to the DOCDB family of the patent by other DOCDB patent 
families. This measure is comparable across patent offices, unlike the counts 
of citations to individual patents of different offices, which are affected by 
different citation practices practiced in different offices and differ considerably 
(Bakker et al., 2016).  
 
                                                          
20 This family groups patents from different offices that have an identical technical content 
(Albrecht et al., 2010). 
67 
 
Observing patent renewal for USPTO patents is relatively easy, as one simply 
has to observe whether maintenance fees have been paid to the USPTO. The 
USPTO system anticipates three periods of renewal with decisions possible at 
4, 8 and 12 years of the patent life. The USPTO renewal time is calculated as 
the period for which fees have been paid.  
Observing patent renewal for EPO patents is more complicated because the 
EPO has no unitary structure but acts as an intergovernmental organization 
operating through member state offices. Granted patents are hosted at national 
offices that subscribe to the EPO (e.g. the Portuguese or the Netherlands 
patent office). Maintenance payments and renewal decisions are also made at 
these offices. Thus, an EPO patent may be renewed at one office but 
abandoned at another. In order to achieve a single EPO renewal indicator, the 
Single Renewal Approach (SRA) of Van Zeebroeck (2011) is used: the EPO 
renewal indicator is determined by the longest time a patent has been renewed 
at any of the national offices subscribing to the EPO convention. Renewal 
payments at the national offices that subscribe to the EPO are made yearly, 
and EPO renewal time is therefore calculated as the longest period for which 
fees have been paid at any of these national offices.  
An analysis is performed where a dummy is created for each score level of the 
DOCDB citation indicator. Here, the dummies are denoted as 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖, where 
𝑖 denotes the citation score. Levels range from 0, 1, 2, 3…99, 100…368+. 
Patents with a score larger than 100 are grouped in progressively larger 
clusters consisting of not one, but several, levels of the citation score. For 
example, patents with a DOCDB citation score of 101, 102 or 103 are grouped 
in the same cluster. These clusters are treated in the same way as individual 
citation levels, where their citation score is determined by the central value of 
the patent citation score of the levels grouped in each cluster. This procedure 
is undertaken because the density of patents per citation level is otherwise too 
low for meaningful estimation of the coefficients associated with each level. 
The number of citation levels per cluster is denoted in Table 1. Finally, all 
patents with a score of 368 and above (i.e. 9 standard deviation outliers) are 
grouped together in one category. Because there are few uncited patents, the 
reference category combines the set of uncited patents with the set where 
patents are cited only once. 
Table 2: Number of citation levels grouped together in each cluster as a function of the 
DOCDB citation score.  
DOCDB citation score Citation levels per cluster 
2-100 1 
101-142 3 
143-178 5 
179-227 7 
228-290 9 
291-367 11 
368+ N/A 
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Including a set of appropriate control variables (𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) and assuming an 
independent error term 𝜀, the number of years the patent was maintained 
(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙) can be expressed as a function 𝑓() of the citation levels 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖 and 
a constant 𝐶: 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 𝑓(𝐶 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∙ 𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
) + 𝜀           
In this model, assuming the function 𝑓() is correctly chosen to represent the 
relation between patent value and renewal time, the size of the coefficients 𝛽𝑖  
should relate to 𝑖 following the functional form with which patent citations relate 
to patent value. Pakes (1986) highlighted a real option approach to the 
estimation of renewal time by considering that patent renewal not only extends 
patent protection for a limited time but also provides the option of future 
extensions. Maurseth (2005) modeled this as a survival problem using a Cox 
model. This approach rests on the idea that an expected revenue stream can 
be attributed to a patent in each given year. Whenever the costs of maintaining 
the patent (are expected to) exceed the revenue stream, the owner of the 
patent will decide not to continue paying maintenance fees. Because the 
(modeled) revenue and the costs of maintaining a patent are not constant, the 
relation between patent value and observed patent life is not linear. Therefore, 
a Cox survival analysis should better model patent value through patent 
renewal than a linear regression model such as OLS. The survival model can 
also take into account the censoring that stems from either the data that is 
absent due to missing renewal information at the end of the dataset or from the 
maximum patent lifetime of 20 years. 
Cox survival regressions are dependent on the number of distinct possible 
survival times that can be observed. Multiple objects with the same survival 
time need to be taken into consideration and a method needs to be employed 
to resolve these ties. This is especially important for USPTO cases where only 
three renewal decisions are taken for each patent, resulting in many patents 
with the exact same survival time. In analyses with many ties, the standard 
method of resolving them (Breslow, 1974) could yield biased coefficients, while 
the Efron (1977) method has been advocated as an unbiased method (Hertz-
Picciotto and Rockhill, 1997; Hsieh, 1995). Therefore, the analyses have been 
computed using both methods. Small differences were found, but these were 
not significant in estimating the log-linear fits presented in the results section. 
In the main analyses, the results of Efron’s method are reported, since they 
appear to be less biased than those of Breslow’s method (Hertz-Picciotto and 
Rockhill, 1997). 
This paper attempts to construct a framework that applies to all patents. The 
analysis, therefore, includes control variables concerning the year and the 
technological class (IPC3 level) of the application, because of the likelihood 
that these variables affect patent citations as well as renewal probability. 
Furthermore, it is likely that different applicants have different renewal 
considerations and write different patents, resulting in different citation 
characteristics. Thus, the analysis also includes controls that reflect basic 
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characteristics of the applicant (i.e. type, experience, size and country21). This 
information has been obtained from the harmonized table provided for the EPO 
PATSTAT database (Magerman et al., 2006; Peeters et al., 2010). Table 2 
provides an overview of the definitions and descriptive statistics of the variables 
used in the analysis. 
Table 3: Descriptions and descriptive statistics of USPTO patents in the Cox survival 
analyses. Statistics for EPO patents deviate slightly and are given for EPO renewal. a In the case 
of dummy variables relating to levels of a discrete variable, statistics are given for this variable. 
b indicates partial counts when applicable. Finally, when an application is co-patented, variables 
with c default to the largest and oldest applicants. 
Name Description Mean Standard  
deviation 
Min Max 
USPTO 
renewal time 
Maximum year for which 
maintenance fees are paid at the 
USPTO. 
14.59 5.76 4 20 
EPO renewal 
time 
Maximum year for which 
maintenance fees are paid at any 
national office subscribing to the 
EPO. 
13.12 4.81 2 20 
DOCDBia 
Dummy indicating whether the 
DOCDB patent family of the 
patent is cited 𝑖 times by other 
DOCDB families. 
22.16 39.02 0.00 3146 
Nr. Offices 
Number of distinct patent offices 
in which the DOCDB family of 
the patent has at least 1 
application present. 
7.08 4.12 2 51 
Application 
yeara 
Dummy for the application year 
of the patent. 
1992.59 5.38 1981 2000 
IPC3b  
Dummy variable to indicate if the 
IPC3 class (e.g. A01) is present in 
the patent application. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Applicant 
experiencec 
Years between filing of current 
patent and that of the first 
application filed by the applicant. 
36.23 31.12 0 146 
Ln(Applt. 
size)c  
Logarithm of the total number of 
patents filed by the applicant. 
7.40 3.32 0 12.99 
Co-patented 
Dummy indicating if the patent 
has more than 1 applicant. 
0.06 0.24 0 1 
Applicant 
typeb 
Type of applicant: company, 
government, hospital, individual, 
university or unknown. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Applicant 
countryb 
Dummy for the country in which 
the applicant resided at time of 
filing the patent. 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
  
                                                          
21 Applicants may come from countries with few patents, which would disrupt the analysis 
because the dummy variable relating to that country cannot be estimated (well). Therefore, 
applicant countries with less than 50 patents in the analyses have been grouped together in a 
separate category. This has affected 819 patents in total. 
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Results 
 
The coefficient estimates (𝛽𝑖) for the 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖  dummies, from the Cox survival 
regression for the USPTO renewal data, are shown in Fig. 1. Note that Cox 
survival regressions estimate hazard (i.e. abandoning patents); hence, 
negative coefficients indicate a higher chance of renewal. The coefficients of 
the analysis are monotonically decreasing, even though, at higher citation 
levels, there is greater variance in this relation.  
A log-linear function of the form  𝛽𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ln(𝑐 + 𝑖) is estimated with 𝛽𝑖  the 
size of the dummy coefficient, and 𝑖 the citation score. The log-linear relation 
depicted fits the relation between the citation scores and the coefficients well 
(R2 = 0.86). As a comparison, a linear curve of the form 𝛽𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑖 has also 
been estimated, which produces a worse fit (R2 = 0.54). Finally, it can be argued 
that the log-linear fit has one more parameter and would, therefore, have an 
advantage over the linear estimation. Consequently, a quadratic curve of the 
form 𝛽𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑖 + 𝑐𝑖
2 has been estimated as well, and it is a better fit than the 
linear specification (R2 = 0.76). Nevertheless, the log-linear specification is a 
superior fit to this specification, indicating that the data fit better with a log-linear 
form than a polynomial with the same number of parameters. 
 
Figure 2: Estimates of the dummy coefficients related to different DOCDB citation scores, 
that were obtained from a Cox survival analysis relating different scores on the DOCDB 
citation indicator, to the maintenance time of a patent at the USPTO. A 95% confidence 
interval is shown as well as a log-linear fit of βi = 0.33 − 0.32 ln(1.43 + i), which has an R
2 of 
0.86. 
 
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0 100 200 300
D
u
m
m
y 
co
e
ff
ic
ie
n
t 
(β
i)
DOCDB citation level (i)
71 
 
 
Figure 3: Estimates of the dummy coefficients related to different DOCDB citation scores, 
that were obtained from a Cox survival analysis, relating different scores on the DOCDB 
citation indicator to the maintenance time of a patent at the EPO. A 95% confidence 
interval is shown as well as a log-linear fit of βi = 1.27 − 0.55 ln(10.80 + i), which has an R
2 
of 0.93. 
 
Similar results are found when repeating the analysis with EPO data (see Fig. 
2). Here, the fit is even better with R2 = 0.93 for the log-linear specification. 
However, the fits for the other curves also improve with R2 = 0.88 for a quadratic 
curve and R2 = 0.78 for a linear curve. Therefore, the found log-linear form 
appears to be robust with respect to the source of renewal data. Unfortunately, 
the analysis does not provide a guideline on the optimal offset, given that this 
parameter varies substantially with a value of 1.43 for the USPTO analysis and 
a value of 10.80 for the EPO analysis. 
Robustness 
In this paper, the functional form is estimated using Cox survival analyses. 
Unfortunately, these analyses rely on the proportional hazards assumption. 
This assumption states that the hazard function only differs by a constant non-
time dependent value between the observed categories. This assumption can 
be verified by using Schoenfeld (1982) residuals and is violated severely (at 
p<0.0001) for both the USPTO and the EPO analyses.  
In consequence, robustness tests using other model specifications have been 
performed. First, the binary approach from Hegde and Sampat (2009) is 
adopted, which determines the odds that a patent is renewed by a certain time. 
This approach has the benefit that it relies on few assumptions concerning the 
value function of the patent over time. Unfortunately, it also exploits less of the 
information contained in the renewal data by only observing the patent renewal 
time at one single time period. In this paper, a binary test is employed where 
the chance that a patent was renewed until it reached its maximum lifespan 
(20 years) is estimated using an adaption of Eq. (2), as shown below. 
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𝑃(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 20) = 𝑃 (𝜀 > 𝐶 − ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∙ 𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
)   
 
If 𝜀 follows a logistic distribution, the bi coefficients can be estimated using a 
logistic regression. Because this test relies on patents reaching their maximum 
lifetime, the sample is confined to patents that have the possibility of reaching 
it. At the USPTO, where full renewal is decided at 12 years, this includes 
patents with at least 13 years in the renewal data of spring 2014, which applies 
to all patents in the original sample. For EPO patents, the renewal decisions 
are taken yearly; hence, only patents with application years up to 1993 are 
included in the logistic analysis.  
A linear regression analysis is also employed. Here, instead of estimating 
whether a patent is renewed at a certain point in time, its renewal time 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 
is directly estimated. This estimation can be constructed easily from Eq. (1), 
when assuming function 𝑓() is linear, leading to the equation listed below. 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 𝐶 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∙ 𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵𝑖
𝑖
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 ∙ 𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝜀           
A linear analysis is interesting because it facilitates use of the richness of the 
data - i.e. not just whether a patent is renewed but also for how many years - 
while still not having to rely on the proportional hazards assumption as is the 
case with the Cox survival analysis. Moreover, this analysis allows for direct 
computation of the size of the effect that patent citations have on the expected 
lifetime of a patent. Furthermore, both logistic and Cox survival analyses use a 
link function that relies on an exponential form. This could affect the form by 
which the citations correlate with patent renewal. Thus, a linear specification 
would be helpful in showing that the results found in ‘‘Results’’ section are not 
caused by modeling choices. Unfortunately, this linearization comes with the 
assumption that the value of a patent and its renewal time are linearly related, 
which is unlikely, as the ‘‘Methods and data’’ section explains.  
This equation cannot be estimated using OLS because patents can only be 
renewed up to a certain point (i.e. 20 years). Therefore, the renewal time 
variable cannot take values greater than 20 years in our data, creating a need 
to deal with this censoring. Therefore, a Tobit regression analysis is employed, 
which considers censoring at the maximum lifetime of the patent, i.e. 20 years. 
Because this analysis has the same selection issues as logistic analysis, the 
sample is restricted in the same manner.  
Finally, a lower bound of the value of a patent can be directly estimated using 
an interval regression analysis where the intervals are determined by the 
cumulative renewal fees, paid by the owner of the patent. Here again, 
censoring needs to be considered for patents that reach their maximum lifetime 
as well as censoring due to limited renewal data. Therefore, the sample 
restrictions for the binary analysis are also employed here.  
The same analyses from the ‘‘Results’’ section are performed using both the 
Logit/Tobit and interval regression analyses rather than the Cox survival 
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regression. The same curves relating 𝛽𝑖 to 𝑖 are also estimated. The results 
from these estimations are presented in Table 3. From the evidence of these 
results, it is clear that the logarithmic functional form fits best the relation 
between the estimated coefficients of the dummy bi and the DOCDB citation 
score 𝑖. The analyses provide fit characteristics that are quite similar, indicating 
that the relation between patent citations and private value, as indicated by 
patent renewal, follows the same functional form regardless of the analysis. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that, of those studied, the log-linear form offers 
the best description of the functional form by which patent citations relate to 
patent value. 
Table 4: R2 of the different fits that relate 𝛃𝐢 to 𝐢  for each analysis at each patent office. It 
should be noted that the Logit, Tobit and interval analyses for EPO were performed on a smaller 
sample and are thus not fully comparable with the Cox survival regressions. 
 USPTO 
  Cox        Logit       Tobit     Interval 
EPO 
  Cox       Logit       Tobit     Interval  
Linear 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.78 0.76 0.81 0.80 
Qua-dratic 0.76 0.80 0.80 0.75 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90 
Log-linear 0.86 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 
 
The relation between patent value and patent 
citations 
The results obtained from the main analysis in the ‘‘Results’’ section, and from 
the robustness analyses, are informative in establishing the functional form that 
relates patent citations to patent value. However, the fits themselves may, in 
addition, explain the relevance of patent citations in more economic terms. 
Hence, the fits are presented with an interpretation of their estimated effect in 
Table 4.  
The estimated effect of each additional patent citation is harder to estimate 
using the log-linear form. Therefore, the effects are given for patents that have 
double the number of patent citations than a patent with similar scores on the 
control variables. Given a log-linear fit of 𝛽𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏 ln(𝑐 + 𝑖) this translates as 
𝑏 ln 2. It should be noted that having double the citations should be interpreted 
using the offset, i.e. the c parameter in the loglinear fit. Therefore, ‘doubling’ 
the citations for an uncited EPO patent means adding 14 citations in the case 
of the Tobit regression. 
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Table 5: Fits and economic interpretation of the analyses relating patent citations to patent 
value  
Office Analysis Log-linear fit relating  Estimated comparative effect of having double 
the number of citations than a comparable 
patent  
USPTO 
Cox  𝛽𝑖 = 0.33 − 0.32 ln(1.43 + 𝑖) Decreased abandonment hazard of 0.22 
Logit 𝛽𝑖 = −0.43 + 0.48 ln(1.12 + 𝑖) Increased odds of full renewal of 0.33 
Tobit 𝛽𝑖 = −3.15 + 2.86 ln(1.44 + 𝑖) Increased renewal time of 0.99 years 
Interval 𝛽𝑖 = −1366 + 1642 ln(1.00 + 𝑖) Increased value of $1137.95 
EPO 
Cox  𝛽𝑖 = 1.27 − 0.55 ln(10.80 + 𝑖) Decreased abandonment hazard of 0.38 
Logit 𝛽𝑖 = −1.49 + 0.80 ln(6.49 + 𝑖) Increased full renewal odds of 0.56 
Tobit 𝛽𝑖 = −8.64 + 3.32 ln(14.05 + 𝑖) Increased renewal time by 2.30 years 
Interval 𝛽𝑖 = −12738 + 5021 ln(13.67 + 𝑖) Increased value of €3480.62 
 
The results listed in Table 4 show that the estimated effect size of having been 
cited more than a comparable patent is substantial. Estimates show that patent 
citations confer value that can be measured in years of additional patent life 
and a value increase of thousands of euros/dollars. It should be noted that 
patent renewal analyses intrinsically estimate minimum values of patent value. 
Therefore, the value added by doubling patent citations may very well be much 
higher. Interestingly, with regard to USPTO patents, this value appears lower 
than for EPO patents, both in renewal time and patent value. However, the 
latter is in part due to the lower maintenance fees at the USPTO. 
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Applying the functional form to an 
econometric analysis 
 
Introduction 
The previous section established a log-linear relation between patent citations 
and patent value. Sets of patents, i.e. patent portfolios, can also be evaluated 
using patent citations. The value of a patent portfolio is generally estimated by 
counting the number of times any patent in the portfolio has been referenced. 
This practice could be justified on the assumption that the value of a patent 
portfolio is equal to the sum of the value of its members. The logical conclusion 
is that, when the value of individual patents is calculated differently, this should 
have repercussions for the estimation of the value of patent portfolios. 
Therefore, in this paper, a new method that relies on the found log-linear 
relation is introduced.  
In this log-linear method, the value of a patent portfolio is derived by first 
computing a log-transformed value for each patent and then computing the 
sum of these log-transformed values. Because this method better models the 
relation between patent citations and patent value, it could prove superior to 
the normal linear method of estimating the value of a patent portfolio, i.e. simply 
computing the sum of individual patent citations.  
A superior method of calculating the value of the patent portfolio would 
enhance understanding of firm innovative performance, an often-used metric 
in innovation research. To evaluate the log-linear method, a patent portfolio 
analysis is presented using both the traditional way of computing the value of 
a patent portfolio and the proposed log-linear method. For this endeavor, an 
adapted analysis of Hall et al. (2005) is presented, which relates Tobin’s Q, (𝑄) 
to stocks of R&D, patents and patent citations. 
 
Methods and data 
The analysis adapted from Hall et al. (2005) will be used to assess which 
method of evaluating patent portfolios better explains firm performance: the 
common linear method, or the log-linear method that models a log-linear 
relation between patent citations and patent value. The analysis of Hall et al. 
(2005) models Tobin’s Q as a function of the relative knowledge stock of the 
firm. This stock is then approximated using the ratio between the R&D stock 
and the assets of the firm as well as other ratios involving the R&D stock, the 
patent stock, and the patent citation stock. Controls for year, as well as the 
firm, will also be included in the analysis. Therefore, the following equation is 
estimated: 
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ln 𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝐶𝑖 + 𝐶𝑡 + ln (1 + 𝛽1
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽2
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3
𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
+ 𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡=0)
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
Here 𝐶𝑖 and 𝐶𝑡 denote constants of firm 𝑖 and time 𝑡 while 𝐴𝑖𝑡 denotes the total 
assets. 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝐼𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑖𝑡 denote respectively the R&D, patent and 
citations depreciated stock. 𝐷𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡=0  denotes a dummy for firms with no 
reported R&D expenditures at time 𝑡. When this dummy is equal to 1, the ratio 
𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡
 is set to 0 if the R&D stock, 𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑑𝐷𝑖𝑡, is equal to 0. There are also cases 
for which the patent stock is equal to 0; these are not used in the analysis. 
Finally, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents a random error.  
The non-linear analysis that follows from equation 4 is presented along with a 
linearized version, which assumes ln (1 + 𝑥) ≈ 𝑥. This linear analysis has the 
benefit of facilitating a fixed effects approach, which is not possible with the 
non-linear analysis, as noted in Hall et al. (2005). In the non-linear analyses, 
𝐶𝑖 is approximated using sector dummies of the Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC). 
For this analysis, USPTO applications (since the sample mainly concerns US 
firms), combined with DOCDB citation information are matched to a random 
sample of patenting firms with at least 100 patents listed in PATSTAT, and that 
are listed in the Compustat database. For the resulting sample of 1092 firms, 
financial data is considered from the years between 1981 and 2005. In this 
paper, citation stock increases are modeled using a linear model, as well as 
the log-linear model previously specified. 
The sample was constructed as follows: only firms that have a continuous 
presence in at least two periods in the dataset were used. Moreover, in order 
to accurately compare patenting firms, only observations of firms that have a 
non-zero patent stock - i.e. observations of firms that have at least one patent 
in the current or any previous period - are used.22 Finally, Tobin’s Q was not 
known for all observations in the resulting dataset, leading to the removal of 
1890 observations.  
The R&D stock was initialized as the R&D expenditure for the first year in which 
a firm enters the sample divided by 0.23, in a procedure similar to Hall (1990), 
and Hall et al. (2005). The patent stock and the citation stocks are not initialized 
because the full patenting activity of all firms is observed for 30 years prior to 
the first year of the sample using the EPO PATSTAT database. Finally, all 
stocks are depreciated by 15% each year, in line with Hall et al. (2005). The 
descriptive statistics of the sample are detailed in Table 5. 
 
 
                                                          
22 A comparative analysis that included observations for firms with no patent stock as well as a 
dummy controlling for this occurrence yielded very similar results to the analyses presented in 
this paper. 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the horse-race regressions. Below 
each citation stock is listed the formula used to create it, where 𝐶𝐼𝑇 refers to the citation score 
of an individual patent. R&D stock and total assets are adjusted for inflation using 
USBLS(2016) data (1983=100). All stocks are calculated with a 15% depreciation rate.   
Variable Description Number of 
Observations 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Ln (Tobin's Q) Natural log of 
market value 
divided by total 
assets    
13044 0.39 0.78 -6.23 4.63 
Year Book year of the 
firm, application 
year of the patents 
13044 1995 7.39 1980 2005 
R&D stock  The current stock 
of R&D expenses 
($M) 
13044 631 2091 0.00 29814 
Total Assets  The total assets of 
the firm ($M) 
13044 4841 24430 0.04 658800 
D(R&D=0) Dummy to 
indicate no R&D 
expenses in that 
year 
13044 0.116 0.32 0 1 
Patent stock The current stock 
of USPTO patents 
13044 239 843 0.00 14649 
Citation stock  
∑ 𝑪𝑰𝑻 
The current 
citation stock,  
calculated using 
the linear method 
13044 4402 15156 0.02 226776 
Citation stock 
∑ 𝐥𝐧 (𝟏 + 𝑪𝑰𝑻) 
The current 
citation stock,  
calculated using 
the log-linear 
method  
13044 579 2038 0.01 31932 
 
The results of the fixed effects linear models are shown in Table 6. The 
increase in 𝑅2 shows that citation indicators using the log-linear transformation 
perform better - with an increase of 3.4% in explained variance - at explaining 
log Tobin’s Q than the citation indicators without the use of the logarithmic 
transformation. This represents a substantial increase of 70% in added 
explained variance by introducing a citation indicator to explain company 
performance. Therefore, this analysis shows the potential of applying the log 
transformation to portfolio analysis, while simultaneously providing external 
validity to the findings in the ‘‘Measuring the relation between citations and 
renewal’’ section. 
The non-linear analysis of Hall et al. (2005) was also performed: see analyses 
4, 5 and 6. Applying their analysis to this paper’s sample produces very similar 
results, with one exception: the ratio of patent stock over R&D stock, 
representing patenting efficiency, is negative. The likely cause is the inclusion 
of several firms for which R&D expenditure is not listed in the COMPUSTAT 
database, and for which this ratio is recorded as 0. Analyses excluding these 
firms produce a positive coefficient for this ratio. The linear and the loglinear 
specifications of the citation stock perform very similarly in the non-linear 
analysis: there is only a difference of 0.007 in their 𝑅2. Using the log-linear form 
only adds 2.9% in added explained variance.  
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Including firm dummies, instead of SIC dummies, give very similar results, as 
can be seen from analyses 7, 8 and 9. However, here the linear specification 
performs slightly (0.006) better. This represents a decrease of 17% in 
explained variance when using the loglinear method as opposed to the 
classical method. This analysis, therefore, demonstrates that that the log-linear 
method of citation counting does not always deliver improvement, but it 
produces adequate results nonetheless. 
Table 6: Horse-race regressions explaining Ln(Tobin’s Q). Variables with a represent stocks 
with a 15% depreciation rate. Below each citation stock is listed the formula used to create it, 
where 𝐶𝐼𝑇 refers to the citation score of an individual patent. Cluster-robust standard errors are 
reported in parentheses and asterisks indicate statistical significance with: * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Fixed effects Fixed effects Non-linear Non-linear Non-linear Non-linear 
R&Da/ Total assets 0.0156** 0.0156** 0.145** 0.237* 0.0439 0.0558 
 (0.00550) (0.00546) (0.0463) (0.0922) (0.0316) (0.0406) 
       
Patentsa/R&Da -0.000743 -0.000781* -0.00055** -0.0011*** -0.000544** -0.000723*** 
 (0.000387) (0.000324) (0.000181) (0.000222) (0.000192) (0.000180) 
       
D(R&Dit=0) 0.0811 0.0767 0.0422 0.0620 0.0960 0.127 
 (0.0666) (0.0652) (0.0588) (0.119) (0.0825) (0.105) 
       
Citationsa/Patentsa 0.00213***  0.0119***  0.00457**  
∑ 𝐂𝐈𝐓 (0.000579)  (0.00181)  (0.00155)  
       
Citationsa/Patentsa  0.124***  0.630***  0.159* 
∑ 𝐥𝐧 (𝟏 + 𝐂𝐈𝐓)  (0.0308)  (0.152)  (0.0642) 
       
Constant 0.204*** -0.0601 0.0954 -0.540** -0.355*** -0.567*** 
 (0.0333) (0.0834) (0.122) (0.201) (0.0177) (0.0877) 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
SIC dummies No No Yes Yes No No 
N 13044 13044 13044 13044 13044 13044 
Nr. Firms 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 1092 
Nr. SIC 214 214 214 214 214 214 
R² 0.125 0.160 0.4905 0.4912 0.7052 0.7046 
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Conclusion 
 
The main result of this paper is that patent citations display a log-linear relation 
with patent value. Therefore, researchers are advised to take this relation into 
consideration when using patent citations to approximate patent value. The fits 
obtained from the renewal analysis show that patents with double the number 
of citations of comparable patents, have an increased value of $1137.95 in the 
case of USPTO patents and €3480.62 in the case of EPO patents.  
The results of the firm analysis indicate that, at least in some economic models, 
it may be better to first apply a log transformation to the citation count of an 
individual patent before computing the sum. Doing so may yield an 
improvement of up to 70% in added explained variance. Yet, in another 
analysis, the classical way of calculating patent citations has proved slightly 
superior. For that reason, the log-linear transformation should be used with 
caution. 
When using a logarithmic functional form, the explanatory power of the citation 
indicator improves. Yet, much unexplained variance remains. Therefore, we 
should continue to keep in mind the limited ability of patent citations to 
approximate patent value. Moreover, the found functional form reflects the 
relation between patent citations and private value, but it may not hold true for 
other value constructs such as the social value and (knowledge) impact of a 
patent. Hence, researchers should be careful when applying the findings of this 
paper to approximate other constructs of patent value. 
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Patent citations and a 
framework of the 
productive and market 
value of patents 
Jurriën Bakker and Bart Van Looy 
Abstract 
We advance a novel framework in which patent value is composed of a 
productive component, i.e. the benefits stemming from creating and selling 
goods based on patented inventions, and a market component, i.e. the direct 
or indirect benefits accrued to the owner of a patent by means of licensing, 
litigating or trading. Building on the legal role of patent citations, we propose 
that productive value can be approximated by self-citations, while market value 
can be estimated by the citations a patent receives from other patents (non-
self-citations). We then derive hypotheses about the likely actions (renewal, 
sales and licenses) of patent owners, dependent on the productive and market 
value of their patents. We procede to validate our framework by testing these 
hypotheses on a large body of EPO (N= 547,365) and USPTO patents 
(N=571,816), filed between 1981 and 2000. The obtained results support our 
assertions. The relevance of the advanced framework is then shown by 
applying it to the strategy of patent owners during the life of their patent. 
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Introduction 
 
Measuring innovative performance is of crucial importance in our current 
knowledge driven economy. Most researchers opt to use patent statistics for 
this endeavor, as they are a vast and detailed source of information on 
innovation. However, not all patents have the same relevance, which forces 
researchers to determine their value to arrive at a proper measure of innovation 
(Griliches,1990). Determining the value of patents is a difficult endeavor, given 
that they are intellectual property. Patents are related to a vast number of 
different technologies and they can be owned by firms, non-profits and 
individuals. Additionally, it is often difficult to determine their exact share in the 
profits of a product or firm. Moreover, for researchers and managers of large 
portfolios, it is necessary that large sets of patents can be valued quickly and 
consistently. 
In this paper, we will define the value of a patent as the added utility that an 
owner derives from the possession of the patent. It is to be noted that this 
definition, better known as the patents private value, excludes other value 
constructs such as social value, i.e. the value to society, and inventive value, 
i.e. the novelty of the technological process protected by the patent (see e.g. 
Carpenter et al., 1981; Fleming, 2007; Verhoeven et al., 2016). Patent owners 
can generally1 derive value from their patents in two ways: first, they can use 
the patent to deter competition from their products and thus gain additional 
profits; second, patents can be monetized through engaging in transactions, 
licenses, or by suing those that infringe. We will refer to these two value 
constructs respectively as the productive value and market value of a patent.  
We argue that these constructs of patent value can be measured by observing 
the amount of times a patent has been referenced by other patents. The 
forward citations indicator is a viable candidate to observe our value constructs 
because it has been clearly established in the literature that it is a consistent 
indicator of the value of a patent (Carpenter et al., 1981; Trajtenberg, 1991; 
Jaffe et al., 1992; Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1999; Harhoff et al., 1999; Thomas, 
1999; Gambardella et al., 2008). Likewise, this relationship has been 
established for several constructs of patent value: inventive value (e.g. 
Carpenter et al., 1981), and social value (Trajtenberg, 1991), as well as the 
general private value of patents (e.g. Harhoff et al., 1999; Thomas, 1999; Hall 
et al., 2005; Gambardella et al., 2008), and finally the sales price of the patent 
(Fischer and Leidinger, 2014).  
Initial contributions (e.g. Trajtenberg, 1990; Jaffe et al., 1992; Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg, 1999) argued that patent-to-patent citations reﬂect spillovers: 
‘‘citing patents would bear a sort of causal relationship to the cited patent, with 
citations being the overt manifestation of such a link’’ (Trajtenberg, 1990 p. 
                                                          
1 Patents can also be used as collateral (Amable et al., 2010) and even for reduced tax loads 
(Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012).  
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185). Jaffe et al. (1993 p. 578) argue that ‘‘knowledge ﬂows do sometimes 
leave a paper trail, in the form of citations in patents’’. Thus, a citation between 
two patents means that the cited patent represents previously existing 
knowledge upon which the citing patent builds (see also Jaffe et al., 2000). 
Conceived as such, highly cited patents reflect impact, relevance and hence 
quality, similar to the role citations play in the scientific literature2.  
However, unlike scientific citations, patent citations (front page references) are 
the result of a search and selection process of prior art by the examiner, not by 
the inventor, and ultimately serve a legal purpose (Callaert, Pellens and Van 
Looy, 2014, but see also Michel and Bettels, 2001; Tijssen et al., 2000; Meyer, 
2000). References in the scientiﬁc literature are added by the author during 
their research, and serve to indicate and acknowledge previous knowledge on 
which the contribution builds. References in patents are added during the 
granting process for evaluating novelty and inventiveness, and for qualifying 
the claims made in the patent. The cited prior art on the front page of patent 
documents is ultimately selected by the patent examiner and not by the 
applicant/inventor, who might, or even should (in the case of USPTO 
applications, the so called ‘duty of candor’), bring relevant references to the 
attention of examiners. Based on available information in archives and 
databases, patent examiners ultimately decide which references are relevant 
to include for qualifying the claims implied in the patent document. Therefore, 
it would be unwise to consider patent citations as a direct analogy to academic 
citations. 
It would be better to evaluate patent citations for what they are: references that 
operate within the legal context of the patent application process. Patent 
citations will often signal that the technological scope of the citing patent is 
reduced by the cited patent. Even if the scope of the citing patent remains 
intact, patent citations are still an indication that the citing and the cited patent 
encompass substantially related technology. How these notions can be used 
to link the forward patent citations to the productive and market value of the 
patent will be explained in the following paragraphs.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Albeit that both recall and precision deserve attention: Jaffe et al. (1993) already signal issues 
when conceiving patent citations as knowledge spillovers- not all spillovers are captured in 
citations and not all citations represent direct knowledge spillovers, as the more recent study of 
Callaert, Pellens and Van Looy (2014) reveals (see also Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006; Breschi 
and Lissoni, 2001 in this respect). 
87 
 
It is likely that when an owner greatly values the products that the patent 
protects, they will spend additional resources in expanding the technology. This 
additional effort can then be observed by self-citations, i.e. the number of times 
the patent is cited by other patents belonging to the same owner. Supporting 
this theory, (Narin et al., 1987) found that these citations are often associated 
with patents that are used in continuous and ongoing projects. In addition, 
Belenzon (2012) found that these self-citations are indicators of a cumulative 
effort within the firm, with Thomas (1999) finding that self-citations may explain 
patent value better than non-self-citations. Therefore, self-citations are a 
promising indicator to signal the productive value of a patent.  
We propose that non-self-citations on the other hand, are an indication of 
market value because they indicate the position of the patent document within 
the legal context of the patent system. In a similar vein to the work on patent 
thickets by von Gravenitz et al. (2011), we propose that non-self patent 
citations indicate value because they limit the scope of citing patents. Since 
many technologies are composed of multiple patentable inventions, a patent 
limiting the scope of subsequent patents can be very valuable. This is because 
it can prevent or hinder the production of products which are based on the citing 
patents, if they still partly rely on the claims defined in the cited patent. This 
blocking power of the cited patent can then be translated in demands for 
compensation from the owner of the blocked product. Therefore, a patent being 
cited indicates that its owner may draw value from others and thus these patent 
citations should indicate market value.   
In the remainder of the paper we will first relate our value framework to the 
decisions of patent owners. Then we will expand on the measurement of patent 
value using patent citations, to arrive at four testable hypotheses. These 
hypotheses will then be tested using a large set of data on EPO and USPTO 
patents. Finally, we will show the power of the framework in explaining when 
owners are interested in using patents to produce or gain monetization from 
the market.   
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Theory and hypotheses 
 
In this section, we will link productive and market value to the major decisions 
patent owners face over the lifetime of the patent. Next, we will link patent 
citations to productive and market value. Combining these exercises, we will 
derive testable hypotheses that we can use to validate our framework. 
Patent value and owner operations 
Patent renewal 
Most patent offices, notably the EPO and the USPTO, charge maintenance 
fees for patents to remain in force until their maximum time. It is expected that 
owners will maintain their patents for as long as they believe that keeping the 
patent outweighs the costs of maintaining it. Patent renewal has long been 
recognized as a primary indicator of the private value of a patent (e.g. Pakes, 
1986; Thomas, 1999; Harhoff et al., 1999; Mauseth, 2005; Hegde and Sampat, 
2008). In our framework, the private value of a patent is composed of its 
productive value and its market value. Therefore, we expect that patents that 
have a high productive and/or market value will be maintained, while patents 
that have neither will be abandoned.  
Patent transfers 
Patents, being a defined property, can be transferred from one owner to the 
other. In doing so, the original owner relinquishes all rights to his invention and 
in exchange obtains a lump sum payment. The rationale for selling can be 
easily understood when an owner has more to gain from selling the patent than 
from using it to produce goods (Serrano, 2010). This will generally happen if 
the buying party has a comparative advantage (e.g. in the marketing or 
production capabilities) in the technology protected by the patent (Gans and 
Stern, 2000; Gans et al., 2002; Galasso et al., 2013; Figueroa and Serrano, 
2013). This immediately reveals that productive and market value impact the 
decision to sell differently: a higher market value increases the chances that 
the patent is sold, due to the higher possible returns for the owner. A higher 
productive value on the other hand, represents higher opportunity costs and is 
therefore detrimental to the chances a patent is sold. 
However, there is more to patent transfers than it appears from this simple 
analysis. For an owner to transfer a patent, they need to consider all possible 
revenue for the patent into the future (Smith and Parrs, 2005). Moreover, the 
owner needs to consider that selling the patent may inhibit them from building 
further on the technology, since they will be forced to deal with the patent’s 
buyer for its use (Heald, 2005). Therefore, it is unlikely that an owner will sell 
any patent, or patent portfolio, if they believe that in some future they will want 
to expand on its technology. Thus, patents with a high productive value are 
unlikely to be sold.     
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Patent licenses  
Besides selling a patent, and thereby completely relinquishing control, owners 
may also choose to license their patents. This entails allowing a party to use 
technology defined in the patent, under certain conditions, in exchange for a 
monetary compensation (e.g. a royalty or a fixed fee), or even a non-monetary 
compensation in the case of cross-licensing. 
Patent owners will decide to license their patent based on the invention and 
the size of the market. According to Katz and Shapiro (1985), as well as 
Rockett (1990), licensed patents should be of lesser quality since the creation 
of a competitor will eat into their monopolistic profits, which is especially true 
for larger firms (Arora and Fosfuri, 2003). On the other hand, licenses should 
be interesting for smaller firms as they may not have the productive capabilities 
to commercialize the invention (Sakakibara, 2010). 
The decision to license a patent is also contingent to the position of the patent 
owner in the market: if the owner is an outsider in the market where his patent 
upholds, thus not a competitor, licensing can be done in a similar method as a 
sale, i.e. with a one-off payment (Kamien and Tauman, 1986; Katz and 
Shapiro, 1986; Kamien et. al., 1992; Kamien, 1992); if on the other hand the 
owner is an insider in the market, he will become a natural competitor. In that 
case it is however, still possible for the owner to profit though licensing by using 
a royalty structure (Rockett, 1990; Wang, 1998; Poddar and Sinha, 2001; 
Kamien and Tauman, 2002). However, the theoretical derived license 
structures do not always hold up in practice, as found by Rostoker (1983), and 
Taylor and Silberston (1973). 
It is obvious that market value is of interest for the chances of licensing, since 
owners will only license if there is sufficient interest, albeit that this relation may 
be moderated by owner specific variables. The productive value could be 
negatively related to licenses, since many authors refer to the trade-off 
between licensing revenues and the profits from increased market power. But, 
unlike patent transfers, owners may still license their patents even if they have 
established a position in the market, when royalty payments outweigh their 
losses in market power.  
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A framework of patent value and patent decisions 
It is possible to combine the insights of the previous subsection into one 
framework. This is done by reviewing the likely decision of a patent owner as 
a function of the productive value and the market value of a patent. These 
considerations of the owner can be graphically represented, as shown in table 
1. 
 
Table 7: Conceptual framework of the decisions of patent owners in relation to the 
productive and market value of their patent. 
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Patent citations and their relation to distinct kinds of 
patent value 
Non-self-citations as an indicator of market value 
As stated in the introduction, patent citations serve a legal purpose as they are 
essential to interpret the claims of the citing patent. Interestingly, this concept 
is rarely utilized in the literature in lieu of the interpretation of patent citations 
as knowledge sources. To better understand the (legal) role of patent citations, 
we present an overview of non-self-patent citations and their relation to patent 
value. 
The literature regarding the processes that lead to patent citations focusses on 
citations that are either given by the applicant or the examiner. Therefore, we 
will also use this distinction in our overview. However, it bears reminding that 
the examiner has the final judgement on which citations end up on the 
‘frontpage’, and thus in many patent databases. Given that applicants are the 
first to deliver their references, if any, we will start with their reasons for doing 
so. 
Applicants may cite patents to obtain an expert judgement on the validity of 
their patent considering these cited patents (Akers, 2000). Interestingly, 
applicant submitted prior art is also often ignored by patent examiners 
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(Cotropia et al., 2013), which implies that the expert judgement is often not fully 
provided. Therefore, applicant citations may imply serious opportunities for the 
holders of the cited patent to extract rents for possible infringement by the 
holders of the citing patent. This signal of litigious opportunity, and thus 
potential value may be further enhanced, since Lampe (2012) and Sampat 
(2013) show that applicants will cite more frequently when their patent has a 
high value.   
However, applicants may be strategic in the citations they provide (Lampe, 
2012), as they may be unwilling to provide relevant prior art (especially of 
competitors), if this prior art would be instrumental in rejecting or narrowing 
down their patent (Sampat, 2005).  Finally, applicants may also try to ‘flood’ the 
patent office with citations of inferior quality, i.e. less relevant to the 
patentability of their patent, to limit the time an examiner spends on finding 
possibly limiting prior art. A theory that is partially confirmed by Cotropia et al. 
(2013). 
Examiners on the other hand, do not appear to rely greatly on the citations of 
applicants and perform in any case an independent search for prior art (Alcacer 
and Gittelman, 2006; Azagra-caro et al., 2011; Cotropia et al., 2013). Instead 
they cite according to the region where the patent is from, the volatility3 of its 
technology class (Tan and Roberts, 2010), and the economic sector of the 
patent, albeit that they may still be influenced by the included references of the 
applicant (Azagra-caro et al., 2011). When examiners cite a patent, this may 
be viewed as a more objective measure of the relevance of the patent, since 
examiners are tasked explicitly with using prior art as a legal basis to reject or 
narrow patents (e.g. Schmoch, 1993). In addition, they may be further apart 
from the current technological frontier than the applicant (Eisenberg, 2004) and 
live in a different legal reality (Noveck, 2006).  
Nonetheless, there may also be noise in examiner citations: Cockburn et al. 
(2003) found that there are substantial differences in citing behavior between 
examiners, with Lemley and Sampat (2012) explaining the examiners’ tenure 
as one of sources of these differences. Additionally, examiner citations also 
provide avenues for the citing patent to work around the cited patent without 
infringing it (Tan and Roberts, 2010). Finally, examiners may also have 
‘favorite’ patents they often cite which may not always be the most relevant to 
the citing patent (Cockburn et al., 2003) 
From this brief overview, we conclude that the most likely reason most patent 
citations are introduced is because the cited patent is relevant in some way to 
the citing patent, albeit that this relation may be moderated by the familiarity of 
the cited patent in the community as well as the value of the citing patent. 
Notwithstanding, as we also discussed, certain practices introduce a large 
degree of noise in this relation, both for examiner and applicant generated 
citations. This makes it difficult to determine whether applicant or examiner 
                                                          
3 Tan and Roberts measure the volatility of a technology class by the amount of revisions that are 
made to it by the patent office. 
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citations are better at indicating market value. In any case, the examiner 
ultimately decides on the included citations, primarily for legal purposes. 
Therefore, we will not introduce a difference between the citations in our 
framework. 
The notion that patents which are relevant to other patents are likely to have a 
market value, follows from the fact that since the cited patent is in principle filed 
before the citing patent, it may lay a claim on the knowledge space of the citing 
patent. If the owner of the citing patent uses this part of the claimed knowledge 
space of his patent then the owner of the cited patent may claim damages or 
demand license or acquisition of the cited, and now infringed, patent. 
Therefore, a patent being cited is likely to be correlated with the possibility to 
monetize the patent, and therefore the market value of the patent. 
Self-citations as an indication of productive value 
Patents can also be cited by patents that belong to the same owner, this is 
referred to as a self-citation. Naturally, this does not involve market value since 
owners are not going to demand compensation from themselves4. 
Since early patent citation literature (Narin et al., 1987), it has been argued that 
self-citations provide a valuable indicator of innovative quality. A patent with 
many self-citations indicates that the owner pursued further activity in the area. 
It is thus likely that patents with many self-citations indicate building stones for 
large projects within the firm (Narin et al., 1987; Lanjouw and Schankerman, 
2004). Moreover, it has also already been shown, that a count of self-citations 
performs well at explaining patent value (Bessen, 2008) and may even 
outperform a count of other citations (Thomas, 1999; Hall et al., 2005; 
Belenzon, 2012).   
In conclusion, the literature mostly suggests that a patent that receives many 
self-citations will be of a more productive nature, as it then constitutes a part of 
a larger patent portfolio of the owner of the patent. It is thus likely that the 
patents that are cited multiple times by patents from the same owner protect a 
critical part of the innovative effort of the owner and therefore possess a 
substantial productive value. 
Hypotheses 
From the discussed theories relating patent value to decisions of patent 
owners, and patent citations to patent value, we can derive several hypotheses 
that can be used to validate our framework. These hypotheses can then be 
tested by analyzing patent data. In this subsection, we will briefly discuss each 
of the hypotheses and their underlying rationale. 
Productive value and market value as different constructs 
Throughout the theoretical section, we assumed that productive value and 
market value classify as substantially different constructs of patent value. It is 
                                                          
4 Internal transfers do happen, for instance because of fiscal considerations. 
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likely that these constructs have a degree of correlation. After all, if a patent 
has a substantial value to its owner, it is likely that other parties are also 
interested in acquiring or licensing it. Nonetheless, for our framework to be 
useful, the constructs must be substantially different from each other. 
Therefore, in the data we expect that our measures, self-citations and non-self-
citations, contain different information, i.e. one indicator does not explain a 
large amount (>50%) of the variation in the other. 
Patent transfers and patent licenses are positively correlated by 
market value 
Patent transfers and patent licenses can only occur by the grace of sufficient 
interest from others. Therefore, market value should positively impact the 
chances of a patent being sold or licensed, and thus non-self-citations should 
correlate positively with patent transfers and patent licenses. 
Patent transfers are negatively correlated with productive value 
Productive value is unlikely to positively relate to the sale of a patent because 
productive value, in this case, represents the opportunity costs for the patent 
owner: when they sell the patent they are unlikely to be able to use its 
technology and obtain any revenue from products related to it. Therefore, the 
productive value of a patent, as measured by its self-citations, should be 
negatively correlated with its chances of being sold. 
Productive and market value correlate with patent renewal 
Patent owners are faced with the decision of continuing to pay maintenance 
fees for the patent, which they will continue to do if the value of the patent 
outweighs the costs of maintaining it. In our framework, productive and market 
value should both increase the value of the patent for its owner. Therefore, 
patents that have a high productive and/or market value should be more likely 
to be renewed. We hence expect that both citation based measures of patent 
value, self-citations and other citations, correlate positively with patent renewal. 
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Methods and Data 
Data and sample selection 
We use patent citation indicators constructed from the October 2013 version 
of the EPO PATSTAT database.  We want to perform and compare analyses 
at both the EPO and the USPTO. Consequently, the sample was constructed 
of DOCDB patent families that contain at least an EPO application and at least 
one USPTO application. This allows for a sample in both offices of identical 
inventions, since all members of this family have the same technical content 
(Albrecht et al., 2011). It is to be noted that this decision biases the dataset to 
include more valuable patents, as patents with larger families have been found 
to be of higher value (e.g. Harhoff et al., 2003).  We further restricted the 
families to have granted patents in both EPO and USPTO, since patents are 
likely to be abandoned at some point if they are never granted. We then applied 
a basic data cleaning (equal to Bakker et al., 2016) to remove duplicates 
caused by untraceable priorities and citations, incorrect conversions of patent 
numbers, and several issues caused by changes in the USPTO system in 
2001. The changes brought by this data-cleaning are minor but ensure that all 
patents and citations in our dataset correspond to actual patents filed in the 
relevant patent offices.  
We decided to have EPO patents valued by the citations in the EPO system, 
and the USPTO patents by the citations in the USPTO system. This is done to 
ensure the patent is valued in its legal context, rather than as a general 
measure of quality. Bakker et al. (2016) show that this choice represents a 
substantial difference in the patent citation counts, and therefore our results 
should always be considered as representing the value of patents in their own 
patent system.  
To enable a decent time window for observing renewal decisions, sales, 
licenses and patent citations, we only included patents up until the year 2000. 
The sample was further restricted to include only patents that were applied later 
than 1981 because we are unsure of the accuracy of renewal data of earlier 
patents5. We therefore arrive at a dataset with patents between 1981 and 2000. 
It is to be noted that even after these procedures, a small number of patent 
families had more than one member at the same patent offices. Therefore, the 
number of observations between analyses using EPO indicators (N=547,365), 
is slightly different than those that rely on USPTO indicators (N=571,816). 
Licenses and sales data  
In this paper, we explain patent licensing deals and patent sales using a model 
of market and private value. We use data from the INPADOC PRS file of the 
spring version of PATSTAT 2014. Unfortunately, from this data we could only 
extract licenses and sales of EPO patents. For this reason, we added license 
                                                          
5 We observed a larger number than expected of never renewed patents for earlier dates. This 
indicates that renewal data may be incomplete, thus making an analysis of these years unreliable.  
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and transaction data from the research of Marco et al. (2015) which relate to 
USPTO documents.  
A major problem with the analysis of patent sales is that, even though it is 
sometimes obligatory to license changes in ownership to the patent office, this 
is often omitted by the parties involved (Kovács, 2016). This entails that we 
need to treat the reported data of sales and licenses as inherently incomplete 
and according to Kovács (2016) biased towards patents of higher value. 
Therefore, we should not focus on whether higher valued patents are sold, but 
instead if productive and market value relate differently to the chances of a 
patent being sold.  
It is likely that registrations of licenses are even more incomplete, as no 
requirement generally exists to register licenses of patents. Here we will 
instead analyze if the chance of licenses is explained by both an increase in 
market value and an increase in private value.  
Methods for estimating the effect of patent citations 
on patent renewal 
To observe patent renewal, we will use data on maintenance payments 
recorded in the INPADOC PRS file, provided by the 2014 April version of the 
EPO PATSTAT database. Patent renewal as an indicator is derived from the 
process in which the owners of a patent need to pay periodical fees to keep a 
patent in force. For patents at European offices this fee is paid yearly (after an 
initial free period of a few years), while owners of USPTO patents only  pay this 
fee at 4,8 and 12 years after application. The value of patent documents can 
then be assessed by observing if any renewal fees have been paid and for 
what period they were paid. It is to be noted that patent renewal is (in general) 
limited by the maximum lifetime of patents - 20 years. This entails that the 
patent will expire, regardless of the desire of an owner to pay any price for 
renewal at this point. The implication of this expiration is that all patents, which 
have a value/revenue stream above the threshold to be maintained until their 
twentieth year, will have an exactly equal score on the renewal indicator. 
Therefore, a censoring occurs with respect to the higher values that may be 
attributed to the patent. 
In this paper, we will describe renewal as the end of the period for which 
maintenance fees have been registered. We observed patent renewal for all 
granted patents of both EPO and USPTO by examining renewal fees paid to 
the respective office6. In the case of EPO patents, we considered a patent 
renewed if it has been renewed in at least one national office which subscribes 
to the EPO regional system. This method follows the Single Renewal Approach 
(SRA), as discussed in van Zeebroeck (2011) and which was also used in 
Bakker (2017).  
                                                          
6 i.e. we observed the last registered renewal payment of the patent at its respective office. 
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We tested the robustness of the SRA method in appendix C by using instead 
data of a single patent office (i.e. the German, British, and French patent office). 
In this analysis, we found that the results obtained by only using patents from 
one of the European patent offices does not differ substantially from those 
presented by aggregating the offices using the SRA method.  
The patent renewal indicator is often seen as an indicator of value (e.g. Pakes 
and Schankerman, 1984; Pakes, 1984; Lanjouw et al., 1998; Harhoff et al., 
1999; Thomas, 1999; Hegde and Sampat, 2009) as it reflects an economic 
decision of the owner of the patent. Thus, patent renewal can be thought of as 
revealing the private value that the owner attributes to the patent. 
Estimating patent renewal is not a trivial endeavor as patents can be 
maintained for only a small number of years, with different payments charged 
by the patent office each year. Addtionally, Pakes (1986) highlighted a real 
option approach by considering that renewing a patent does not only extend 
patent protection for a limited time but also provides the option of future 
extensions. This approach has been extended and modelled by Maurseth 
(2005) using survival analyses. Patent renewal can also be modelled using 
binary approaches, by considering for each patent whether it had been 
renewed up until that benchmark or not.  
Each approach has its advantages: binary analyses provide an easy to 
understand framework, with relatively few assumptions, but do not use all 
information by only assessing a single timeframe. Survival analyses better 
model the renewal process, incorporating the full variation in the renewal 
indicator, but must rely on different and stronger assumptions on the underlying 
model. The main assumption being that patents with different citation rates 
have proportional hazard functions. For our analyses, this would restrict patent 
citations to have effects on the patent renewal decision that are constant over 
time. This assumption is generally violated in our data as will be shown in the 
analyses at the end of the paper. For this reason, the survival analyses will 
depict an average hazard, which may be harder to interpret economically. 
Finally, a linear model where renewal time is directly estimated can also be 
used. While neglecting the likely non-linearity, in the relation between patent 
renewal and patent value, it does produce an easy to understand model with 
respect to renewal time.  
In this paper, we will present survival analyses as they give a more 
comprehensive picture and allow for deeper inspection of the data. However, 
in appendix C, we will present alternative methods such as logistic analysis 
from Hegde and Sampat (2009), and censored linear, i.e.Tobit, analysis as 
shown in Bakker (2017), to corroborate the main findings from the survival 
analyses. 
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Controls 
Patents, as the inventions they represent, have a high degree of heterogeneity, 
and therefore suitable controls need to be added. Thereupon, controls will be 
added for the main causes of heterogeneity that may affect the citations to a 
patent and its value. These are: the year of filing, technology, applicant, and 
value characteristics. In the remainder of this section we will discuss the 
reasons for the inclusion of each of these controls and how the controls will be 
implemented.  
As is common in patent research, dummies were added for both the year and 
technological area (IPC3)7 in which the patent was filed. In some of the 
robustness tests, the IPC3 level is found too generate to many control 
variables, which impacted the analyses negatively8. In these cases, we 
resorted to using controls using the 35 FHG categories as defined by Schmoch 
(2008). These FHG categories are derived by clustering classes from the IPC 
system and are therefore likely to be good representation of the information in 
the IPC3 controls. Most patents have multiple IPC3 classes, while some 
patents cover several FHG categories. In these cases, the dummies have been 
normalized to reflect a partial count to estimate the average effect the 
technology classes/categories have on patent renewal, and thereby better 
controlling for their contribution.  
Furthermore, additional controls were added to reflect the attributes of the 
applicant of the patent9. The controls are included because we assume that 
different applicants likely write different kinds of patent documents, thus 
affecting their citation rates, and also have different evaluation criteria of the 
renewal decision of a patent. Moreover, smaller applicants may qualify to pay 
lower maintenance fees at the USPTO (2016). Additionally, Lampe (2012) 
found that foreign applicants may have a different citation behavior. 
Accordingly, as controls we included the following: the type of applicant (i.e. 
company, government, hospital, individual, university, or unknown/other); the 
size of the applicant; the experience of the applicant; and the residence country 
of the applicant. We also included a dummy indicating whether there were 
multiple applicants. Whenever there were multiple applicants we observe this 
in a dummy variable and adjust the applicant related variables in the following 
way: for continuous variables, we defaulted to the oldest and largest applicant 
as we assume that it is the most experienced actor that will decide on patent 
renewal; as for the categorical attributes (i.e. applicant type and country of 
residence), we used a partial count in these cases. 
The main difficulty with research involving patent citations and private value is 
that patent citations, in general, correlate with the quality of the patent 
(Lanjouw, 2004). Therefore, to distinguish the productive and market value, the 
                                                          
7 The second highest level of aggregation of the International Patent Classification system, also 
known as the class level. In our data we observe 128 distinct categories.  
8 For example, in some binary analyses non-convergence was encountered due to the 
considerable number of dummies which had non-zero values only for a few patents.  
9 For 7 patents no applicant was identified, these applications were not included in the analysis. 
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general quality of the patent needs to be controlled for. In this paper, we add 
several controls that have been known to correlate with patent quality and 
patent value, following the overview by Squicciarini et al. (2013). These are: 
whether the patent is triadic; the number of countries the patent family 
members are filed in (an adapted version of Harhoff et al., 2003); the number 
of claims; and the grant lag of the patent (Harhoff and Wagner, 2009; Régibeau 
and Rockett, 2010). We validated the inclusion of these control variables in 
appendix A.  
Additionally, we added controls that reflect the broadness and complexity of 
the patent, since simple and narrow patents may differ from complex and broad 
patents. We control for complexity using the number of distinct IPC3 classes, 
and for broadness using the total number of IPC classes present on the patent.  
Further controls for complexity are the following: the number of backward 
citations Harhoff et al. (2003); the Trajtenberg et al. (1997) originality; and the 
Shane (2001) radicalness indicator at the IPC6 level. Here the IPC6 level was 
chosen as it represents a more fine-grained control than the IPC3 level that is 
used to control for technology classification.  We did not add the number of 
non-patent references of a patent as an indicator, since it did not provide 
significant coefficients in the survival regressions and lead to non-convergence 
in some of the binary analyses. Survival analyses with the indicator included 
showed that the relevant coefficients for our analyses were not substantially 
altered because of this omission.  
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Descriptive statistics  
In table 2, the descriptive statistics are listed for the variables that are used in 
this paper. The descriptive statistics, except for EPO specific indicators, refer 
to the statistics of USPTO patents. The statistics for most variables differ little 
as the EPO patents belong to the same DOCDB patent family and therefore 
have the same technological content.  
Because of censoring issues, it may happen that patents are present in one 
patent office and yet have no family member in the other, because the family 
member was filed outside the time limits of our sample. It also rarely happens 
that a DOCDB patent family has multiple granted family members in the same 
office, which may occur because of divisions of patents. This explains the 
different number of observations in both EPO and USPTO analyses.  
Finally, there is sometimes the problem that no patents belonging to applicants 
of particularly small nationalities, and/or technology categories, were 
licensed/sold/maintained. To prevent these patents from falling out, two left-
over categories were created for groups containing less than 50 patents: one 
for applicant nationalities; and one for technology categories. This ensures that 
we can still correct for patent classes and applicant nationalities, even if there 
are very small groups created by these controls. However, for the binary 
analyses regarding licenses and transfers it was necessary to still drop some 
of the smaller categories, leading to slightly fewer observations in their 
analyses.       
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Table 8: Descriptions and descriptive statistics of the continuous variables used in this 
paper. Variables with # default the largest and oldest applicant if a patent has multiple 
applicants.   
Name  Description 
N Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
Min Max 
 Dependent variables 
USPTO renewal  The number of years for which 
maintenance fees have been paid to the 
USPTO  
571816 14.55 5.78 4 20 
EPO renewal  The number of years for which 
maintenance fees have been paid to the 
USPTO 
547365 13.08 4.82 2 20 
EPO Opposition  
 Whether an opposition procedure is 
instigated against an EPO patent 
538261 0.058 0.234 0 1 
EPO Licensed  
 Whether an EPO patent is registered as 
licensed 
538261 0.010 0.100 0 1 
USPTO 
Licensed 
 Whether an USPTO patent is registered 
as licensed 
569758 0.008 0.087 0 1 
EPO Transfer  
 Whether a sale is registered for the EPO 
patent 
538261 0.326 0.469 0 1 
USPTO Transfer  
 Whether a sale is registered for the 
USPTO patent 
563413 0.340 0.474 0 1 
 Time controls 
Application year  Dummy for the year in which patent 
was applied for. 
571816 1992.61 5.38 1981 2000 
 Applicant Controls 
Applicant 
experience# 
 Years between the filing date of the 
current patent and that of the first 
application filed by the applicant. 
571816 36.24 31.15 0 146 
Ln(Applt. size) #   Logarithm of the total number of 
patents ever filed by the applicant, 
observed over the entire database.   
571816 7.39 3.32 0 13.0 
Co-patented  Dummy indicating if the patent has 
more than 1 applicant. 
571816 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 Patent quality controls 
Nr. Countries  Number of distinct patent offices in 
which the DOCDB family of the patent 
has at least 1 application present . 
571816 7.08 4.12 2 51 
Triadic  Dummy to indicate if the DOCDB 
patent family of the patent also contains 
a Japanese patent 
571816 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Backward 
citations 
 The number of patents cited by the 
patent 
571816 11.88 12.67 0 198 
Originality  The score of the Trajtenberg originality 
indicator on the IPC6 level 
571816 0.51 0.32 0 1 
Number of 
claims 
 The number of claims registered in the 
patent 
571816 14.57 12.37 0 596 
No claims 
registered 
 Dummy to indicate patents where the 
number of claims is unknown. For these 
patents the number of claims is set to 0 
571816 0.0004 0.02 0 1 
Grant lag  The number of days between the filing 
of the application document and the 
grant date of the patent 
571816 798.65 430.99 0 9827 
Number of IPC 
classes 
 Number of IPC technology classes that 
are assigned to the patent 
571816 5.11 5.08 1 166 
Number of 
distinct IPC3 
classes 
 Number of distinct IPC3 classes that are 
assigned to the patent 571816 1.74 0.93 1 16 
Shane 
radicalness 
 The score on the Shane radicalness 
indicator at the IPC6 level 
571816 10.05 11.31 0 198 
 Citation variables 
EPO self-
citations 
 Number of times a patent has been cited 
by EPO patents that have the same 
applicant as the cited patent 
547365 0.16 0.36 0 1 
EPO other 
citations  
 Number of times a patent has been cited 
by EPO patents that have a different 
applicant as the cited patent 
547365 1.27 2.47 0 126 
USPTO self-
citations 
 Number of times a patent has been cited 
by USPTO applications that have the 
same applicant as the cited application 
571816 1.52 5.65 0 1057 
USPTO other 
citations 
 Number of times a patent has been cited 
by USPTO applications that have a 
different applicant as the cited 
application 
571816 13.26 24.91 0 2792 
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The main model of this paper uses various categorical variables (IPC 
categories, applicant country, and sector allocation). Other models replace the 
IPC classification with FHG categories due to the considerable number of 
controls created by using the IPC3 classifications. The FHG categories were 
specifically created to group close IPC classes and seem therefore a decent 
alternative to control for technological variety. To better understand the 
categorical variables we display some characteristics of the diversity between 
them (see table 3).  
Table 9: Overview of categorical variables used in this paper. All variables use a partial 
count. A Herfindahl index is provided for USPTO patents; the values for EPO patents are very 
similar. 
Variable definition Number of 
categories  
Herfindahl 
index 
IPC3 
Dummy variable to indicate if the IPC3 
class (e.g. A01) is present in the patent 
application. 
121 0.035 
FHG 
Dummy variable to indicate if the patent 
application is classified in a particular FHG 
class as determined by Schmoch (2008). 
35 0.036 
Applicant 
type 
Type of applicant: Company, government, 
hospital, individual, university or 
unknown/other.  
6 0.92 
Applicant 
country 
Country in which the applicant resided at 
time of filing the patent. 
53 0.190 
 
The categories of applicant type and applicant country have a relatively high 
Herfindahl index, which is due to the presence of a category in which most of 
observations fall. Most patent applications are, unsurprisingly, filed by 
companies (96%), while a substantial number of applicants come from the US 
(32%). These findings entail that the results for patents belonging to non-firm 
applicants may be substantially different because of their small share in our 
sample. This is less a concern for patents of non-US applicants as they still 
represent a majority. 
Using the current value of the renewal payments at the EPO10 and the USPTO, 
we can determine the variance and average value of the renewal payments in 
our dataset. Because EPO renewal data is censored, due to the long time it 
takes to obtain a full picture of the maintenance payments (i.e. 20 years) we 
also include estimates for a restricted sample for which all maintenance data 
is available. In the full sample, more patents will be fully maintained as a 
decision of the owner to abandon the patent at a later stage in the patent life 
time, will not have been recorded.  
 
                                                          
10 The maintenance payments at the EPO are dependent on the national offices at which the patent 
is registered. Here we will use the pre-grant payment scheme, as defined by the EPO, as an 
approximation for these payments. 
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The cumulative values of renewal payments are listed in table 4. This table 
shows the frequent problem with renewal as an indicator of private value: it 
doesn’t capture extreme values. Renewal payments are useful to distinguish 
between patents that are valued somewhere between a low bound, after taking 
filing costs into account, and several tens of thousands of euros/dollars. 
Extreme outcomes that may derive from radical and novel innovations (e.g. 
see Verhoeven et al., 2016) will not be captured by this estimation. Fortunately, 
for our sample, this is not a problem as many patents are not fully renewed. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the results of this analysis will be mainly 
relevant to understand the use of the average run-of-the-mill patent, rather than 
radical or very novel patents.   
 
Table 10: Estimates of the overall private value and variance within our sample. 
Name Description 
N Mean 
Standard  
deviation 
Min Max 
% fully 
renewed 
EPO total  
payment(full 
sample) 
Approximated amount of 
maintenance/renewal fees payed (€) 
to maintain the EPO patent 
547365 13467 7071 0 24090 34% 
EPO total 
payment 
(restricted 
sample) 
Approximated amount of 
maintenance/renewal fees payed (€) 
to maintain the EPO patent, for 
patents filed before 1993 
256559 13381 7890 0 24090 19% 
USPTO 
total 
payment  
Total amount of 
maintenance/renewal fees payed ($) 
to maintain the USPTO patent  
571816 7753 5021 0 12600 49% 
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Validation 
 
In the theory section of the paper, we established 4 hypotheses, which are 
instrumental to verify whether our assertions that distinguish between 
productive and market value hold. It is important to note that we assume that 
owners estimate these values independently of the patent citations. In this 
view, patent citations reflect value, but do not influence it. In this section, we 
will test the four hypotheses, using the data and methods outlined in the 
previous section, to determine whether the proposed framework is reflected in 
our data.  
Productive and market value as different constructs 
We determined that productive and market value should measure different 
constructs. This entails that the correlation between self- and other citations 
should be relatively small. However, it is still reasonable to assume that the 
constructs correlate, since technologies that are valuable to their owner are 
likely to be valuable to others. We estimated the correlation between self- and 
other citations for both EPO and USPTO patents. The results are shown in 
table 5. 
Table 11: Correlation between self- and non-self-citations for EPO and USPTO patents.  
*** indicates p<0.001. 
Patent source Nr. observations Correlation 
Squared 
correlation 
EPO 547365 0.32*** 0.10 
USPTO 571816 0.21*** 0.04 
 
It appears that self- and non-self-citations have a reasonably large correlation. 
This correlation is nonetheless, low enough that one indicator only explains a 
fraction of the variation, as measured by the squared correlation in the other 
indicator. We therefore conclude that self- and other citations appear to 
measure different constructs. 
Patent citations and market operations 
The productive value and the market value of a patent should influence the 
behavior of the patent owner regarding market operations, such as licensing 
and selling. It is expected that patents with a high market value are more likely 
to be licensed or sold. Furthermore, we expect that patents with a higher 
productive value, i.e. more other citations, are less likely to be sold.  
 
We test the relation between received citations and the probability of sales and 
licenses using logistic models and a standardized loglinear form of self- and 
other citations. This is done for both EPO and USPTO patents regarding sales, 
and only for EPO patents regarding licenses, due to data issues. In these 
analyses we correct for technology class using the FHG35 classification 
scheme, which divides patents in 35 industrial classes based on their IPC 
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classification (Schmoch, 2008). This is used instead of the IPC3 dummies of 
later analyses, since including these IPC3 dummies lead to many excluded 
categories of technologies, as well as poor convergence of the logistic 
analyses. The analyses are shown in table 6: 
 
Table 12: Logit analyses if a patent is licensed or sold for granted EPO or USPTO patents, 
explained by the patents self- and other citations. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
†p=0.05, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 License 
registered 
(EPO) 
Transfer 
registered 
(EPO) 
License 
registered 
(USPTO) 
Transfer 
registered 
(USPTO) 
Ln(1+Self- 0.0315† -0.0688*** 0.0836*** -0.171*** 
citations) (0.016) (0.0035) (0.014) (0.0034) 
(standardized)     
     
Ln(1+Other  0.110*** 0.103*** 0.303*** 0.215*** 
citations) (0.016) (0.0035) (0.018) (0.0036) 
(standardized)     
     
Constant -2.636* -3.135*** -18.22*** -3.136*** 
 (1.04) (0.68) (5.03) (0.76) 
     
FHG35 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Applicant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Quality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 546176 547365 569758 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.202 0.100 0.255 0.115 
Log-likelihood -24694 -310785 -18882 -324367 
Recall (%) 0.29 30.16 2.25 37.93 
Specificity (%) 100.00 90.67 99.98 87.41 
Precision (%) 50.00 60.97 44.09 60.74 
 
The analysis presented provides support for the hypothesis that non-self-
citations correlate positively with the chances of a patent being licensed and 
the chances that a patent is sold. Our other hypothesis, which states that sales 
are negatively correlated with self-citations and positively correlated with other 
citations, is also supported by the analyses. All relevant coefficients are 
significant, which is a result of the large volume of sold patents in our sample. 
It is interesting to note that the standardized coefficient of self-citations is, in 
order of magnitude, close to the one related to other citations. This indicates 
that owners take a substantial interest both in the market value as well as the 
position of the patent in their IP strategy.   
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The coefficient regarding self-citations in the analysis of licensed EPO patents 
is on the edge of significance (p=0.050). This may be related to the functional 
form as analyses with a linear relation for self-citations are strongly significant 
(p<0.001). In all other analyses of this paper the functional form was also 
tested, but this did not affect significance nor the direction of the effect. The 
reason it does in this analysis is due to the relatively small number of licensed 
patents (5,537), which makes the effective sample size of this analysis much 
smaller than any other, presented in this paper.  In general, it is also unclear 
which functional form should be preferred for self-citations since Bakker (2016) 
only determined the functional form of all citations combined, out of which self-
citations are only a minor subset. 
The analysis of this section reveals that the framework presented correctly 
explains the correlations of self- and other citations with patent licenses and 
patent sales. We also tested if the owner of the citing patent feels directly 
threatened by the cited patent, which is a major indication of market value since 
no one will license or acquire a patent if there was no indication of a possible 
threat (Sherry and Teece, 2004). This analysis is based on reactions to threats 
by patent opposition and is detailed in appendix B. This analysis confirms that 
parties, which are threathened by a patent, tend to cite this patent.  Thereby 
confirming that non-self-citations indicate market value.  
Patent citations and renewal 
Patent owners are more likely to maintain their patents if their value is high. 
Therefore, we expect that both productive and market value correlate positively 
with patent maintenance. Following our framework, this entails that both self- 
and other citations correlate negatively with patent abandonment. To test this 
we ran a ox survival regression to determine the relation between self- and 
other citations and patent renewal. Bakker (2016) indicated that citations have 
a loglinear relation to patent value, therefore we will use a log-linear transform. 
Moreover, we standardized the resulting indicators to estimate their relative 
contributions. The resulting analysis is then performed for both EPO and 
USPTO patents. It bears reminding that negative coefficients indicate a lesser 
hazard of non-renewal, and therefore a higher value. The results are listed in 
table 7.    
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Table 13: Cox survival regressions for the last renewal registered for granted EPO and 
USPTO patent applications. Citation indicators refer to office counter parts as listed in 
table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) 
 Renewal 
EPO 
Renewal  
USPTO 
Ln(1+Self-citations) -0.0758*** -0.182*** 
(standardized) (0.0017) (0.0021) 
   
Ln(1+Other citations) -0.116*** -0.199*** 
(standardized) (0.0018) (0.0019) 
   
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
Applicant controls Yes Yes 
   
Value controls Yes Yes 
N 547365 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.009 
AIC 9166501 7491354 
Log-likelihood -4583040 -3745463 
 
The measures of productive and market value are both found to be important 
since they correlate significantly negative with patent abandonment, and thus 
positively with patent renewal. Hence, the results provide support for the 
second hypothesis. Furthermore, the analyses show that the standardized 
coefficients for self-citations are very similar to those of other citations. This 
indicates that the estimated productive value has a similar explanatory power 
as the estimated market value. We tested different methods of estimating 
renewal (Logit and Tobit), this yielded the same results (see appendix C). We 
also tested the robustness of the SRA approach for EPO, by comparing it to 
national offices within its territory. The approach was found to be comparable 
with that of using a single patent office, as is also documented in appendix C.  
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How do owners value their patents over 
time? 
 
Patent owners can use their patent for different purposes: protecting their own 
innovative efforts or monetize them. It is reasonable to assume that patent 
owners have a different preference towards either of these two goals, and that 
this value changes over the lifetime of the patent, for instance in relation to the 
legal status of the patent (Sherry and Teece, 2004). For example, it is possible 
that owners first file patents in conjunction with a research and development 
strategy, where patents are used as a method of protecting their invention. 
Later, when more is known about possible market operations, the attention 
may switch more into that direction. Alternatively, given that the option value of 
renewal is diminishing (Pakes, 1986; Serrano, 2010), the amount of protection 
may be reduced as patent owners start switching to other measures of IP 
protection. This may decrease the market value as prospective buyers would 
need to create production and marketing resources, which eats into the time of 
the patent validity.          
We use our established framework to estimate the weight owners give to 
productive and market value by observing how their respective indicators 
explain patent renewal at different points during the patent lifetime. The weight 
itself is estimated by how well each indicator explains patent renewal. As in the 
previous section, we use standardized versions of the loglinear transformed 
citation indicators. As such, we can use the size of the coefficients associated 
with the citations to gauge the importance attributed by the patent owner. This 
may be informative to understand when patents are more likely to be offered 
for sale or otherwise monetized. Likewise, it will help to understand the 
positioning of patents of different ages in a patent portfolio. In the second 
subsection, we will look at the evolution of the different valuations for patents 
over time. This analysis will provide a better look on the motivations for 
maintaining patents over time, and by doing so the expansion of markets for 
technology. 
To evaluate this, we ran Cox regressions with both values, as estimated by 
patent citations, interacted with the year after the filing of the patent. It is to be 
noted that there are only a few decision moments for patents at each office. At 
the USPTO there are decision moments at the 4, 8 and 12-year mark. For EPO 
patents the renewal decisions are made yearly, but to attain symmetry we also 
converted this into three distinct periods. This approach also has the benefit of 
an increased power in the analysis, which leads to smaller standard errors.  
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Figure 4: Relative importance of the productive and market value for 3 renewal decisions 
in the lifetime of USPTO patents. Error bars signal a robust 95% confidence interval. 
   
 
Figure 5: Relative importance of the productive and market value for 3 renewal decisions 
in the lifetime of EPO patents. Error bars signal a robust 95% confidence interval. 
In both figures the drop of the coefficients over time is obvious. This likely is an 
indication that factors, other than the productive and market value observed in 
our framework, are becoming more important. These factors may be related to 
the success of a product or the performance of the firm, and less related to the 
patent document itself.  
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The other observation is that while both values become less important near the 
end of the patent life time, the importance of productive value decreases more 
than that of market value. This effect appears stronger for USPTO patents than 
for EPO patents. Therefore, it appears that in the initial stages of a patent’s 
lifetime, owners place a higher importance on the role of the patent in 
facilitating the production of goods. This focus wanes over time, while owners 
remain attentive to the interest of other parties in their intellectual property. 
Because of this process, the complete value of later patents is more likely to 
be related to their market value and as such they are then more likely to be 
monetized. 
These results also signal measurement issues for those who wish to use patent 
renewal as a metric to evaluate value. If one only evaluates whether a patent 
has been renewed in the initial stages (e.g. whether a USPTO patent has been 
renewed for at least 4 or 8 years) this will capture more productive value than 
when one considers a full renewal indicator.  
However, the EPO analysis may be affected by censoring since we do not 
observe all renewal decisions for patents filed after 1993 because these 
decisions were not yet recorded in our dataset. Consequently, we also 
repeated the analysis with only patents that are filed up until 1993 (see figure 
3). This exercise presented a more similar picture to the analysis involving 
USPTO patents. The divergence between the USPTO and EPO analysis is 
thus, likely caused by the censoring at the end of the sample.  
 
Figure 6: Relative importance of the productive and market value for 3 renewal decisions 
in the lifetime of EPO patents filed in or before 1993. Error bars signal a robust 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Conclusion and discussion 
 
The analyses in this paper reveal that patent owners care about both the 
productive and market value of their patents when making decisions regarding 
the patent. Some of the results had already been found in other scientific works. 
For instance, using a simpler methodology, Thomas (1999) found that self-
citations and other citations relate positively to patent renewal. This paper adds 
to this literature by introducing a new consistent framework which explains 
directly why certain correlations are expected even when controlling for the 
technological value of the patent. The paper also adds new insights by 
consistently finding that self-citations correlate negatively with patent sales, but 
not with patent licenses. The directionality of the framework is then also 
validated by using an analysis which ties patent citations to the parties involved 
in the opposition of patents. Our analyses further reveal that at first, the 
productive value is important, while for later decisions both productive and 
market considerations may be weighed in a similar fashion.  
Another main contribution is relating patent citations to patent value, by using 
their function in the patent system. Thus, leading to the conclusion that patent 
citations indicate value as they indicate potential monetization options for the 
patent owner. This point of view is a good addition, and perhaps occasional 
replacement, to the patent citations as knowledge flows narrative, and may be 
of more use to those interested in the management of intellectual property. For 
example, patent owners can gauge the market value, as well as potentially 
interested parties, by observing the received citations. On the other hand, 
those owners may also want to pay attention to the patents they cite if they 
want to avoid accidental infringement. The productive and market value are 
also likely to correspond to defensive and offensive patents respectively. 
Hence, the citation structure may reveal the positions of parties in complicated 
technology markets, in a similar vein to the patent thicket analysis by von 
Gravenitz et al. (2011). Finally, researchers of open innovation can use the 
framework as an indication for the openness of the innovation strategy of firms: 
those that generate relatively many outside citations are likely more focused 
on the market of intellectual property. Alternatively, the renewal analysis 
presented at the end may help to gauge the importance firms attach to the 
market value of their patents.  
Next to the main conclusions, this paper also provides more technical 
contributions for patent research, which we will shortly discuss here. First, it 
shows that patent value indicators do not correlate well, thus necessitating the 
inclusion of many variables to arrive at a decent value control. By relating the 
quality controls to patent renewal, it is validated that the quality controls do 
indeed indicate value in the way that was expected. As for the patent renewal 
analysis itself, it was demonstrated that our results are independent of the 
chosen Cox survival regression technique, and also that the SRA method of 
Van Zeebroeck (2011) for multiple EPO patent offices gives very similar results 
to the use of a single patent office.  
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Considering the results found in this paper, it is recommended that researchers 
include self-citations separately in their analyses, as they appear to represent 
a quite different process than other patent citations. It is likely that these 
different processes interact differently with indicators of value and therefore 
such an indicator could prove to be useful. Consequently, more efforts should 
be made to better observe patent value, by including additional variables and 
developing new indicators. 
The analyses were made by observing individual patents. This brings with it 
several issues, out of which the main concern is that larger firms are likely to 
make decisions based on bundles of patents. Our framework is still applicable 
regarding the productive and market value of such groups, but will exclude 
strategic considerations such as the overlap between patents and the diversity 
of the portfolio. This may also explain the low explanatory value, sometimes 
found in our analysis, as patent renewals, sales, and licenses may be not 
decided on the base of the value of an individual patent, but on the base of a 
patent portfolio. This may lead to low-quality patents being renewed, sold or 
licensed, simply because they are part of the portfolio of a successful 
technology protected by multiple patents. Alternatively, patents of a decent 
quality may be allowed to lapse because they provide overlapping protection 
with other patents. Thus, the results of the analyses presented in this paper 
may have inaccuracies with respect to the exact patent value.       
In conclusion, this paper shows the importance and potential of considering the 
legal context of patents when estimating their value, instead of simply 
observing the technological advances of patent. It seems desirable that 
researchers of fields that analyze innovation and IP strategies, such as open 
innovation, continue research in this direction to arrive at a more complete 
understanding of (the value of) patents and their relation to innovation.   
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Appendix A: Validation of control variables  
Multivariate statistics 
 
In this paper, we use two sets of controls to control for applicant characteristics 
and the quality of the patent. We will first examine the relation between the set 
of controls using correlation analysis and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). 
We only present an analysis based on USPTO patents for this exercise, as the 
analysis based on EPO patents gives comparable results. First, we will present 
the correlations between members of the same set of controls (see tables A1 
and A2).  
Table A1:Correlations between control variables on the applicant level. N=571,816 
 Variable 
 Number 
1 2 3 
Ln(Applt. size) 1 1   
Co-patented 2 0.03 1  
Applicant experience 3 0.67 0.06 1 
 
Table A2: Correlations between the variables that control for patent quality. N=571,816.  
Variable name nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Nr. Countries 1 1          
Originality 2 .23 1         
No claims registered 3 .00 .01 1        
Triadic 4 .27 .32 .00 1       
Number of distinct IPC3 classes 5 .13 .58 .00 .20 1      
Number of IPC classes 6 .33 .54 .00 .27 .44 1     
Backward citations 7 .10 .04 .00 -.01 .06 .10 1    
Number of claims 8 .08 .04 -.02 -.01 .04 .08 .24 1   
Grant lag 9 .07 .08 .00 .01 .07 .11 .18 .14 1  
Shane radicalness 10 .16 .18 .00 .01 .19 .22 .70 .18 .17 1 
 
These tables show that substantial correlations exist between some of the 
control variables but, with a few exceptions, these do not exceed 0.50. 
Variables that show high correlation between them are for instance: the 
variables firm experience and firm size. This is expected because older firms 
also had more time to file patents and are therefore likely bigger. Another 
example is the number of distinct IPC3 classes which has a large correlation 
with the total number of IPC classes. These variables both correlate well with 
originality. For the remaining variables, we find low correlations, which is 
consistent with the findings of Squicciarini et al. (2013). 
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Next, we performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on all controls. This 
will help determine if the controls indeed indicate two distinct constructs and 
whether there is any overlap between them. The (Varimax) rotated factor 
loadings are shown in table A3. 
Table A3: Factors extracted using EFA (principal component factors) with the Kaiser 
criterion and rotated using the Varimax algorithm.  Loadings greater than 0.4 are denoted in 
bold.  
Variable 
(cum. 
Variance) 
Factor 1 
(18%) 
Factor 2 
(33%) 
Factor 3 
(46%) 
Factor 4 
(54%) 
Factor 5 
(62%) 
Uniqueness 
Nr. Countries 0.49 0.12 -0.23 -0.11 -0.16 0.65 
Originality 0.83 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.31 
No claims 
registered 
0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.96 -0.03 0.07 
Triadic 0.56 -0.11 0.17 -0.07 -0.23 0.58 
Number of 
distinct IPC3 
classes 
0.72 0.08 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.45 
Number of 
IPC classes 
0.77 0.14 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.38 
Backward 
citations 
0.00 0.88 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.23 
Number of 
claims 
0.02 0.46 -0.06 -0.22 -0.08 0.73 
Grant lag 0.08 0.40 0.00 -0.06 0.12 0.81 
Shane 
radicalness 
0.16 0.85 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.25 
Ln(Applt. 
size) 
0.01 -0.02 0.92 0.00 0.02 0.16 
Co-patented 0.04 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.94 0.11 
Applicant 
experience 
0.03 0.00 0.90 -0.01 0.01 0.20 
 
From these loadings, we can deduce that 3 constructs are measured, as well 
as two separate control variables. The latter can be observed in factors 4 and 
5, which only have high loadings on one variable each: missing claims and co-
patented. This is a strong indication, in conjunction with the correlation tables 
presented before, that the other control variables do not explain whether a 
patent has missing claims in the database, or if the patent is co-patented.  
For the other variables, we detect one factor that appears to be related to the 
characteristics of the applicant of the patent. One of the two remaining factors 
appears to be related to the broadness of the patent, while the other appears 
to be related to its backward citations. Controls that represent the expected 
value at the moment of the filing of the patent, such as grant lag, claims, and 
family size, have reasonable loadings on these factors, but retain a high 
uniqueness. Therefore, we can conclude that the controls that measure 
applicant behavior and patent quality are indeed measuring different 
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constructs. As for the quality controls, it is surprising that the two constructs 
they appear to measure are not directly related to patent value but to the 
broadness of the patent, as well as the nature of its backwards citations.  
Patent indicators and renewal 
The models that we will present in this paper will feature the inclusion of many 
control variables. These controls are included because it is expected that they 
may influence the relation between patent citations and patent value. In the 
paper, we have included controls that should represent the general inventive 
value and quality of the patent. Based on the literature, certain relations 
between the control variables and patent renewal are expected. By observing 
these relations in a model without patent citations, we can determine whether 
the variables approximate the expected constructs. 
In this analysis, the IPC technological dummies are not presented since 
different technological fields may have different lifecycles. This makes it likely 
that different renewal times may not only represent different value estimations 
by the owner, but also distinct characteristics of the technology. In fact, this is 
one of the reasons they are included in the main analyses.  
Unlike the analyses in the paper, we will provide hazard ratios for the control 
variables as they are easier to interpret than the raw coefficients, which are 
provided by the Cox hazard regressions. It bears reminding that the ratio here 
refers to the hazard of being abandoned. Therefore, variables that increase 
this hazard are negatively correlated with patent value. The results are 
presented in table A4.  
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Table A4: Hazard ratios for Cox survival regression for granted patent applications, using 
only control variables to estimate renewal. Hazard ratios presented. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) 
 USPTO  
Renewal 
EPO 
Renewal 
Application year   
1981 Reference Reference 
   
1982 0.983 0.996 
 (0.017) (0.014) 
   
1983 0.999 0.993 
 (0.017) (0.013) 
   
1984 1.004 1.011 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
   
1985 1.006 1.020 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
   
1986 1.005 1.013 
 (0.016) (0.013) 
   
1987 0.969* 0.988 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
   
1988 0.948*** 0.960*** 
 (0.015) (0.012) 
   
1989 0.929*** 0.968** 
 (0.014) (0.012) 
   
1990 0.925*** 0.953*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) 
   
1991 0.896*** 0.950*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) 
   
1992 0.876*** 0.924*** 
 (0.014) (0.011) 
   
1993 0.851*** 0.902*** 
 (0.013) (0.011) 
   
1994 0.824*** 0.807*** 
 (0.012) (0.0098) 
   
1995 0.792*** 0.759*** 
 (0.012) (0.0093) 
   
1996 0.807*** 0.740*** 
 (0.012) (0.0092) 
   
1997 0.777*** 0.705*** 
 (0.011) (0.0088) 
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Table A4 continued   
 (1) (2) 
 USPTO  
Renewal 
EPO 
Renewal 
Application year 
(continued) 
  
1998 0.812*** 0.667*** 
 (0.012) (0.0085) 
   
1999 0.999 0.626*** 
 (0.014) (0.0081) 
   
2000 1.357*** 0.594*** 
 (0.019) (0.0078) 
Applicant type   
Company 0.948*** 0.967** 
 (0.011) (0.010) 
   
Government 1.023 1.028 
 (0.018) (0.017) 
   
Hospital 0.958 1.067 
 (0.072) (0.080) 
   
Individual 1.053*** 1.079*** 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
   
University 0.968 1.076*** 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
   
Unknown 1.093* 1.046 
 (0.044) (0.040) 
Other applicant controls   
Ln(applt size) 0.972*** 0.979*** 
 (0.0010) (0.00093) 
   
Co-patented 1.016 1.012 
 (0.014) (0.013) 
   
Applicant experience 1.003*** 1.002*** 
 (0.000092) (0.000084) 
Value controls   
Number of countries 0.983*** 0.971*** 
 (0.00056) (0.00053) 
   
Originality 1.019* 1.011 
 (0.0085) (0.0074) 
   
No claims registered 8.928*** 0.950 
 (0.58) (0.029) 
   
Triadic 1.004 1.027*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0043) 
   
Number of distinct IPC3 
classes 
0.988*** 0.995 
 (0.0026) (0.0024) 
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Table A4 continued   
 (1) (2) 
 USPTO  
Renewal 
EPO 
Renewal 
Value controls   
(continued)   
Number of IPC classes 1.000 0.999* 
 (0.00048) (0.00051) 
   
Backward citations 0.997*** 0.987*** 
 (0.00023) (0.00062) 
   
Number of claims 0.994*** 0.994*** 
 (0.00018) (0.00021) 
   
Grant lag(years) 1.162*** 0.901*** 
 (0.0017) (0.00094) 
   
Shane radicalness 1.005*** 1.008*** 
 (0.00025) (0.00041) 
   
IPC3 dummies Significant Significant 
   
Country dummies Significant Significant 
N 571816 547365 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.006 
AIC 7508163 9174499 
Log-likelihood -3753870 -4587041 
 
The hazard ratios with respect to the year of patent filing, show that patents of 
later years are more likely to be renewed. Only in the USPTO analysis for the 
last years is this trend reversed. This may signal a data issue (i.e. renewal 
payments from 2012 not yet registered in the database), or a changing of the 
financial incentives for renewing patents in the 2000s, which may be caused 
the financial crisis starting in 2007. Interestingly, we do not observe similar 
shocks for the EPO year dummies. This is likely because EPO renewal is 
determined much more often, which entails that shocks affect more patents. 
The observed shock for the last year of USPTO patents is, however, still cause 
for concern. Therefore, we performed robustness tests in all the analyses in 
this paper, which showed that excluding the last year did not lead to 
substantially different results.  
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The hazard ratios belonging to the dummies concerning the type of applicant, 
reveal that companies are most likely to maintain their patents, which is 
unsurprising as they receive the most direct incentives from having patents. On 
the other hand of the spectrum, individual applicants are less likely to renew 
their patents. This could be due to the limited resources they can spend on 
maintenance payments. The other applicant types do not appear to have 
different renewal characteristics from each other: their hazard ratios are not 
significantly different. It is also found that larger and newer applicants are more 
likely to maintain their patents. The latter is surprising as newcomers are 
maybe more likely to cease their production activities.  
The quality controls behave as expected, with commonly used indicators of 
private patent value, i.e. the number of countries and the number of claims, all 
being negatively related to the hazard of abandonment. Interestingly, the speed 
of granting a patent appears to be negatively related to EPO renewal, this may 
indicate that granting speed as a measure of private value may be better suited 
for USPTO patents than for EPO patents. The coefficient for triadic patents is 
not significant at the USPTO, which is probably due to our sample selection in 
which all patents already have at least a USPTO and EPO family member. 
Variables that signal complexity show a more diverse picture, with the variables 
Shane radicalness and originality indicate a higher hazard of abandonment, 
while the number of distinct IPC3 classes and the number of backward citations 
indicate a lower hazard. Finally, patents where no claims are registered in the 
EPO PATSTAT database are very unlikely to be maintained.   
This exercise shows that the control variables are generally performing in the 
way they are expected to. Therefore, we believe that we indeed arrive at a 
model which can reasonably control for the general patent value, which is likely 
the result of its underlying technology in the models presented in this paper.   
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Appendix B: Opposition as a response to 
threatening patents  
 
We validated our framework by correlating citation indicators based on self- 
and other citations with the probability a patent is licensed, sold, or renewed. 
We would also like to determine a more direct measure of market value, which 
tests whether the owner of the citing patent displays an interest in the citing 
patent. Unfortunately, licenses and sales of patents are relatively rare events, 
and moreover, it is hard to consistently extract the name of the new owner from 
the patent data. For this reason, we turn to another indication of market value 
which is whether an opposition procedure is instigated against a patent.   
The opposition procedure at the EPO is a possible method of invalidating a 
patent. This procedure allows third parties to challenge the validity of any 
patent that has been granted within 9 months after its grant date. Such an 
opposition procedure is then used as a method by which third parties can 
remove low-quality patents from the patent system without the expense of a 
lawsuit (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). Hence, we expect that opposition filings 
are mainly initiated by parties for which the granted patent would represent a 
potential threat (Harhoff et al., 2015). Patents that are potentially threatening 
to others are patents that have a potential market value for their owner. This is 
because the owner can use the patent to force the threatened parties into 
license agreements, use legal action against them, or sell the patent to them. 
Therefore, we use the existance of the opposition procedure as a proxy for the 
market value of a patent. 
If citations are indeed an indication of market value, then we would expect 
opposed patents to be cited relatively often by patents that belong to the 
opposing party. To test this hypothesis, we use opposition data from the April 
2014 version of the INPADOC PRS augmented EPO PATSTAT database. For 
all EPO patents between 1980 and 2005 we extracted information on the listed 
opposition as well as the patents that cited them in the EPO PATSTAT 2013 
fall database. From this information, we extracted patents for which the 
opposing party could be identified as an applicant, by using the HRM 
aggregated table, for any patent in our database. This lead to the identification 
of 11528 applicants, of which the vast majority (92%) are identified as 
companies.  
For each of these opposed patents a reference set was created. This set 
consists of granted, but not opposed patents, filed in the same year and which 
shared at least one full IPC code with the opposed patent. Full IPC codes are 
very detailed, and few patents are filed in groups that are identified by these 
codes: on average 148 possible control patents were found per opposed 
patent. From this control set, we randomly selected 5 control patents per 
opposed patent, while discarding any opposed patents for which at least 5 
control patents could not be found.  
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Our matching did not involve any patent quality or patent value considerations, 
and therefore we control for these characteristics by inserting the same value 
controls as used in the analyses presented in the main paper. We also control 
for the number of times the patent has been cited by others than the opposing 
part. Following Bakker (2017), we model the contribution of patent citations 
because log-linear as the linear fit causes convergence issues for the logistic 
models. Finally, there is the possibility that self-citations also play a role in our 
analyses, therefore the analyses were replicated with a log-linear 
transformation of them included. Descriptive statistics of relevant variables are 
listed in table B1. 
Table B1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analyses of this sub-section. 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Patent is opposed 270636 0.17 0.37 0 1 
Opposer citations 270636 0.25 1.94 0 353 
P(opposer citing) 270636 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Ln(non-opposer citations+1) 270636 1.04 1.09 0 7 
Ln(self-citations+1) 270636 0.27 0.60 0 6 
DOCDB family size  270636 9.45 8.84 1 392 
Trajtenberg originality at IPC6 level 270636 0.62 0.28 0 1 
No claims registered 270636 0.002 0.05 0 1 
Triadic 270636 0.58 0.49 0 1 
Number of distinct IPC3 classes 270636 2.03 1.12 1 16 
Number of distinct IPC classes 270636 6.93 6.53 1 166 
Number of backward citations 270636 5.45 5.12 0 149 
Number of claims 270636 13.82 10.27 0 422 
Grant lag(days) 270636 1860.15 794.08 0 8826 
Shane radicalness at IPC6 level 270636 6.03 6.54 0 147 
 
For the resulting sample, we established whether a patent was cited by a patent 
that was applied for by the opposing party of the reference patent and if so, 
how many times11. These occurences are then primarily explained as a 
function of the dummy that indicates if the patent was opposed, or part of the 
reference group. The results of this exercise are listed below in table B2. 
  
                                                          
11 An applicant may have multiple patents citing the opposed patent. 
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Table B2: Regressions estimating the chances of being cited by the opposing party of an 
EPO opposition procedure for opposed patents and their controls. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Logit 
P(opposer 
citing) 
OLS 
Opposer 
citations 
Poisson 
Opposer 
citations 
Logit 
P(opposer 
citing) 
OLS 
Opposer 
citations 
Poisson 
Opposer 
citations 
       
Patent is  1.336*** 0.505*** 1.228*** 1.342*** 0.499*** 1.218*** 
opposed (0.017) (0.017) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) (0.032) 
       
Ln(non-  0.691*** 0.261*** 0.828*** 0.562*** 0.155*** 0.643*** 
opposer (0.0067) (0.0084) (0.014) (0.0088) (0.0075) (0.020) 
citations+1)       
       
Ln(self-    0.358*** 0.351*** 0.382*** 
citations+1)    (0.013) (0.022) (0.026) 
       
Value controls Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant Significant 
       
Constant -3.125*** -0.0835*** -2.749*** -3.039*** -0.0482* -2.580*** 
 (0.031) (0.023) (0.073) (0.032) (0.022) (0.069) 
N 270636 270636 270636 270636 270636 270636 
R2  0.034   0.043  
Pseudo R2 0.146  0.224 0.153  0.238 
AIC 120869 1116325 380535 119883 1114009 373297 
Log-likelihood -60422 -558149.4 -190255 -59928 -556991 -186634 
 
From these results, we observe that opposed patents are more likely to be 
cited by patents belonging to the party that opposes the patent. This holds even 
when controlling for the quality, as well as the number of other citations 
received by the patent. This effect is, besides highly significant, also 
substantial: the binary analysis estimates that the odds ratio is about 3. 
Moreover, the linear regression indicates that, on average, the opposed patent 
receives 0.51 more citations than the patents selected for control. The Poisson 
regression confirms that this increase is significant. Finally, this was also 
verified by a negative binomial regression which gave a very similar coefficient 
(not shown here).   
We conclude that opposed patents have an increased probability to be cited 
by the opposing party. This is consistent with our hypothesis that patent owners 
feel threathened by patents that they cite. From the previous discussion, we 
infer from this result, that non-self-citations are indicative of market value. 
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Appendix C: Evaluating the robustness of 
our renewal analysis 
 
We approximated the value that owners attribute to their patents, by using Cox 
survival regressions. However, in that analysis we used several large 
assumptions, which deserve a closer examination. First, we will evaluate the 
choice of using survival analyses rather than binary analysis or a censored 
linear analysis. Second, we evaluate the SRA method of Van Zeebroeck (2011) 
by comparing the EPO analysis to analyses using only German, French or UK 
patents.  
Using other estimation methods for renewal 
In this paper, we employ Cox survival analyses to estimate the relative value 
of different types of patent citations. As described earlier, this method is used 
because it takes full advantage of the variance in the data. Yet, other methods 
may also be considered. For example, binary analysis such as the linear 
probability model used by Hegde and Sampat (2009). Hence, we ran logistic 
regressions as well as linear regressions. For the latter, the issue of censoring 
needs to be considered as patents that are renewed untill their full term may 
have a larger unobserved value. Here we follow therefore the approach of 
Bakker (2017) and apply a Tobit regression. The results of this exercise are 
listed in table C1.     
 
Table C1: Results of other estimation methods to estimate patent renewal. Robust standard 
errors between parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Tobit 
EPO Renewal 
Logit 
Full term EPO 
Tobit 
USPTO 
Renewal 
Logit 
full term 
USPTO 
     
Ln(1+Self- 0.469*** 0.119*** 1.444*** 0.251*** 
citations) (0.013) (0.0046) (0.017) (0.0033) 
Standardized     
     
Ln(1+Other  0.731*** 0.245*** 1.710*** 0.335*** 
citations) (0.012) (0.0050) (0.016) (0.0037) 
(Standardized)     
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Applicant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Value controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 286805 286759 571816 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.019 0.051 0.035 0.107 
AIC 1606550 265084 2507529 708236 
Log-likelihood -803070 -132375 -1253551 -354071 
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The coefficients of the logistic regressions are unfortunately a biased 
representation of the population coefficient. Allison (1999) found that the 
logistic coefficients scale with the unexplained variance in the model. 
Consequently, when there is a different amount of unexplained variance, the 
exact coefficients cannot be compared between regressions.Fortunately, the 
bias affects all coefficients by the same factor and therefore, the relation 
between the coefficients should be similar as the one found in table 5.  
Therefore, we compare the ratio of coefficients listed in this table to the ones 
found in this section (see table C2).  
 
Table C2: Ratios between the coefficients of self- and other citations in analyses that 
estimate patent renewal using different methods. 
Office EPO USPTO 
Analysis method Cox survival Tobit Logit Cox survival Tobit Logit 
Ratio  
self-citations/ 
other citations 
0.65 0.64 0.49 1.09 1.18 1.33 
 
This comparison shows that the ratio of the estimated coefficients in table C1 
remains quite close to that of the survival regressions. Hence, we conclude that 
the results of the patent renewal analysis are robust with respect to the 
estimation methods used in this paper.   
EPO renewal 
As described in the method section, renewal at the EPO is not a straightforward 
process, considering that owners of patents need to maintain EPO patents at 
national offices. In this paper, EPO renewal was estimated using the SRA 
method of Van Zeebroeck (2011). Yet, as this method has rarely been used to 
estimate patent value, a robustness test is required to explore how this method 
fares against methods using only a single patent office. Thus, we repeated the 
analysis presented in table 5 using renewal data of three largest patent offices 
within the EPO territory. These are the patent offices of Germany (DE), the 
United Kingdom (UK), and France (FR). Not all EPO patents have been 
renewed at least once in all three of these offices, and therefore renewal data 
is not available for the entire sample of patents from the main analysis. This 
leads to slightly smaller samples in the individual analyses, whose results are 
listed in table C3.  
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Table C3: Comparison of Cox survival analyses with single patent offices that subscribe to 
the EPO, as compared to the EPO analysis of table 2.  Robust standard errors between 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (0)  (1) (2) (3) 
 Renewal  
EPO 
 
Renewal  
DE 
Renewal  
UK 
Renewal  
FR 
      
Ln(1+Self-citations) -0.0758***  -0.0693*** -0.0632*** -0.0618*** 
Standardized (0.00171)  (0.00177) (0.00179) (0.00183) 
      
Ln(1+Other citations) -0.116***  -0.113*** -0.106*** -0.110*** 
(Standardized) (0.00179)  (0.00186) (0.00188) (0.00193) 
IPC3 Dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year dummies Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
      
Applicant controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
      
Value controls Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
N 547365  493347 461048 440165 
Pseudo R2 0.007  0.007 0.007 0.007 
AIC 9166501  8251160 8012374 7613663 
Log-likelihood -4583040  -4125370 -4005977 -3806622 
 
The difference found is small: the difference between the coefficient of the SRA 
regression and the smallest coefficient is 23%, for the coefficient related to self-
citations, and 9% for the coefficient related to other citations. Thus, we can 
conclude that the SRA method presents a decent alternative to using renewal 
data from a single European office when working with data concernaing the 
renewal of EPO patents.  
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Which patent citation 
indicator performs best at 
approximating patent 
value? 
Jurriën Bakker and Bart Van Looy 
Abstract 
Patent citations are the most used source for arriving at indicators of patent 
value. However, various sources and methods lead to a large variation in the 
resulting patent value indicators. In this paper, we evaluate 4 commonly used 
patent citation indicators, based on EPO patents, USPTO patents, and DOCDB 
and INPADOC patent families, regarding their ability to explain patent value as 
measured by patent renewal. Our findings reveal that INPADOC patent family 
indicators generally perform better when explaining patent value, except for 
USPTO patents held by US applicants. When further distinguishing between 
citations received by the focal patent and its family members, it becomes clear 
that not all citations convey an equal value. For instance, ‘Crowding out’ 
phemona become visible: both the presence of (multiple) family members, and 
the family member’s citations, negatively affect the likelihood of renewal (of the 
focal patent). Combined, these observations suggest the relevance of adopting 
a nuanced weighting scheme which considers the family characteristics of the 
focal patent. Indicators using such a weighting scheme are then computed and 
shown to produce superior results to any of the commonly used indicators.  
Keywords: Patent citations, Patent family, Patent value, Patent renewal  
JEL Classification O34 
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Introduction 
 
Patent based statistics serve as an essential tool to measure innovation. This 
is because patents are designed to protect innovative efforts, counting and 
qualifying them creates thus a reasonable approximation of innovative activity. 
Additionally, patent statistics are relatively easily gathered, categorized and 
analyzed. This has contributed to the established status that patent based 
indicators enjoy as innovation measures.  
It may be difficult to capture innovative activity using only patent statistics (e.g. 
Griliches, 1990), by virtue of the heterogeneous nature of patent documents: 
some are small incremental improvements, while others represent radical or 
breakthrough innovations (Dahlin and Beherns, 2005). Therefore, indicators 
have been advanced that provide insights in the value (sometimes also 
referred to as quality) of patents (see Squicciarini, 2013 for a brief overview). 
Of these, patent citations are the most used as a result of their extensive 
validation (e.g. Carpenter et al., 1980; Trajtenberg, 1990; Harhoff et al., 1999; 
Hall et al., 2005; Gambardella, 2008), and their longtime availability in the most 
used patent databases.   
However, not all patent citations indicators are equal, since researchers may 
construct them differently: some scholars (e.g. Trajtenberg, 1990; Hall et al., 
2005; Czarnitzki et al., 2011) use data that is based on patents from the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) - primarily because of the 
popularity of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) data set (Hall 
et al., 2001). A second group (e.g. Czartnizki et al., 2011; Hottenrott et al., 
2016), uses patents from the European Patent Office (EPO), which are 
sometimes combined with patents applied through the Paris Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT), that have an EPO designation. This data is often acquired 
through the “EPO/OECD citation database”, which is described in Webb et al. 
(2005). The indicators that are derived from these different practices have been 
shown to be very different from each other (Bakker et al., 2016). 
Additionally, some researchers prefer to aggregate citation data on the level of 
the patent family (e.g. Gambardella et al., 2008; Graham and Harhoff, 2006; 
Magerman et al., 2011; Neuhäusler and Fritsch, 2012; Bakker, 2017). 
Generally, patent families are used to identify patents with equal content (often 
equivalents) in different patent offices, but they can also be used to group 
patents thought to be related to the same invention (Martínez, 2010). 
Aggregating data on the patent family level entails counting citations to all 
members of the same patent family and, when doing research at the level of 
the individual patent, attributing this score to an individual member of the patent 
family. Bakker et al. (2016) have also found that there are major differences 
when computing patent citation indicators using such a family aggregation, as 
opposed to using data from an individual office. Nakamura et al. (2015) have 
likewise found substantially different citation networks, when using patent 
family aggregation. 
132 
 
In face of these practices, it is unclear which patent citation indicator should be 
used if one wishes to estimate patent value. Bakker et al. (2016) suggest that 
using patent family aggregation is preferred if one wishes to create a universal 
indicator that can be (relatively) easily applied, even when one uses data from 
a single patent office. Be that is it may, comparability between research papers 
is not usually the main priority of researchers working on a singular project. 
Accordingly, it would be useful to set a new standard of patent citation 
indicators, based on the relation between the indicator and patent value. This 
should harmonize the research of innovation that relies on the value of patents, 
as well as improving the accuracy of this measure.  The establishment of a 
preferred indicator will also help reduce the workload for each individual 
research scholar, as they will not be required to gather data and compute 
multiple citation indicators. They can instead focus their efforts on obtaining 
citation data from a sole source.   
Therefore, we will investigate the performance of different patent citation 
indicators, by determining their effectiveness at estimating patent value in a 
large dataset. We do this by ranking the most commonly used indicators, 
regarding their ability to explain patent value. By using a large dataset, with a 
vast number of controls, we will be able to determine general trends which may 
not be observable in much smaller sets when researchers focus on specific 
subfields.  
In the remainder of the paper, we first introduce the relevant dataset, citation 
indicators, and relevant control variables. Afterwards, we investigate the extent 
of native biases in each indicator, and we then proceed to explore which patent 
citation indicators are best at explaining patent value. Finally, we will discuss 
possibilities for a weighed indicator, which may perform better than the 
currently available patent citation indicators.  
 
      
  
133 
 
Patent data and variables 
 
We use the same dataset as Bakker (2017), which is based on the EPO 
PATSTAT database of October 2013, and renewal data from the spring 2014 
EPO PATSTAT database. This data set consists of granted USPTO and EPO 
patents, filed between 1981 and 2000, thus giving each patent enough time to 
accrue forward citations.  
Two different patent family definitions are used to aggregate patent citations: 
DOCDB and INPADOC. The DOCDB patent family definition groups patents 
that share the same technical content (Albrecht et al., 2010) and is, generally, 
used to group equivalent patents which have been filed in different patent 
offices. The INPADOC patent family is larger, and groups patents that share a 
part of their priority picture (Martínez, 2010). It can be thought of as 
representing the underlying invention, when it is protected by multiple 
overlapping patents. The INPADOC patent family is therefore, usually (Bakker 
et al., 2016), larger than the DOCDB patent family. 
We restricted the dataset to EPO and USPTO patents that have a granted 
DOCDB patent family member in the other office. This ensures that analyses 
of EPO and USPTO renewal are comparable. Additionally, because it involves 
patents with at least two family members, it ensures that a difference is likely 
present between the family based citation indicators and the counts at the 
USPTO and EPO offices. Finally, this type of data ensures that only relatively 
valuable patents are observed, since having family members in other patent 
offices is a good indication of patent value (Harhoff et al., 2003). 
Patent citation indicators 
Patent citations are aggregated on the level of the family or application, in a 
similar vein as Bakker et al. (2016). To keep the analysis tractable, we also 
used similar definitions, which denote the citation indicator by the entity that it 
is based on. For example, the ‘EPO count’ variable counts the citations an EPO 
patent received from other EPO patents. On the other hand, the ‘DOCDB 
count’ variable counts the number of times the DOCDB family of the focal 
patent has been cited by other DOCDB families. Performing this exercise for 
EPO and USPTO patents, as well as the DOCDB and INPADOC patent 
families, leads to 4 different citation indicators: the EPO count; the USPTO 
count; the DOCDB count; and the INPADOC count. These indicators are 
described in table 1. 
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Table 14: Definitions and descriptive statistics of the indicators used in this dataset. 
Statistics for the controls are drawn for the USPTO patents, but are very similar for their EPO 
counterparts due to the sample composition.  
Indicator  Definition N mean Std. 
dev 
min max 
EPO count Number of citations that are 
received by EPO patents from 
other EPO patents 
547365 1.63 3.37 0 311 
USPTO 
count 
Number of citations that are 
received by USPTO patents 
from other USPTO patents 
571816 14.77 26.65 0 2802 
DOCDB 
count 
Number of citations that are 
received by the patent, or other 
members from its DOCDB 
family, from other DOCDB 
families 
571816 21.83 38.82 0 3146 
INPADOC 
count 
Number of citations that are 
received by the patent, or other 
members from its INPADOC 
family from other INPADOC 
families 
571816 26.13 82.54 0 4751 
 
Bakker et al. (2016) showed that patent citation indicators can differ 
substantially. To investigate this in our sample we computed correlations 
between the different citation indicators. Two tables are presented relating to 
either EPO patents (table 2), or USPTO patents (table 3).   
Table 15: Correlations between patent citation indicators referring to EPO patents. All 
correlations are significant at the p<0.001 level. N=547,365  
EPO count DOCDB count INPADOC count 
EPO count 1   
DOCDB count 0.31 1  
INPADOC count 0.14 0.59 1 
 
Table 16: Correlations between patent citation indicators referring to USPTO patents. All 
correlations are significant at the p<0.001 level. N=571,816  
USPTO count DOCDB count INPADOC count 
USPTO count 1   
DOCDB count 0.71 1  
INPADOC count 0.39 0.62 1 
 
From these tables, we observe that the correlations between indicators are 
significantly positive and vary substantially. The correlations between these 
indicators are expected to be high, as they should measure the same 
constructs. However, the correlations are not high enough to conclude that all 
indicators observe the same information, thus confirming that the conclusions 
by Bakker et al. (2016) also hold on this dataset.  
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The correlation between the EPO count and the family indicators is much lower 
than the correlation between the USPTO count and the family indicators. This 
is likely due to the substantial number of citations in the USPTO system, which 
in turn also affect the patent family citation indicators. Therefore, we expect 
more differences to be observed between the EPO indicator and the family 
indicators in the analyses of this paper. Likewise, patent family based citation 
indicators may display similar biases as the USPTO indicator due to this high 
correlation. 
Controls 
In all analyses, control variables were added to ensure that the always present 
heterogeneity of patent documents does not create undesired biases. 
Consequently, we included technology controls (IPC3), year controls, and 
applicant controls. The latter are included, since different applicants may write 
different patents, leading to different forward citation patterns. Additionally, 
different applicants may also have different filing strategies leading to 
differences between family and non-family indicators. The applicant controls 
refer to the size of the applicant (as measured by the total number of their 
patent applications observed in our database), the age of the applicant at the 
time of filing (as measured by the number of years between the year of the 
applicant’s first application and that of the currently observed patent), whether 
the patent had more than 1 applicant, and the nationality of the applicant. In 
the rare occasions (~6%) that a patent has more than 1 applicant we take the 
value of the largest and oldest applicant, as we assume that it is this applicant 
that handles any maintenance decisions. The controls used in our analyses 
are shown in table 4. 
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Table 17: Descriptive statistics of the control variables used in this paper. * indicates that a 
partial count is used to generate dummies. Variables with # refer to maximum values if more 
applicants are present. 
Indicator Definition 
N Mean 
Std. 
dev 
Min Max 
IPC3*  
Variable to indicate if the 
IPC3 class (e.g. A01) is 
present in the patent 
application 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Application 
Year 
Year in which the 
application was applied 
for at the patent office 
571816 1992.61 5.38 1981 2000 
Ln(Applt. 
size) #  
Logarithm of the total 
number of patents ever 
filed the applicant 
571816 7.39 3.32 0 13.0 
Applicant 
type* 
Type of applicant: 
Company, government, 
hospital, individual, 
university or unknown  
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Applicant 
experience# 
Years between filing of 
current patent and that of 
the first application filed 
by the applicant 
571816 36.24 31.15 0 146 
Applicant 
country* 
Country in which the 
applicant resided at time 
of filing the patent 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Co-patented 
Dummy to indicate if the 
patent has more than 1 
applicant 
571816 0.06 0.24 0 1 
 
Estimating patent value using patent renewal 
The main analysis of this paper centers around using patent indicators to 
estimate the private value of patents. We choose to use patent renewal for this 
purpose. The renewal indicator is derived from the fact that patents at the 
USPTO and EPO need to be maintained by periodical payments from their 
owners. These payments can then be used as a value indicator, denoted by 
‘patent renewal’ as they entail direct decisions of the patent owner to continue 
to pay a fee to extend their patent protection. This indicator has been used to 
approximate private patent value by several researchers (e.g. Hegde and 
Sampat, 2008; Thomas, 1999; and Bakker, 2017). In this paper, we generally 
follow the approach of Maurseth (2005), and estimate patent renewal using a 
Cox survival framework. In effect, we will be observing the hazard of non-
renewal, since survival regressions always model hazards, not sucesses. In 
our case this refers to a patent no longer being renewed.    
Patent renewal can be observed for both EPO and USPTO patents, but it will 
be computed differently for each office. As the USPTO is an ordinary national 
office, renewal can be readily established by reviewing maintenance payments 
registered at the USPTO. The EPO, on the other hand, is a regional office 
which administers patents from various national offices.  To establish EPO 
renewal, we used the single renewal SRA method of Van Zeebroeck (2011), 
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as explained in Bakker (2017). This metric constructs the EPO renewal time as 
the longest time a patent has been maintained at one of the national offices 
that subscribe to the EPO. This allows for a comparable renewal metric for both 
EPO and USPTO renewal. All USPTO patents had enough time to be fully 
renewed considering this decision is taken 12 years after the filing date at the 
USPTO. EPO renewal is censored for patents with application years after 
1993, for the reason the last potential EPO renewal decision only takes place 
20 years after the filing of the patent. As such, in models using only the full 
renewal time, we only employ EPO data up until 1993. For the resulting renewal 
indicators, we present the descriptive statistics in table 5. 
Table 18: Descriptive statistics of the renewal indicators used.  
Indicator Definition N Mean 
Std. 
dev 
Min Max 
USPTO 
renewal 
Latest fee payment registered 
at the USPTO 
571,816 14.55 5.78 4 20 
EPO 
renewal 
Latest fee payment at any of 
the offices that subscribe to 
the EPO 
547,365 13.08 4.82 2 20 
 
The econometric model 
In this paper, we set out to find the best citation indicator to use when 
estimating patent value. And so, our first objective is to find the citation indicator 
that best explains patent value, as to reduce the noise to signal ratio when this 
indicator is used as a proxy for patent value. If patent value were to be found 
as a simple monetary equivalent, this research could be operationalized by 
computing the shared variance (i.e. squared correlation) between the citation 
indicators and patent value. This is however not the case, since we rely on 
patent renewal data.  
Therefore, we construct a model that explains patent renewal as a function of 
patent citations, using the previously described Cox survival regressions. This 
model will be run several times, with a different patent citation indicator each 
time. Due to the different indicators the model will have each time a different 
explanatory power, which is indicated by the fit of the model. The best citation 
indicator is then revealed by its presence in the model that best explains patent 
renewal. This process is commonly referred to as horse-race regressions.    
Because of the nature of the Cox survival regressions, there is unfortunately 
no fit statistic that is easy to interpret, such as an R2.  Fortunately, there are 
other fit statistics that show which model has the best fit. Out of these we chose 
to focus on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) since it can be used to rank 
models when they are computed on the same dataset1. The model with the 
best fit is then indicated as the one having the lowest AIC score.  
                                                          
1 The AIC is a linear transformation of the log-likelihood, if the different models have the same 
number of variables. Therefore, this is equivalent to comparing the log-likelihood of the models.  
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Unfortunately, this method does not provide an easily understandable estimate 
of the differences between the various computed models. Consequently, we 
show binary (logistic) regressions where we use the citation indicators to 
explain the chances a patent is fully renewed. (available in appendix A). By 
doing so we can compare fit statistics such as precision, recall and specificity. 
In appendix B we use a method (i.e. a J-test) which does not rely on finding the 
best model fit. However, this method works best in a linear setting, which is 
why we use a model based on censored regression instead of a Cox survival 
model. 
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Using patent citation indicators to estimate 
patent value 
 
Which indicator to use? 
Researchers that want to use patent citations to measure patent value can 
choose from several patent based indicators, and will generally be interested 
in the indicator that best correlates with patent value. As discussed in section 
2 we perform Cox survival regressions to explain patent renewal using the 
different patent citation indicators. Due to the nature of survival regressions, 
the models will indicate the hazard of non-renewal.  
Additionally, we reviewed how well the USPTO count indicator performs for the 
renewal of their EPO DOCDB family members, and vice versa. This analysis 
reveals the efficacy of using USPTO patent data to approximate the value of 
EPO patents, and vice versa. This may be helpful for researchers that want to 
estimate patent value but do not have the required citation dataset. 
The indicators are presented using a log-linear transformation, as it presents a 
better model of the relation between private value and patent citations (Bakker, 
2017). We added controls for technology and year, as well as several variables 
to control for applicant characteristics: size, age, country of origin, and 
applicant type.  
In this section, we will cater to the situation in which only one patent citation 
indicator is used to explain patent value., i.e. the most common situation in 
innovation research. We will do this by using a “horse-race” approach to rank 
the patent citation indicators, regarding their ability to explain patent value in 
our dataset. This entails the computation of separate regressions that use 
patent citations to explain patent renewal, which differ on the citation indicator 
that is present. These analyses are presented in table 6 for renewal of EPO 
patents, and in table 7 for renewal of USPTO patents. We will rank the 
indicators based on the model fits (as measured by the AIC) of the analyses in 
which they are present. The indicator that is present in the model with the best 
fit, i.e. the model with the lowest AIC score, is then deemed to have the best 
performance at explaining patent value. 
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Table 19: Horse-race Cox survival regressions to determine which citation indicator best 
explains EPO renewal. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 EPO 
Renewal 
time 
EPO 
Renewal time 
EPO 
Renewal time 
EPO 
Renewal time 
EPO 
Renewal time 
Ln(1+EPO count)  -0.218***    
  (0.0024)    
      
Ln(1+USPTO count)   -0.197***   
   (0.0017)   
      
Ln(1+DOCDB count)    -0.292***  
    (0.0019)  
      
Ln(1+INPADOC 
count) 
    -0.294*** 
     (0.0019) 
      
Ln(Applt. size) -0.0232*** -0.0188*** -0.0192*** -0.0162*** -0.0162*** 
 (0.00094) (0.00094) (0.00094) (0.00094) (0.00094) 
      
Applicant experience 0.00257*** 0.00254*** 0.00229*** 0.00194*** 0.00183*** 
 (0.000083) (0.000083) (0.000083) (0.000083) (0.000083) 
      
Co-patented -0.00114 -0.00996 -0.000503 0.00520 0.00635 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
      
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 547365 547365 547365 547365 547365 
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 
AIC 9192257.0 9183751 9178888 9168307 9167176 
Log-likelihood -4595931 -4591676 -4589245 -4583955 -4583389 
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Table 20: Horse-race Cox survival regressions to determine which citation indicator best 
explains USPTO renewal. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 
0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 USPTO 
Renewal time 
USPTO 
Renewal time 
USPTO 
Renewal time 
USPTO 
Renewal time 
USPTO 
Renewal time 
      
Ln(1+EPO count)  -0.195***    
  (0.0028)    
      
Ln(1+USPTO count)   -0.247***   
   (0.0019)   
      
Ln(1+DOCDB count)    -0.243***  
    (0.0021)  
      
Ln(1+INPADOC count)     -0.234*** 
     (0.0021) 
      
Ln(Applt. size) -0.0268*** -0.0224*** -0.0220*** -0.0204*** -0.0205*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
      
Applicant experience 0.00271*** 0.00264*** 0.00230*** 0.00211*** 0.00205*** 
 (0.000092) (0.0000916) (0.000092) (0.000092) (0.000092) 
      
Co-patented 0.0248 0.0173 0.0266* 0.0352** 0.0368** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
      
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 571816 571816 571816 571816 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 
AIC 7519602 75144334 7503404 7505840 7506419 
Log-likelihood -3759599 -3757014 -3751499 -3752717 -3753007 
   
In these analyses, we observe that there is not one indicator that performs best 
at explaining both the renewal of EPO patents, and the renewal of USPTO 
patents. The lowest AIC score, which indicates the best fit, is found in the 
analysis containing the INPADOC count indicator for the sample of EPO 
patents. For the sample of USPTO patents the lowest AIC score is found for 
the analysis containing the USPTO count indicator. The DOCDB count 
indicator appears as a compromise, performing second best at explaining 
renewal for both the sample of EPO patents, and the sample of USPTO 
patents. It would thus appear that in the case of EPO patents the addition from 
other citation sources may prove to be more useful than for the case of USPTO 
patents. 
Interestingly, using USPTO citation data to estimate the value of EPO patents 
achieves a lower AIC than using EPO citation data. Therefore, we would advise 
to refrain from using EPO citations to estimate patent value, unless no other 
option is available.  
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We tested the results from this section using different model specifications, 
such as a logit, which estimates the probabilities of full renewal, and a Tobit, 
which estimates renewal time (see appendix A). From the results of the logistic 
analyses we observe that using a better suited citation indicator adds about 2 
percent points in either the specificity or sensitivity of the estimate. This 
increase is also close to the lowest improvement, which is observed by 
introducing any citation indicator. Thus, the effect of choosing a better citation 
indicator can be to double the additional explained variance gained from 
introducing a patent citation indicator. We also performed a J-test (see 
appendix B) which allows for a ranking of citation indicators, confirming the 
rankings shown in this section.  
The effects of applicant origin on value estimates  
We discovered that a home bias also exists in patent citation indicators (see 
appendix C). Accordingly, we should evaluate whether this affects the way in 
which patent citation indicators correlate with patent value. We have found that 
for EPO patents the INPADOC derived citations were better at explaining 
patent renewal, while for the USPTO patents USPTO derived citations proved 
superior. However, this effectiveness may come at the cost of biased estimates 
for domestic and foreign patents, in which one or the other is consistently 
over/under valued, even when appropriate control variables are included.  
In this subsection, we will explore this question by repeating the analyses of 
the previous section, by using a sample split by applicant origin.  This will allow 
us to determine if patent citation indicators will maintain the same ranking we 
found in the previous section if they are applied on sets of patents that have 
applicants of different origins. By doing so we can determine if the bias we 
detected in appendix C affects the effectiveness of the patent citation 
indicators. We assume that the main difference in the way patent citation 
indicators approximate value will differ between domestic and foreign 
applicants, following the results from appendix C and the intuition behind the 
home bias from Criscuolo (2006).    
We first determine which patents are foreign and domestic, by applying the rule 
that patents which have at least one domestic owner are deemed domestic, 
while all others are foreign. In this analysis, we will again show the results for 
all indicators, with exception of the EPO count for USPTO patents and the 
USPTO count for EPO patents, as these counts are never superior (including 
in this analysis) and are in general unlikely to be used in this way. The analyses 
for EPO patents are shown in table 8, and the analyses for USPTO patents are 
shown in table 9.   
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Table 21: Cox survival analyses explaining patent renewal of EPO patents with different 
patent citation indicators for both domestic (EPO) and foreign applicants. Standard errors 
in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EPO 
Renewal 
time 
Domestic 
applicants 
EPO 
Renewal 
time 
Domestic 
applicants 
EPO 
Renewal 
time 
domestic 
applicants 
EPO 
Renewal 
time 
Foreign 
applicants 
EPO 
Renewal 
time 
Foreign 
applicants 
EPO 
Renewal 
time 
Foreign 
applicants 
Ln(1+EPO count) -0.259***   -0.175***   
 (0.0037)   (0.0031)   
       
Ln(1+DOCDB 
count) 
 
-0.282*** 
  
-0.295***  
  (0.0028)   (0.0025)  
       
Ln(1+INPADOC 
count) 
  
-0.287*** 
  
-0.294*** 
   (0.0028)   (0.0024) 
       
Ln(Applt. size) 0.000650 0.000518 0.000981 -0.0238*** -0.0413*** -0.0412*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) 
       
Applicant 
experience 
0.00134*** 0.00122*** 0.00118*** 0.00245*** 0.00327*** 0.00311*** 
 (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) 
       
Co-patented 0.0121 0.0319* 0.0326* -0.0412* -0.0633*** -0.0631*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
       
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 244891 244891 244891 302474 302474 302474 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.007 
AIC 3938991 3934148 3933884 4744438 4733749 4732829 
Log-likelihood -1969346 -1966925 -1966793 -2372069 -2366725 -2366264 
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Table 22: Cox survival analyses explaining patent renewal of USPTO patents with 
different patent citation indicators for both domestic (US) and foreign applicants. Standard 
errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
Domestic 
applicants 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
Domestic 
applicants 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
Domestic 
applicants 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
Foreign 
applicants 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
Foreign 
applicants 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
Foreign 
applicants 
Ln(1+USPTO 
count) 
-0.299***   -0.229***   
 (0.0037)   (0.0023)   
       
Ln(1+DOCDB 
count) 
 -0.241***   -0.247***  
  (0.0040)   (0.0024)  
       
Ln(1+INPADOC 
count) 
  -0.209***   -0.248*** 
   (0.0038)   (0.0024) 
       
Ln(Applt. size) 0.00283 0.00246 0.00113 -0.0514*** -0.0494*** -0.0479*** 
 (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00220) (0.000975) (0.000976) (0.00098) 
       
Applicant 
experience 
0.00134*** 0.00122*** 0.00118*** 0.00245*** 0.00327*** 0.00311*** 
 (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00010) 
       
Co-patented 0.0121 0.0319* 0.0326* -0.0412* -0.0633*** -0.0631*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
       
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 182833 182833 182833 388983 388983 388983 
Pseudo R2 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.005 
AIC 1653884 165665 1657184 5534006 5533890 5533776 
Log-likelihood -826793 -828180 -828443 -2766853 -2766795 -2766738 
 
The model fits, as indicated by the AIC score, show the following: first, for the 
renewal of EPO patents the ranking of the indicators remains the same; and 
second, the ranking for explaining the renewal of USPTO patents does change 
depending on the origin of the applicants. For patents that have foreign 
applicants it appears to be better to use the INPADOC patent citation 
aggregation, while USPTO patents from US applicants are best estimated by 
using the USPTO citation counts. Therefore, the choice of citation indicator 
does not only depend on the office of the patent but also on the origin of its 
applicants.  
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A combined model of patent citation indicators 
We want to know if a single patent citation indicator is dominant, in which case 
adding another citation indicator does not significantly increase the explained 
variance in the patent renewal indicator. If this is true, then we would be able 
to simply recommend to always use that indicator when estimating patent 
value. Furthermore, we wish to find out if adding multiple citation indicators in 
one regression leads to an increased performance. And so, we construct a 
composite regression, in which all citation indicators are present. If all citation 
indicators have significant coefficients in this regression then they all have 
added information, and it is thus best to use them all to explain patent value. 
The results of the composite regressions are listed in table 10. 
Table 23: Cox survival regressions using all citation indicators to explain renewal for EPO 
and USPTO patents. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) 
 EPO 
Renewal time 
USPTO 
Renewal time 
Ln(1+EPO count) -0.0662*** -0.0939*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0031) 
   
Ln(1+USPTO count) 0.0732*** -0.201*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) 
   
Ln(1+DOCDB count) -0.132*** 0.0454*** 
 (0.0076) (0.0078) 
   
Ln(1+INPADOC count) -0.210*** -0.0822*** 
 (0.0065) (0.0068) 
   
Ln(Applt. size) -0.0152*** -0.0197*** 
 (0.00094) (0.0011) 
   
Applicant experience 0.00185*** 0.00221*** 
 (0.000083) (0.000092) 
   
Co-patented 0.00374 0.0247 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
   
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
Sector dummies Yes Yes 
   
Country dummies Yes Yes 
N 547365 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.008 
AIC 9165832 7501852 
Log-likelihood -4582714 -3750720 
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In both the composite regressions for EPO and USPTO patents all citation 
indicators have significant coefficients, and hence all contribute significantly in 
explaining patent value. We also tested this using a J-test, which is a more 
comprehensive method, and which is detailed in appendix B. This test confirms 
the results from our composite regression.  
In this composite analysis, we observe positive coefficients for some indicators, 
i.e. the USPTO count indicator in the regression concerning EPO patents, and 
the DOCDB count indicator in the regression concerning USPTO patents.  
These coefficients are clearly the result of adding multiple citation indicators in 
one regression, since their coefficients are always negative when they are the 
only citation indicator present, as can be seen in tables 6 and 7. This behavior 
is likely caused by multicollinearity as the two indicators have a correlation of 
0.71.  
We conclude from this analysis that the best research approach, which would 
explain patent value best in our large sample, is using all patent indicators at 
the same time. Be that as it may, such an approach is often unsuitable and has 
therefore rarely, if ever, been used. Consequently, when trying to explain 
patent value it is preferred if such a value can be expressed on a single 
dimension instead of four different ones. This also holds if one wants to use 
patent citations as a proxy of patent value, since it is likely that not all indicators 
have the same sign, due to the presence of multicollinearity. Finally, many 
researchers use small datasets in which it is not feasible to estimate 4 
coefficients, especially in the presence of multicollinearity (as in the case in our 
sample).  
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Deriving a weighting scheme for patent 
citations 
Set-up 
The results from the previous section present a puzzling picture, in which all 
citation indicators explain patent value, and there exists no single indicator that 
can be selected to present an optimal indication of patent value. In addition, 
the indicator rankings, with respect to their ability to explain patent value, 
depend on the value indicator used (i.e. EPO or USPTO renewal): family based 
indicators are better at explaining EPO renewal; and the non-family based 
USPTO count performed better at explaining USPTO renewal. Therefore, it 
appears that both users of USPTO citation counts and users of family counts 
estimate patent value best, albeit at different datasets. Even more so, because 
those relying on USPTO data more frequently try to estimate data of USPTO 
patents anyway, since USPTO data is often found in a dataset which only 
covers USPTO patents (e.g. the NBER dataset of Hall et al., 2001).  
We believe that a further investigation in the relation between received citations 
and patent value is necessary. To this end, we split up the received citations in 
mutually exclusive sources of citations. To accomplish this, we first divided the 
citations into categories, which depended on the cited entity. This exercise 
leads to three categories of citations: first, citations made to the patent; second, 
citations made to its DOCDB family members; and third, citations made to its 
INPADOC family members, but not to its DOCDB family members. It is to be 
noted here that such a grouping is possible, since the INPADOC patent family 
is, in our dataset, almost2 always larger than the DOCDB patent family.  
We then determined the office of the citing patents, leading to the following 
groups: citations from USPTO patents; citations from EPO patents; citations 
from PCT applications (i.e. applications that went through the PCT route); 
citations from patents that are applied at a national office subscribing to the 
EPO convention (denoted as European patents); and citations from patents 
from other offices (e.g. the patent offices of Australia, Japan (JPO), Korea 
(KIPO)). This leads to a combination of 3 cited entity categories and 5 groups 
of citation origins, which when combined leads to 15 exclusive citation 
indicators.  
  
                                                          
2 This does not hold for 88 EPO patents which appear to be part of the set identified by Bakker et 
al. (2016), for which the DOCDB family is larger than the INPADOC patent family. For these 
patents we equated the INPADOC patent family to the DOCDB patent family in our dataset, in 
order to maintain consistency.  
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To keep the indicators tractable we denoted them by cited entity-citation origin. 
For instance, Patent-USPTO refers to the number of citations the patent 
receives from USPTO patents, while DOCDB-USPTO refers to the number of 
citations its DOCDB patent family members receive from the same origin. 
Table 11 lists definitions for each of the citation indicators that are created, by 
following this procedure to decompose patent citations.  
Table 24: Definitions of the exclusive patent indicators that are used in this paper. 
Name Definition 
Patent-USPTO  Count of citations made to the patent by USPTO patents 
Patent-EPO Count of citations made to the patent by EPO patents 
Patent-PCT Count of citations made to the patent by PCT applications 
Patent-Europe 
Count of citations made to the patent by patents from offices 
subscribing to the EPO 
Patent-Other Count of citations made to the patent by patents from other offices 
DOCDB-USPTO  
Count of citations made to DOCDB family members of the patent 
by USPTO patents 
DOCDB-EPO 
Count of citations made to DOCDB family members of the patent 
by EPO patents 
DOCDB –PCT 
Count of citations made to DOCDB family members of by PCT 
applications 
DOCDB –Europe 
Count of citations made to DOCDB family members of the patent 
by patents from offices subscribing to the EPO 
DOCDB –Other 
Count of citations made to DOCDB family members of the patent 
by patents from other offices 
INPADOC-USPTO  
Count of citations made to INPADOC family members of the 
patent by USPTO patents 
INPADOC –EPO 
Count of citations made to INPADOC family members of the 
patent by EPO patents 
INPADOC –PCT 
Count of citations made to INPADOC family members of the 
patent by PCT applications 
INPADOC –Europe 
Count of citations made to INPADOC family members of the 
patent by patents from offices subscribing to the EPO 
INPADOC –Other 
Count of citations made to INPADOC family members of the 
patent by patents from other offices 
 
This approach has two advantages. First, it avoids the double counting that 
could arise if we would simply use the indicators from the previous section in 
the same regression. For instance, an analysis containing the USPTO count 
and DOCDB count indicator would double count any USPTO citations, since 
the DOCDB count indicator also counts USPTO citations. In fact, the presence 
of a considerable number of USPTO citations in the DOCDB count is likely the 
cause of the large correlation between these two indicators. These large 
correlations may create multi-collinearity problems in our regressions, as can 
be seen by the coefficients with different signs in table 10. Creating exclusive 
citation indicators reduces this problem, by avoiding the large correlations 
between indicators, caused simply by the fact that they partially consist of the 
same underlying patent data.  
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The second advantage is that, when the exclusive indicators are added in the 
same estimation, the coefficients associated with them will represent relative 
weights. These weights are relative because their exact value depends on the 
relation between patent citations and patent renewal.  The relative weights are 
then an indication of the relative contribution of each set of citations. If these 
contributions are similar, they can easily be added together (i.e. using a unitary 
weight for each contribution) to create a better indicator. If they are dissimilar 
a weighting scheme may be necessary.  
These weights can also be used to test two hypotheses simultaniously. The 
first hypothesis revolves around the assumption underlying the commonly used 
patent family based citation indicators, and states that all patent citations are 
equal and therefore can be simply summed to arrive at an indicator. If this is 
the case, the weights of the different citations should be equal. The second 
hypothesis is almost its antithesis, it states that only patent citations made 
directly to the patent application from patents of its own office contribute to 
explaining its value. This is implicitly the assumption behind using patents and 
patent citations only from a single patent office. In this case the only weights 
associated with the patent citations originating from the same patent office 
should be non-zero.  
Descriptive statistics 
The procedure described in the previous section creates several patent citation 
indicators that are uncommon in the literature. It therefore may be interesting 
to observe the descriptive statistics related to these indicators.  
Table 12 provides descriptive statistics for each indicator used in our analysis. 
Here we see again the dominance of USPTO citations, as there are many more 
USPTO citations to USPTO patents than in any other citation category. 
Additionally, USPTO citations to EPO patents are almost as high as EPO 
citations themselves. The ‘Other’ category presented in this table is composed 
of citations that originate from several patent offices, and is discussed in more 
detail in appendix D. 
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Table 25: Descriptive statistics for the exclusive patent indicators used in this section. 
Patent exclusive indicators are split up to describe citations to EPO and USPTO patents. Family 
indicators can differ substantially because of our exclusive treatment, and are therefore 
presented for both EPO and USPTO patents.  
Indicator name N Mean Std. dev Min Max 
EPO-EPO 547,365 1.63 3.37 0 311 
EPO-USPTO  547,365 1.44 4.21 0 417 
EPO-PCT 547,365 0.80 2.20 0 301 
EPO-Europe 547,365 0.58 1.36 0 92 
EPO-Other 547,365 0.08 0.39 0 20 
USPTO-EPO 571,816 1.29 4.47 0 1208 
USPTO-USPTO  571,816 14.77 26.65 0 2802 
USPTO-PCT 571,816 1.20 4.03 0 1047 
USPTO-Europe 571,816 0.31 0.89 0 123 
USPTO-Other 571,816 0.18 0.58 0 35 
Patent family indicators based on USPTO patents 
DOCDB-EPO  571,816 3.39 8.47 0 1353 
DOCDB-USPTO 571,816 6.96 33.14 0 2448 
DOCDB –PCT 571,816 2.31 7.23 0 1218 
DOCDB -Europe 571,816 1.22 2.40 0 150 
DOCDB –Other 571,816 0.91 2.01 0 246 
INPADOC-EPO  571,816 0.78 11.06 0 1381 
INPADOC -USPTO 571,816 3.42 45.21 0 3037 
INPADOC -PCT 571,816 0.65 9.28 0 1163 
INPADOC -Europe 571,816 0.13 1.45 0 102 
INPADOC -Other 571,816 0.17 2.01 0 95 
Patent family indicators based on EPO patents 
DOCDB-EPO  547,365 2.69 8.61 0 1255 
DOCDB-USPTO 547,365 17.41 36.78 0 2866 
DOCDB –PCT 547,365 2.35 7.43 0 1071 
DOCDB -Europe 547,365 0.95 2.27 0 180 
DOCDB –Other 547,365 0.97 2.10 0 246 
INPADOC-EPO  547,365 1.47 17.59 0 1913 
INPADOC-USPTO 547,365 6.57 80.42 0 6163 
INPADOC-PCT 547,365 1.34 16.52 0 1610 
INPADOC-Europe 547,365 0.29 2.67 0 276 
INPADOC-Other 547,365 0.52 3.95 0 262 
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In appendix D we describe relevant correlations and multivariate statistics. The 
conclusions of these exercises are twofold: first, there is relatively little 
correlation between citations received from the various citation sources; and 
second, there is a very high correlation (in the order of 0.9) between citations 
received from EPO and PCT documents, which is due to EPO documents often 
having the same citations as their PCT equivalent.  Therefore, we exclude PCT 
obtained citations from our analyses as to prevent multi-collinearity problems.   
The relation between patent citations and patent 
value 
To estimate the relative weights for different citations we employed Cox 
survival regressions as described in the prevous section. The weights are 
estimated in a linear rather than a log-linear framework, considering it is 
possible that the coefficients for certain citation categories are not positive, 
potentially due to multi-collinearity. This would create problems with a log–
linear specification, since taking the log of a negative value returns an 
imaginary number.  
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Table 26: Survival regressions to determine the relative weights of exclusive citation 
indicators when explaining the renewal of USPTO or EPO patents. Standard errors in 
parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 EPO 
Renewal 
time 
EPO 
Renewal 
time 
EPO 
Renewal 
time 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
USPTO 
Renewal 
time 
       
Patent-EPO  -0.0452*** -0.0361*** -0.0361*** -0.0414*** -0.0369*** -0.0369*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
       
Patent-USPTO -0.0074*** -0.00396*** -0.00390*** -0.0115*** -0.0105*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.00080) (0.00074) (0.00074) (0.00019) (0.00020) (0.00020) 
       
Patent-Europe -0.0370*** -0.0264*** -0.0264*** -0.0265*** -0.0175*** -0.0174*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
       
Patent-Other -0.0251*** -0.0256*** -0.0255*** -0.0757*** -0.0678*** -0.0678*** 
 (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
       
DOCDB-EPO  -0.0213*** -0.0181***  -0.00439*** -0.00389*** 
  (0.00088) (0.0013)  (0.00059) (0.00067) 
       
DOCDB-USPTO  -0.00262*** -0.00346***  0.00177*** 0.00161*** 
  (0.00012) (0.00020)  (0.000086) (0.00013) 
       
DOCDB –Europe  -0.0253*** -0.00497  -0.0201*** -0.0102*** 
  (0.0012) (0.0035)  (0.0010) (0.0027) 
       
DOCDB –Other  -0.0479*** -0.0375***  -0.0285*** -0.0307*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0035)  (0.0015) (0.0022) 
       
INPADOC    -0.00280**   -0.000411 
-EPO   (0.00094)   (0.00029) 
       
INPADOC –   0.000867***   0.000170 
USPTO   (0.00016)   (0.000088) 
       
INPADOC –   -0.0203***   -0.00977*** 
Europe   (0.0033)   (0.0025) 
       
INPADOC    -0.0102**   0.00216 
-Other   (0.0031)   (0.0016) 
       
DOCDB family  -0.0307*** -0.0191*** -0.0193*** -0.00821*** -0.00615*** -0.00620*** 
size (0.00048) (0.00048) (0.00049) (0.00039) (0.00038) (0.00038) 
       
INPADOC family  -.00051*** 0.0000145 0.000255*** 0.000343*** 0.000294*** 0.000277*** 
size (0.00015) (0.000068) (0.000054) (0.000032) (0.000028) (0.000038) 
       
Ln(Applt. size) -0.0173*** -0.0164*** -0.0164*** -0.0244*** -0.0233*** -0.0233*** 
 (0.00091) (0.00092) (0.00092) (0.00090) (0.00090) (0.00090) 
       
Applicant 
experience 
0.00226*** 0.00197*** 0.00195*** 0.00237*** 0.00233*** 0.00233*** 
 (0.000081) (0.000081) (0.000081) (0.000078) (0.000078) (0.000078) 
       
Co-patented -0.00820 0.00273 0.00248 0.0262* 0.0288* 0.0290* 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
       
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 547365 547365 547365 571816 571816 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 
AIC 9174624 9164094 9163922 7504012 7502611 7502600 
Log-likelihood -4587108 -4581839 -4581749 -3751798 -3751094 -3751084 
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The analyses presented in table 13 show that almost all citation sources are 
significant in explaining patent value. Accordingly, we conclude that only using 
patent and citation data from one source omits information about patent value. 
Nontheless, the coefficients that are attributed to different citation sources are 
very different, with some coefficients being more than ten times larger than 
others. This is an indication that simply adding all citations together will also 
not yield an optimal citation indicator.  
Interestingly, some coefficients are even positive (and therefore negatively 
related to patent value), an observation which we determined to be caused, in 
part by the competition that occurs when there are multiple granted patent 
family members present in the USPTO system, (see appendix E). This 
competition is caused by the presence of multiple granted USPTO patents in 
the same family, which may force the patent owner to choose to maintain some 
patents, while abandoning others. The added citations to these family 
members may thus be an indication of an increased competition, as opposed 
to an increasingly valuable invention. Thus, the existence more citations to the 
DOCDB patent family members may have a negative relation with the chance 
that the patent is renewed.  
In general, we find that indicators related to citations coming from the EPO 
system have higher coefficients than those coming from the USPTO system. 
This reduced impact may give credence to the idea that citations within the 
USPTO system are less relevant than citations within the EPO system (Michels 
and Bettels, 2001).   
We also find lower coefficients when considering citations to the patent family 
members, as opposed to the patent itself. This effect is increased if we look at 
the larger INPADOC patent family, for which some of the coefficients are 
insignificant, or sometimes even negatively related to patent value. These 
relations appear to hold to some degree in both patent offices. Therefore, it 
may be useful to employ a weighting scheme for citations that are received by 
the patent family.  
Creating a better patent citation indicator 
The previous section provides weights that can be applied to the various 
sources of citations when estimating patent value. In this section we will 
explore whether applying these weights leads to an improved performance 
when estimating patent value. For this endeavor we create weights out of the 
estimates, from the preceding subsection, using a procedure in which all 
weights are determined by dividing the coefficient belonging to the citations by 
the coefficients belonging to the patent-EPO variable. All indicators that have 
a negative weight after this procedure, are excluded from the composite 
indicator. We list the resulting weights of this procedure in table 14.  
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Table 27: Coefficients from the analysis and the weights derived from them.  
Citation source 
EPO USPTO 
Coefficient analysis Weight Coefficient analysis Weight 
Patent-EPO  -0.0361 1.000 -0.0369 1.000 
Patent-USPTO -0.0039 0.108 -0.0105 0.285 
Patent-Europe -0.0264 0.731 -0.0174 0.472 
Patent-Other -0.0255 0.706 -0.0678 1.837 
DOCDB-EPO  -0.0181 0.501 -0.00389 0.105 
DOCDB-USPTO -0.00346 0.096 0.00161 0 
DOCDB –Europe -0.00497 0.138 -0.0102 0.276 
DOCDB –Other -0.0375 1.039 -0.0307 0.832 
INPADOC-EPO  -0.0028 0.078 -0.000411 0.011 
INPADOC –USPTO 0.000867 0 0.00017 0 
INPADOC –Europe -0.0203 0.562 -0.00977 0.265 
INPADOC –Other -0.0102 0.283 0.00216 0 
 
We use the resulting composite indicators to explain patent renewal. This is 
done using the framework we established for the other patent indicators in the 
previous section (i.e. we insert the log-linear transformation of the indicator, 
accompanied by various control variables, in a Cox survival regression which 
explains patent renewal). This is done for the composite indicators resulting 
from the USPTO and EPO analyses in analyses that explain USPTO and EPO 
renewal respectively. The results of this procedure are shown in table 15. 
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Table 28: Cox survival regressions in which composite indicators explain renewal of EPO 
and USPTO patents. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 (1) (2) 
 EPO 
Renewal time 
USPTO 
Renewal time 
Ln(1+EPO composite) -0.332***  
 (0.0019)  
   
Ln(1+USPTO composite)  -0.319*** 
  (0.0024) 
   
Ln(Applt. size) -0.0161*** -0.0217*** 
 (0.00094) (0.0011) 
   
Applicant experience 0.00194*** 0.00220*** 
 (0.000083) (0.000092) 
   
Co-patented 0.00331 0.0325* 
 (0.012) (0.013) 
   
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
Sector dummies Yes Yes 
   
Country dummies Yes Yes 
N 547365 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.008 
AIC 9162608 7501239 
Log-likelihood -4581105 -3750417 
 
The AIC scores of the regressions involving the composite indicators, are lower 
than the lowest AIC score of any regressions from the horse-race analysis of 
tables 6 and 7. Therefore, we conclude that our weighted indicators are 
superior to any of the standard indicators that were discussed in this paper.  
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Conclusion 
 
This paper set out to give more guidance about which patent citation indicators 
to use, when one wants to approximate patent value. For this endeavor we 
created four patent citation indicators based on commonly used practices. We 
then proceeded to test them on their ability to explain patent value, as indicated 
by patent renewal.  
We found that all patent citation indicators explain a significant amount of 
patent value, as measured by patent renewal. However, due to multicollinearity 
issues, most researchers will prefer to use a single patent family citation 
indicator in their research. To aid this choice we performed horse-race 
regressions to select the patent citation indicator which best explains patent 
value. This analysis presented a different ranking for patent renewal at different 
offices. The INPADOC count citation indicator explained most of the variance 
in the renewal of EPO patents, while the non-family based USPTO count 
indicator explained most of the variance in the renewal of USPTO patents. 
Further investigation revealed that the variance in the renewal of USPTO 
patents, which belong to non-US applicants, is also best explained by the 
INPADOC count indicator.   
Consequently, it appears that whenever the subject of the analysis concerns 
USPTO patents from US applicants it would be more prudent to use citations 
to the USPTO patent, rather than a patent family based citation indicator. For 
EPO patents, and USPTO patents with non-US applicants, patent citations 
aggregated at the INPADOC patent family level are preferred. These results 
can be added to the analysis of Bakker et al. (2016), who argue in favor of the 
INPADOC patent citation indicator, due to the fact that it yields comparable 
indicators in different citation systems. Therefore, we recommend that the 
INPADOC family based patent citation indicator should be the standard 
indicator, when using patent citations to approximate patent value.  
To understand why aggregating at the family level does not always bring forth 
improvements an analysis was performed, which revealed that citations to 
family members need to be discounted in aggregated counts. This discount 
may also need to differ when considering patents from different systems. For 
instance, citations from outside the patent system are relatively more valuable 
for USPTO patents, while they are relatively less valuable for EPO patents. 
This may be related to the different citation practices in different system, given 
that a large amount of outside references to EPO patents are derived from the 
USPTO and vice versa (Bakker et al., 2016). For instance, the USPTO with its 
‘duty of candor’ has many more citations per patent than the EPO, and as such 
each individual citation may be less relevant to the patent.  
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This analysis also revealed that patents may suffer from competition if they 
have other granted family members in the same patent office. In these cases, 
additional citations to family members may even indicate a lesser value. This 
is another reason that patent family citation measures cannot be simply 
implemented, rather they would benefit from the use of a weighting scheme. 
Consequently, we created two composite indicators, one for each office 
studied. These composite indicators were then found to explain patent value 
better than any other of the evaluated patent citation indicators. We therefore 
recommend that other researchers adopt the weighting schem that lead to 
these indicators, when they desire a proxy for the value of EPO or USPTO 
patents.  
The results presented in this paper indicate that citations to the INPADOC 
patent family of a patent are useful indicators of its value. We can see these 
citations as referring to the underlying invention of the patent, since the 
INPADOC patent family is designed to describe inventions that are protected 
by multiple patents. Accordingly, it is likely that the renewal decisions are at 
least based, in part, on the value of the underlying product.  
Nevertheless, we need to place our results within the larger body of literature 
regarding patent citations in that they explain a significant but small part of the 
variation in patent value. This can be determined from a closer observation of 
appendix A, in which patent citations (and a vast array of other indicators) are 
used in logistic regressions to explain the probability that a patent is renewed 
to its maximum term. These regressions show that in general only a small part 
of the variation of patent value is explained, with an even smaller part of this 
explained by patent citations. Even the best patent citation indicator added only 
a few percent increase in goodness of fit indicators, such as recall, specificity, 
and sensitivity. These results agree with the observations of Gay and Le Bas 
(2005) and should provide a warning for researchers that wish to use patent 
citations as an approximation of patent value.     
In general, this paper shows that choosing a patent citation indicator to 
approximate innovation is far from an easy decision. But based on the results, 
this paper advocates for the use of INPADOC aggregated patent citations. 
Furthermore, when using this indicator, it may be necessary to apply a 
weighting scheme for which this paper provides an outline. Given the low use 
of the INPADOC patent family in general, we hope that our conclusions spur 
more research into this promising construct of innovation.    
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Appendix A: Other methods to estimate 
patent renewal 
 
Survival analyses are just one method that can used to estimate patent 
renewal. Binary methods are also a possibility (e.g. Hegde and Sampat, 2009; 
Bakker, 2017). These methods have the advantage that the goodness of fit can 
be assessed in a more intuitive way, by observing the classification of patents 
regarding their renewal status. Therefore, we produce additional fit 
characteristics which also allow us to provide an indication of the goodness of 
fit of our models in general. 
To perform this analysis, we computed a logistic estimation regarding whether 
patents are fully renewed. Unfortunately, this information is not available for all 
patents, due to censoring at the end of our dataset. This is particularly relevant 
for EPO patents as we only have full renewal information for patents up until 
1993, since the dataset ends in early 2014.  
We observe some convergence issues when including patents filed in 1993. 
This may be due to their renewal information, which may not always have been 
registered properly, therefore we ran the analysis using only patents up until 
1992. The results and ranking of the models remain unaffected considering this 
data choice, as was confirmed by using simpler controls which allowed the 
models to converge. We again performed horse-race regressions for all 4 
indicators, which are shown in table 16 for the renewal of EPO patents, and in 
table 17 for the renewal of USPTO patents.   
  
159 
 
Table 29: Horse-race regressions using a logistic regression method to explain if EPO 
patents with filing dates up until 1992 will be renewed until their maximum allowed time. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 EPO 
Full renewal 
EPO 
Full renewal 
EPO 
Full renewal 
EPO 
Full renewal 
EPO 
Full renewal 
      
Ln(1+EPO count)  0.459***    
  (0.0067)    
      
Ln(1+USPTO count)   0.416***   
   (0.0056)   
      
Ln(1+DOCDB count)    0.617***  
    (0.0065)  
      
Ln(1+INPADOC 
count) 
    0.612*** 
     (0.0063) 
      
Ln(Applt. size) 0.0206*** 0.00886** 0.0142*** 0.00878** 0.00813** 
 (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
      
Applicant experience -0.00370*** -0.00348*** -0.00300*** -0.00225*** -0.00189*** 
 (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00028) (0.00029) (0.00029) 
      
Co-patented 0.0206 0.0167 0.0311 0.0164 0.0207 
 (0.038) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
      
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 256515 256515 256515 256515 256515 
Pseudo R2 0.018 0.037 0.042 0.058 0.059 
AIC 242286 237647 236407 232422 232115 
Log-likelihood -120964 -118643 -118023 -116027 -115874 
Recall (%) 0.0231 0.757 1.044 2.797 3.239 
Specificity (%) 99.99 99.88 99.81 99.60 99.47 
Precision (%) 45.83 58.70 55.27 61.47 58.04 
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Table 30: Horse-race regressions using a logistic regression method to explain if USPTO 
patents will be renewed until their maximum allowed time. Standard errors in parentheses. * 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 USPTO 
Full renewal 
USPTO 
Full renewal 
USPTO 
Full renewal 
USPTO 
Full renewal 
USPTO 
Full renewal 
      
Ln(1+EPO count)  0.293***    
  (0.0040)    
      
Ln(1+USPTO count)   0.405***   
   (0.0030)   
      
Ln(1+DOCDB count)    0.405***  
    (0.0032)  
      
Ln(1+INPADOC 
count) 
    0.379*** 
     (0.0031) 
      
Ln(Applt. size) 0.0370*** 0.0300*** 0.0299*** 0.0275*** 0.0279*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
      
Applicant experience -0.00420*** -0.00412*** -0.00353*** -0.00316*** -0.00306*** 
 (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) 
      
Co-patented -0.0403 -0.0293 -0.0365 -0.0530* -0.0555* 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
      
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 571816 571816 571816 571816 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.071 0.088 0.085 0.083 
AIC 742404 736838 723126 725915 727005 
Log-likelihood -371039 -368239 -361391 -362779 -363325 
Recall (%) 64.20 64.40 64.67 64.72 64.62 
Specificity (%) 61.51 62.22 64.03 63.75 63.76 
Precision (%) 62.01 62.52 63.76 63.60 63.57 
 
In tables 16 and 17, we observe the same pattern as in the survival analyses: 
family indicators perform best to explain EPO renewal, while USPTO renewal 
is best explained by the local office indicator. The logistic regressions further 
show that EPO renewal is harder to explain than USPTO renewal, which is 
indicated by the much lower fit characteristics, i.e. the lower recall and 
precision. A further investigation of the fit characteristics indicated that the EPO 
analyses estimated that almost no patents were fully renewed. The USPTO 
analyses produce a more favorable picture with a much higher recall, at the 
cost of relatively few sensitivity, thus indicating a better fit. 
It is not fully clear why the renewal of USPTO patents is better estimated than 
that of their EPO counterparts. A possibility is that USPTO renewal is decided 
much earlier and that patent citations may be better at explaining the earlier 
renewal process. The previous chapter gives some indication regarding the 
existence of this process. To test this explanation, we denoted EPO renewal 
only up until 12 years and repeated the analysis (see table 18). Here it is to be 
noted that, because of the now smaller time window, only EPO patents with 
application filing dates up until 2000 can be used. Convergence issues 
unfortunately emerged, and forced us to use 35 FHG controls based on the 
161 
 
classification of Schmoch (2008), instead of the earlier used IPC3 partial count. 
These FHG groups are derived from the IPC classification and should therefore 
present a decent alternative to the earlier used IPC3 partial counts.    
Table 31: Logit regression on reaching 12 years or more for granted EPO patents until 
2000. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 EPO 12 years EPO 12 years EPO 12 years EPO 12 years EPO 12 years 
      
Ln(1+EPO count)  0.331***    
  (0.0043)    
      
Ln(1+USPTO 
count) 
  0.290***   
   (0.0030)   
      
Ln(1+DOCDB 
count) 
   0.445***  
    (0.0034)  
      
Ln(1+INPADOC 
count) 
    0.449*** 
     (0.0034) 
      
Ln(Applt. size) 0.0576*** 0.0512*** 0.0525*** 0.0485*** 0.0483*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) 
      
Co-patented 0.0577** 0.0704** 0.0622** 0.0503* 0.0490* 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
      
Applicant 
experience 
-0.00537*** -0.00533*** -0.00498*** -0.00449*** -0.00432*** 
 (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00015) (0.00015) 
      
constant -4.324** -4.455** -4.915*** -5.351*** -5.352*** 
 (1.47) (1.47) (1.48) (1.48) (1.48) 
      
FHG Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 547365 547365 547365 547365 547365 
Pseudo R2 0.031 0.039 0.044 0.056 0.057 
AIC 696558 690492 687182 678551 677585 
Log-likelihood -348167 -345133 -343478 -339163 -338680 
Precision (%)  65.12 66.07 66.41 67.30 67.38 
Recall (%) 93.36 91.83 91.05 89.34 89.28 
Specificity 13.13 18.07 19.98 24.57 24.91 
 
The results from this check reveal that the statistics of the EPO patents 
markedly improve, since recall rises from less than 1% to 90%, at the cost of a 
relatively smaller amount of specificity. Nevertheless, the results are still more 
skewed for the EPO analysis than for its US counterpart, where recall and 
specificity are about equal.  
We conclude that the low fit statistics for the EPO analysis are likely due to the 
much larger time window in which this analysis takes place, considering that 
later applicants’ decisions can less reliably be explained by patent citation 
indicators. Notwithstanding, there remains a difference in the goodness of fit 
between the EPO and the USPTO analysis, which indicates that patent 
citations may just simply be better at explaining renewal for USPTO patent 
applications.  
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Appendix B: Employing a J-test to find an 
optimal patent citation indicator 
 
In section 3 we analyzed the power of different citation indicators to explain 
patent value. Our analysis lead to two rankings of citation indicators, based on 
EPO and USPTO renewal. It is however unclear if all citation indicators explain 
the same processes that relate to patent value, while having a different 
efficiency. Alternatively, different citation indicators may describe different 
processes that relate to patent value. If the latter is true, then it may be worth 
examining models containing multiple citation indicators.   
We can also test our proposition more formally by using a J-test which 
distinguishes between non-nested models (Davidson and Mackinnon, 1981). 
Unfortunately, the J-test rapidly becomes computationally complex if all 
observed models are non-linear (Mackinnon et al., 1983). Therefore, we use a 
linear representation of patent renewal in which we simply estimate the number 
of years a patent is renewed (𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙) as a measure of value (as was shown 
in Bakker, 2017). Patents cannot be renewed beyond 20 years, even if the 
applicant is willing to pay any fee for the renewal. Accordingly, a censored (i.e. 
Tobit) regression is used. In these regressions we still apply the same controls 
as we used in the Cox survival regressions. The sample of patents needs to 
be reduced in the same way as in the logistic regression, because EPO patents 
after 1993 did not have a chance to be fully renewed by the end of our 
observation period. The results for the Tobit analyses are shown in table 19 for 
EPO patents, and table 20 for USPTO patents, both of which reveal the same 
ranking as the logistic and Cox survival analyses. 
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Table 32: Estimates of the number of years an EPO patent is renewed for different citation 
indicators and using a Tobit regression.  Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 
0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
Ln(1+EPO count) 1.432***    
 (0.016)    
     
Ln(1+USPTO count)  1.225***   
  (0.012)   
     
Ln(1+DOCDB count)   1.792***  
   (0.014)  
     
Ln(1+INPADOC count)    1.819*** 
    (0.013) 
     
Ln(Applt. size) 0.132*** 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.128*** 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
     
Co-patented 0.128 0.128 0.0941 0.101 
 (0.090) (0.089) (0.088) (0.088) 
     
Applicant experience -0.0164*** -0.0150*** -0.0129*** -0.0121*** 
 (0.00063) (0.00063) (0.00062) (0.00062) 
     
Constant -57.51 -73.72 -70.11 -78.34 
 (67.6) (67.3) (66.5) (66.4) 
σ 6.142*** 6.119*** 6.040*** 6.030*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 286805 286805 286805 286805 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.012 0.014 0.018 0.019 
AIC 1617367 1615239 1607935 1606933 
Log-likelihood -808489 -807425 -803773 -803273 
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Table 33: Estimates of the number of years an USPTO patent is renewed for different 
citation indicators and using a Tobit regression.  Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
Ln(1+USPTO count) 2.169***    
 (0.015)    
     
Ln(1+EPO count)  1.623***   
  (0.020)   
     
Ln(1+DOCDB count)   2.132***  
   (0.016)  
     
Ln(1+INPADOC count)    2.004*** 
    (0.015) 
     
Ln(Applt. size) 0.192*** 0.195*** 0.179*** 0.181*** 
 (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0078) 
     
Co-patented -0.157 -0.122 -0.250* -0.264* 
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
     
Applicant experience -0.0204*** -0.0238*** -0.0184*** -0.0179*** 
 (0.00069) (0.00070) (0.00070) (0.00070) 
     
Constant -156.0 -126.8 -142.5 -150.5 
 (104.7) (106.5) (105.1) (105.3) 
σ 9.516*** 9.683*** 9.556*** 9.567*** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 571816 571816 571816 571816 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.029 0.023 0.028 0.027 
AIC 2522713 2538693 2526575 2527657 
Log-likelihood -1261152 -1269142 -1263083 -1263624 
 
We conducted the J-test in the same way as Smith and Maddala (1983). This 
entails that for each indicator 𝑖, the following model was set up: as a null 
hypothesis H0, the model with citation indicator 𝑖, shown in equation 1, is 
assumed to be the only correct model. As noted before there is censoring 
present, leading to the renewal time being limited to 20 years, even if the 
expression on the Right-Hand Side (R.H.S) is larger than 20.   
H0: 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 𝛽𝑐𝑖𝑡,𝑖ln(𝑖 + 1) + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠,𝑖?⃗?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑅. 𝐻. 𝑆 < 20
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 20 𝑅. 𝐻. 𝑆 > 20
         (1) 
The alternative hypothesis H1 states that some other model using a different 
citation indicator 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 is correct instead. It is important to note that the J-Test 
assumes that one, and only one, model is correct. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis are exclusive.  
H1: 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 𝛾𝑐𝑖𝑡,𝑗ln(𝑗 + 1) + 𝛾𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠,𝑗?⃗?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀𝑗 𝑅. 𝐻. 𝑆 < 20
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 20 𝑅. 𝐻. 𝑆 > 20
    (2) 
To test whether the null hypothesis should be rejected, we construct an artificial 
regression that combines the models presented in H0 and H1, which will be 
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denoted by Hc. There is not one but several alternative models H1, thus 
requiring a sum of the models of the other indicators to create the combined 
model. This leads to the following combined regression to test the null 
hypothesis for indicator 𝑖, with weights 𝜆𝑗 belonging to each alternative model, 
as shown below.  
Hc:      𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = (1 − ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
) (𝛽𝑐𝑖𝑡,𝑖 ln(𝑖 + 1) + 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠,𝑖𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)
+ ∑ 𝜆𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖
(𝛾𝑐𝑖𝑡,𝑗ln(𝑗 + 1) + ?⃗?𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠,𝑗𝑥𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝜀𝑐    𝑅. 𝐻. 𝑆 < 20 
  𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙 = 20    𝑅. 𝐻. 𝑆 > 20 
 
In this combined model, all coefficients belonging to the models, tested under 
the alternative hypotheses (i.e. 𝛾𝑐𝑖𝑡,𝑗 and 𝛾𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠,𝑗), are not estimated directly, 
but use fitted values obtained from estimating the model under H1 for each 
citation indicator 𝑗.  
The J-test can be performed using this model by estimating the combined 
probability of the weights all being zero, i.e. 𝜆𝑗 = 0 . Alternatively, we can 
perform a LR-test between the combined model and the model that is assumed 
correct under H0. In this subsection we perform both tests. 
The J-test should only be used to test one model, thus in our case testing one 
indicator at a time .As such, we repeated the above procedure in which one 
indicator is set as 𝑖 and the other indicators are set as 𝑗. The results of this 
exercise are shown in table 21 for EPO data, and in table 22 for USPTO data.    
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Table 34: Tobit regressions of combined models that estimate the number of years an EPO 
patent is renewed. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
EPO 
Ln(1+EPO count) 0.426***    
 (0.019)    
     
Ln(1+USPTO count)  -0.518***   
  (0.025)   
     
Ln(1+DOCDB count)   0.809***  
   (0.054)  
     
Ln(1+INPADOC count)    1.353*** 
    (0.044) 
     
𝜆𝐸𝑃𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡   0.298*** 0.298*** 0.298*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
     
   𝜆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 -0.423***  -0.423*** -0.423*** 
 (0.020)  (0.020) (0.020) 
     
   𝜆𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 0.451*** 0.451***  0.451*** 
 (0.030) (0.030)  (0.030) 
     
   𝜆𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐷𝑂𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 0.744*** 0.744*** 0.744***  
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  
     
Ln(Applt. size) 0.0277*** -0.0730*** 0.0470*** 0.0840*** 
 (0.0068) (0.0070) (0.0083) (0.0076) 
     
Co-patented 0.0323 -0.0600 0.0368 0.0692 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
     
Applicant experience -0.00370*** 0.00756*** -0.00463*** -0.00779*** 
 (0.00064) (0.00067) (0.00080) (0.00072) 
     
Constant -12.85 35.46 -27.37 -54.00 
 (66.2) (66.2) (66.3) (66.2) 
σ 6.016*** 6.016*** 6.016*** 6.016*** 
 (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093) 
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 286805 286805 286805 286805 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 
AIC 160568 1605674 160568 160568 
Log-likelihood -802640 -802640 -802640 -802640 
Test statistics      
𝐹(∀𝜆 = 0) 3924*** 3193*** 755*** 422*** 
LR compared to H0 11699*** 9571*** 2267*** 1266*** 
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Table 35: Tobit regressions of combined models that estimate the number of years an EPO 
patent is renewed. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑙  
USPTO 
Ln(1+USPTO count) 1.798***    
 (0.025)    
     
Ln(1+EPO count)  0.734***   
  (0.022)   
     
Ln(1+DOCDB count)   -0.391***  
   (0.055)  
     
Ln(1+INPADOC count)    0.704*** 
    (0.046) 
     
 𝜆𝑈𝑆𝑃𝑇𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  0.829*** 0.829*** 0.829*** 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
     
   𝜆𝐸𝑃𝑂 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡  0.452***  0.452*** 0.452*** 
 (0.014)  (0.014) (0.014) 
     
  𝜆𝐷𝑂𝐶𝐷𝐵 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 -0.183*** -0.183***  -0.183*** 
 (0.026) (0.026)  (0.026) 
     
  𝜆𝐼𝑁𝑃𝐴𝐷𝑂𝐶 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 0.351*** 0.351*** 0.351***  
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  
     
Ln(Applt. size) 0.0533*** -0.0177* -0.139*** -0.0420*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0080) (0.0098) (0.0091) 
     
Co-patented -0.0432 0.0318 0.133 -0.00563 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
     
Applicant experience -0.00582*** 0.000304 0.0144*** 0.00477*** 
 (0.00078) (0.00072) (0.00092) (0.00084) 
     
Constant -70.74 1.229 84.67 5.653 
 (104.5) (104.5) (104.6) (104.5) 
σ 9.496*** 9.496*** 9.496*** 9.496*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
IPC3 Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 571816 571816 571816 571816 
Pseudo 𝑅2 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.030 
AIC 2520811 2520811 2520811 2520811 
Log-likelihood -1260198 -1260198 -1260198 -1260198 
Test statistics      
𝐹(∀𝜆 = 0) 634*** 5895*** 1926*** 2286*** 
LR compared to H0  1908*** 17888*** 5770*** 6852*** 
 
The J-test indicates that in all cases the null model needs to be rejected.  It 
therefore shows that there is no model of patent renewal, which is absolutely 
better than the other models, given that in each combined regression the other 
models still explain a significant part of the variance in the patent renewal 
indicator. Consequently, we conclude that different citations capture different 
processes that correlate with patent value. 
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The J-test also allows for an additional verification of the ranking of the patent 
indicators. The combined model, in which the test statistic for the weights of 
the other models is lowest, likely contains the best null model. In our case this 
means that the model with the lowest F-statistic estimates directly the citation 
indicator that best explains patent renewal. In the case of EPO patents this 
entails the model containing the INPADOC count indicator, while in the USPTO 
model this entails the model containing the USPTO count indicator. Thereby 
confirming the results of the various horse-race regression analyses shown in 
the main body of the paper. 
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Appendix C: Does a ‘home-bias’ exist in 
patent citations? 
 
Criscuolo (2006) found that patent counts of applicants could be skewed, when 
they are only evaluated in one patent system. It is possible that not only the 
patent counts have such a home bias, but that citation counts are also similarly 
skewed by applicant origin. A citation home bias is likely introduced because 
of two reasons: first, foreign applicants may simply write their patent 
documents differently, as well as follow a patent strategy that is more related 
to their home country; and second, foreign applicants may simply have fewer 
patents, leading to fewer self-citations. Furthermore, if the applicant is part of 
an industry which is clustered outside the country that the patent office resides 
in there may also be less citations from domestic applicants. 
To investigate such a possible bias we will use the same set of patents, as 
used in the main body of the paper. We will denote applicants of patents by the 
country attributed to them in the patent application. The applicants are 
categorized in three groups: US applicants; European applicants, which belong 
to countries that subscribe to the EPO; and other applicants, which belong to 
any other country. 
In these analyses we face the challenge of patents with multiple applicants, 
albeit that this only covers about 5% of our sample. To deal with this issue we 
assume the following: if the patent is applied for by a domestic and a foreign 
applicant, then the native applicant deals with the application process. 
Therefore, whenever a native applicant is present we ascribe the patent to that 
applicant. When the two non-domestic categories are both present we divide 
the patent between them using a partial count method. In tables 23 and 24 we 
give statistics for the EPO and USPTO patents in our sample, per the country 
of their applicant.   
Table 36: Statistics of applicant origin for the number of USPTO patents in our sample. 
Any patent with an US applicant is solely subscribed to the US, while European (i.e. applicant 
belonging to a country which subscribes to the EPO), and other applicants, have a full distinct 
count.   
Applicant  
origin 
Number of 
USPTO 
patents 
% of total 
USPTO 
patents 
Average 
USPTO 
citations 
Average 
DOCDB 
citations 
Average 
INPADOC 
citations 
US 182833 31.97 23.08 33.17 44.53 
Europe 238196 41.66 9.84 15.16 15.23 
Other 151930 26.57 12.49 18.63 21.03 
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Table 37: Statistics of applicant origin for the number of EPO patents in our sample. Any 
patent with an European, i.e. applicant belonging to a country which subscribes to the EPO, 
applicant is solely subscribed to Europe, while US and other applicants have a full distinct 
count.   
Applicant  
origin 
Number of 
EPO patents 
% of total 
EPO 
patents 
Average 
EPO 
citations 
Average 
DOCDB 
citations 
Average 
INPADOC 
citations 
Europe 244,891 44.74 1.39 14.50 14.56 
US 155,379 28.39 1.40 29.35 38.84 
Other 147,896 27.02 2.26 17.67 19.89 
 
From these tables we can already determine that, for EPO patents, there does 
not appear to be much of a difference between EPO and USPTO applicants 
regarding the EPO count. Foreign applicants however, receive more citations. 
This may indicate that the EPO system is less biased, as was already claimed 
in Criscuolo et al. (2005). The USPTO system does appear biased, with 
patents from US applicants cited at almost double the rate at which patents 
from other applicants are cited.  
The family indicators also appear to be very biased towards US applicants. 
Patents with European applicants have low citation scores, followed relatively 
close by those of other applicants, while patents from US applicants are cited 
much more. This is likely due to the high correlation between the USPTO count 
and the DOCDB count indicators, which makes them similar enough that we 
can expect similar behavior. Nonetheless, this is only a simple tabulation, it is 
very well possible that (a part of) the bias is explained by quality and other 
differences between the patents. Therefore, we will conduct an analysis in 
which we control for this heterogeneity.   
It will be necessary to control for the quality of a patents, when estimating a 
possible home bias. For instance, it is possible that domestic and foreign 
applicants write different patents, and produce patents of a different quality. 
For example, a firm willing to protect its invention outside of its home market 
may very well select only its best inventions to do so. To prevent such a 
selection effect from affecting our analyses we will include a set of controls that 
correct for patent quality, based on Squicciarini (2013), and which is also used 
in the third chaper of this PHD. Table 25 lists the controls and their descriptive 
statistics.  
  
171 
 
Table 38: Description and descriptive statistics of patent quality indicators used in this 
section. Statistics are given for USPTO patents and will vary only slightly for EPO patents.  
indicator Description 
N mean 
Std. 
dev 
min max 
Nr. Countries 
Number of distinct patent 
offices in which the 
DOCDB family of the 
patent has at least 1 
application present . 
571816 7.08 4.12 2 51 
Triadic 
Dummy to indicate if the 
DOCDB patent family of 
the patent also contains a 
Japanese patent 
571816 0.71 0.45 0 1 
Backward 
citations 
The number of patents cited 
by the focal patent 
571816 11.88 12.67 0 198 
Originality 
The score of trajtenberg 
originality indicator on the 
IPC6 level 
571816 0.51 0.32 0 1 
Number of 
claims 
The number of claims in 
the patent 
571816 14.57 12.37 0 596 
No claims 
registered 
Dummy to indicate patents 
where the number of claims 
is unknown. For these 
patents the number of 
claims is set to 0 
571816 0.0004 0.02 0 1 
Grant lag 
The number of days 
between the filing of the 
application document and 
the grant date of the patent 
571816 798.65 430.99 0 9827 
Number of 
IPC classes 
Number of IPC technology 
classes that are assigned to 
the patent 
571816 5.11 5.08 1 166 
Number of 
distinct IPC3 
classes 
Number of distinct IPC3 
classes that the patent is 
assigned to 
571816 1.74 0.93 1 16 
Shane 
radicalness 
The score on the Shane 
radicalness at the IPC6 
level 
571816 10.05 11.31 0 198 
 
We will evaluate the rate at which patents receive citations using a Poisson 
regression. Here, the number of citations the patent receives in its own office, 
will be the dependent variable. In both analyses we set applicants that do not 
originate from the US or Europe as the reference category. Because it is 
possible that the quality of a patent differs between applicants from different 
origins we also ran regressions where we control for the quality of the patent, 
by using the aforementioned control variables. The results of these Poisson 
regressions are listed in tables 26 and 27.    
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Table 39: Poisson regressions for granted EPO patent applications to explain the number 
of times they are cited based on the nationality of the applicant of the patent. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) 
EPO 
(2) 
EPO 
(3) 
EPO 
(4) 
EPO 
 Count Count Count Count 
     
European applicant -0.110*** -0.311*** -0.0641*** -0.288*** 
 (0.0064) (0.0081) (0.0067) (0.0081) 
     
US applicant  -0.354***  -0.383*** 
  (0.0083)  (0.0085) 
     
Ln(1+firm size) 0.0878*** 0.0574*** 0.0838*** 0.0516*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
     
Co-patented 0.0422 0.0108 0.0179 -0.0136 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
     
Firm experience -0.00407*** -0.00155*** -0.00351*** -0.000894*** 
 (0.00013) (0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00015) 
     
Constant -11.01*** -11.12*** -13.82*** -14.12*** 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.40) (0.40) 
     
Quality controls No No Yes Yes 
     
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
IPC3 controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Applicant controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 547365 547365 547365 547365 
Pseudo R2 0.071 0.076 0.093 0.098 
AIC 2522735 2510540 2464175 2450711 
Log-likelihood -1261225 -1255126 -1231937 -1225200 
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Table 40: Poisson regression for granted USPTO patent applications to explain the 
number of times they are cited based on the nationality of the applicant of the patent. 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 USPTO 
count 
USPTO 
count 
USPTO 
count 
USPTO 
count 
     
US applicant 0.677*** 0.599*** 0.571*** 0.496*** 
 (0.0048) (0.0066) (0.0054) (0.0071) 
     
European applicant  -0.123***  -0.118*** 
  (0.0063)  (0.0064) 
     
Ln(1+firm size) 0.0184*** 0.00976*** 0.0215*** 0.0134*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) 
     
Co-patented -0.0552* -0.0592** -0.0556* -0.0594** 
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
     
Firm experience -0.00311*** -0.00252*** -0.00282*** -0.00227*** 
 (0.00011) (0.00012) (0.00011) (0.00012) 
     
Constant 7.670*** 7.479*** 6.895*** 6.730*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27) 
     
Quality controls No No Yes Yes 
     
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
IPC3 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 571816 571816 571816 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.207 0.208 0.243 0.244 
AIC 11489829 11477769 10961940 10951294 
Log-likelihood -5744765 -5738733 -5480811 -5475486 
 
From the results presented in tables 26 and 27 it indeed appears that a home 
bias exists: the origin of the applicant is a significant indicator of the number of 
patent citations, and this differs per office. USPTO patents from US applicants 
are significantly more cited than USPTO patents from EPO or other applicants, 
even after correcting for patent quality. At the EPO applicants from non-EU and 
non-US countries perform better, while patents from EPO applicants still get 
cited more than those from USPTO applicants. Correcting for patent quality 
appears to increase this difference even more.     
The next question is whether family based indicators are also biased with 
respect to applicant origin. The descriptive statistics indicate that they may be 
biased in favor of applicants from the US. To analyze this question we again 
ran Poisson regressions but now with DOCDB and INPADOC patent counts as 
dependent variables (see table 28). Here we only present the results for the 
USPTO patents since the results for the EPO patents in our sample are very 
similar, due to the construction of our sample.  
  
174 
 
Table 41: Poisson regressions to determine a possible bias towards different applicants 
with either the DOCDB count or the INPADOC count as a dependent variable. The 
reference category is composed of patents from non-US and non-European origin.  Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 DOCDB 
count 
DOCDB 
count 
INPADOC 
count 
INPADOC 
count 
US applicant 0.558*** 0.373*** 0.0167*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.00197) (0.00187) 
     
EU applicant -0.0945*** -0.111*** -0.0997* -0.156*** 
 (0.0063) (0.0061) (0.046) (0.0385) 
     
Ln(1+firm size) 0.0151*** 0.0176*** -0.00670*** -0.00562*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.00021) (0.000195) 
     
Co-patented -0.0631 -0.0896** 0.732*** 0.508*** 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.012) (0.0117) 
     
Firm experience -0.00392*** -0.00326*** -0.183*** -0.160*** 
 (0.00012) (0.00012) (0.010) (0.00996) 
     
Constant 1.829*** -0.809*** 5.694*** 0.772* 
 (0.21) (0.24) (0.34) (0.394) 
Patent quality  No Yes No Yes 
     
year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
IPC3 dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 571816 571816 571816 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.179 0.282 0.202 0.360 
AIC 14918619.2 13044469.2 25699789.4 20620742.6 
Log-likelihood -7459167.6 -6522077.6 -12849745.7 -10310212.3 
 
This analysis shows that family based indicators in themselves are still 
suffering from a bias towards US applicants. This analysis therefore confirms 
the previous indication that family indicators are as biased as USPTO citation 
indicators. 
In conclusion, the least biased indicator found is the EPO count indicator. The 
USPTO count indicator, as well as the patent family based indicators, are 
biased towards applicants from the US. It is therefore problematic to create 
cross country comparisons using any of these three indicators. Moreover, it is 
likely that this bias will translate in reduced performance of the indicators to 
explain patent value. In the main body of this paper, we will also evaluate the 
efficiency of patent citation indicators to explain patent value depending on the 
origin of the applicants of the patents present in the sample.   
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Appendix D: Descriptive statistics and 
relevant multivariate analyses of exclusive 
citation indicators  
 
In this appendix we discuss, in more depth, the descriptive statistics of the 
exclusive citation indicators that are described in the fourth section. We start in 
table 29 where we provide an overview of all patent citations to our sample, 
separated by patent office of origin.  
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Table 42: Patent citations to our sample denoted by the office of the citing patent. For 
patent offices, of patents not in the sample, offices are denoted by their country of residence if 
applicable.  Percentages in bold add to 100%.  
Office of citation Patent citations given Share of total 
USPTO 2765226 66.81% 
EPO 551267 13.32% 
PCT 540822 13.07% 
Europe 177228 4.28% 
Germany 73127 1.77% 
Great Britain 43699 1.06% 
France 40955 0.99% 
Spain 5976 0.14% 
Netherlands 3720 0.09% 
Italy 3611 0.09% 
Austria 2321 0.06% 
Belgium 1255 0.03% 
Czechia 1238 0.03% 
Switzerland 418 0.01% 
Bulgaria 270 0.01% 
Turkey 267 0.01% 
Greece 211 0.01% 
Luxemburg 131 0.00% 
Denmark 22 0.00% 
Norway 5 0.00% 
Finland 2 0.00% 
Other 104230 2.52% 
Australia 60541 1.46% 
Korea 20021 0.48% 
Japan 17224 0.42% 
Singapore 3074 0.07% 
EAPO 
(Eurasian patents) 
2628 0.06% 
ARIPO 
(African Patents) 
329 0.01% 
Malaysia 300 0.01% 
Russia 113 0.00% 
Total 4138773 100% 
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It is to be noted that these patent statistics are not directly a projection of the 
patent office’s themselves, but rather of the data that is available in the EPO 
PATSTAT database of their documents. This is especially true for the ‘other 
citations’ category as it holds only patents of a few offices. Table 29 indicates 
that the number of citations from each of these offices is rather low, which 
indicates that the coverage of some offices may not be complete. 
Bakker et al. (2016) found that citation indicators could differ drastically, and 
very often had a low correlation. Therefore, we compute the correlations 
between the different partial citation indicators. Correlations of citation 
indicators, aggregated at the patent level, can be found in tables 30 and 31.  
Table 43: Correlations between different patent citations to EPO patents and their family 
members from different sources. All correlations are significant at the p<0.01 level. 
N=547,365. 
Variable Nr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Patent-EPO  1 1 
                            
Patent-USPTO 2 .6 1 
                          
Patent-PCT 3 .8 .6 1 
                        
Patent-Europe 4 .4 .0 .4 1 
                      
Patent-Other 5 .4 .4 .4 .2 1 
                    
DOCDB-EPO 6 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 1 
                  
DOCDB-USPTO 7 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .6 1 
                
DOCDB –PCT 8 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 .9 .6 1 
              
DOCDB –Europe 9 .0 .0 .0 .1 .0 .4 .3 .3 1 
            
DOCDB –Other 10 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .4 .4 .4 .2 1 
          
INPADOC-EPO  11 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 1 
        
INPADOC –USPTO 12 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .2 .3 .2 .1 .1 .8 1 
      
INPADOC –PCT 13 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .2 .2 .3 .1 .1 1.0 .8 1 
    
INPADOC –Europe 14 .0 .0 .0 .0 .0 .2 .2 .2 .1 .1 .7 .8 .7 1 
  
INPADOC –Other 15 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 .2 .2 .2 .0 .1 .8 .7 .7 .6 1 
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Table 44: Correlations between different patent citations to USPTO patents and their 
family members from different sources. All correlations are significant at the p<0.01 level. 
N=571,816. 
Variable Nr. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Patent-EPO  1 1                             
Patent-USPTO 2 .5 1                           
Patent-PCT 3 .9 .5 1                         
Patent-Europe 4 .2 .2 .2 1                       
Patent-Other 5 .3 .3 .3 .2 1                     
DOCDB-EPO 6 .3 .3 .3 .1 .1 1                   
DOCDB-USPTO 7 .1 .2 .1 .0 .1 .6 1                 
DOCDB –PCT 8 .3 .2 .3 .1 .1 .9 .6 1               
DOCDB –Europe 9 .1 .2 .1 .2 .1 .3 .2 .3 1             
DOCDB –Other 10 .2 .3 .2 .1 .2 .5 .4 .4 .2 1           
INPADOC-EPO  11 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 .2 .2 .2 .0 .1 1         
INPADOC –USPTO 12 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 .1 .2 .1 .0 .1 .8 1       
INPADOC –PCT 13 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 .2 .2 .2 .0 .1 1.0 .8 1     
INPADOC –Europe 14 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 .1 .2 .1 .1 .1 .7 .7 .6 1   
INPADOC –Other 15 .1 .1 .1 .0 .0 .1 .2 .1 .0 .1 .7 .8 .7 .7 1 
 
These tables reveal that the correlations between citation sources are 
reasonably high, with correlations often being around 0.5. Yet, as already noted 
in Bakker et al. (2016), these correlations are low enough to show also that 
different citation sources still carry different information.  
There is an extremely high correlation between EPO given citations and PCT 
given citations. This is caused by the fact that many EPO patents arrive through 
the PCT process and are examined by a patent examiner for the EPO. If such 
a patent is then followed up by an EPO application the backward citations found 
at in the previous examination are often re-used. Since this process occurs 
frequently many EPO and PCT documents share the same citations.  
Incidentally, it is this process that causes problems with EPO backward 
citations in many databases, such as PATSTAT, as the backward citations of 
EPO patents that follow this PCT route are not well documented. In this paper 
we corrected this by adding the backward citations of the PCT documents to 
their affected EPO family members. However, because of this correction many 
backward citations from EPO and PCT documents are now equal, leading to 
the very high correlation between the indicators based on these documents.  
Because of this high correlation there is a concern for co-linearity between the 
EPO and PCT count if these are used as independent variables in the same 
analysis.  
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The correlation tables provide good indications for correlations between sets 
of citation indicators. However, to better understand the data we performed 
exploratory factor analyses (see tables 32 and 33 for EPO and USPTO patents 
respectively). These analyses reveal that citation indicators can often better be 
grouped by the documents (application, family) they refer to rather than the 
office they belong to, which appears as a second grouping mechanism. This 
finding confirms the approach followed in the previous section, where patent 
citations were mainly grouped by applications and different families. 
Table 45: Exploratory factor analysis for patent citation indicators based on EPO patents. 
Varimax rotated solution where contributions above 0.4 are marked in bold. 
 1(37%) 2(56%) 3(66%) 4(73%) uniqueness 
Patent-EPO  0.0567 0.8979 0.003 0.0601 0.187 
Patent -USPTO 0.0908 0.7701 -0.0525 0.0846 0.3888 
Patent -PCT 0.0942 0.8624 -0.0105 0.0159 0.247 
Patent -Europe -0.0655 0.5571 0.2547 0.0311 0.6195 
Patent -Other 0.0077 0.56 -0.049 0.109 0.6721 
DOCDB-EPO 0.8946 0.0511 0.1336 -0.0301 0.1784 
DOCDB-USPTO  0.675 0.1533 0.109 0.2336 0.4544 
DOCDB -PCT 0.8988 0.0569 0.0974 -0.0481 0.1771 
DOCDB -Europe 0.2069 0.0123 0.946 0.0131 0.0619 
DOCDB -Other 0.296 0.1468 0.0923 0.807 0.231 
INPADOC -EPO 0.8893 -0.0126 0.1014 0.1782 0.167 
INPADOC-USPTO  0.7082 0.0496 0.1022 0.3863 0.3363 
INPADOC -PCT 0.9044 -0.0087 0.0725 0.1453 0.1557 
INPADOC -Europe 0.3234 -0.0174 0.8916 0.1485 0.0781 
INPADOC -Other 0.4317 0.0604 0.0969 0.8512 0.076 
  
  
180 
 
Table 46: Exploratory factor analysis for patent citation indicators based on USPTO 
patents. Varimax rotated solution where contributions above 0.4 are marked in bold. 
 1(38%) 2(53%) 3(63%) 4(71%) 5(76%) uniqueness 
Patent-EPO  0.0875 0.9125 0.1342 0.0097 0.0088 0.1416 
Patent -USPTO 0.0988 0.6521 0.0647 0.1454 0.2665 0.4687 
Patent -PCT 0.0878 0.9111 0.1455 0.0002 0.0033 0.1409 
Patent -Europe -0.0562 0.3982 -0.1204 0.3841 0.0623 0.6723 
Patent -Other -0.0602 0.4408 -0.0617 0.106 0.3813 0.6416 
DOCDB-EPO 0.2864 0.1421 0.8726 0.1819 0.1733 0.0733 
DOCDB-USPTO  0.4105 0.0273 0.5674 0.1029 0.1921 0.4613 
DOCDB -PCT 0.2988 0.1446 0.8828 0.1297 0.1399 0.074 
DOCDB -Europe 0.0026 0.024 0.2128 0.9407 0.0647 0.0651 
DOCDB -Other 0.1014 0.051 0.3069 0.0823 0.8863 0.1007 
INPADOC -EPO 0.8395 0.1122 0.3719 0.1539 0.1069 0.1092 
INPADOC-USPTO  0.8965 0.0288 0.1382 0.1195 0.1549 0.1381 
INPADOC -PCT 0.8274 0.1174 0.4047 0.1149 0.0803 0.1182 
INPADOC -Europe 0.3594 0.0284 0.0797 0.8883 0.0834 0.0676 
INPADOC -Other 0.5985 0.0444 0.0573 0.1072 0.7246 0.0999 
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Appendix E: The effects of intra family 
competition 
 
The analysis of the fourth section showed that citations to patent family 
members are positively related to the chance a patent is abandonned. A 
possible explanation for this result is based on the existence of competition 
between patents that belong to the same patent family.  
It is likely that patents from the same patent family protect the same invention- 
for example, by protecting several components and/or applications of one 
invention. Patents belonging to the same DOCDB patent family tend to protect 
the same invention in multiple jurisdictions, while patents form the same 
INPADOC patent family may protect different components of the same 
invention.     
When innovators file patents to protect their inventions, they may be inclined 
to try and protect as much of their efforts as possible, since they are uncertain 
of the reaction of potential imitators. After some time has passed, and the costs 
for protection have increased due to increased maintenance fees, innovators 
may decide to abandon some of their patents because they have become 
redundant in protection. This then lead to competition between patents 
belonging to the same patent family.  
Patents that have a larger family will be more likely to have a higher family 
citation score because there are more patents that can be cited. Additionally, 
if there is a patent in a family that is cited more often it may have a higher 
relative performance. In this case the family members with lower citation scores 
should be less likely to be maintained. Therefore, competition may lead to the 
abandonnement of patents, whose family members have more citations. 
To investigate the veracity of this competition model we repeated the same 
analysis as performed in table 13. Here, we introduce two new variables: the 
number of other granted applications, in the same family and in the same office, 
as well as their combined citation count. Furthermore, the family citation count 
in the same office will be changed to only include patent citations from outside 
the patent office. This allows us to answer the research question by testing the 
hypothesis that the coefficient of the count of granted patents in the same 
family and office, is positively related to the chance of abandonment. A similar 
hypothesis can bet tested regarding the number of citations received by these 
patent family members. 
For our sample, there are 43,121 USPTO patents with granted USPTO family 
members in their DOCDB family, and 69,454 USPTO patents with granted 
USPTO family members in their INPADOC patent family. We estimate the 
effects of the number of other USPTO granted patents in the DOCDB or 
INPADOC family on the renewal time of the USPTO patent. Additionally, we 
also include the number of citations to these patents, as competition is also 
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dependent on the value of the other patents. These citations have then been 
subtracted from the DOCDB-USPTO indicator to avoid double counting. The 
results of this exercise are listed in table 34. 
Table 47: Cox survival regression to test the effects of within family competition for 
granted USPTO patents. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 (1) (2) 
 USPTO 
renewal time 
USPTO 
renewal time 
Other patents in same  -0.000452 0.000865*** 
family (0.0014) (0.00019) 
   
Citation counts to these 
other patents 
0.000358*** -0.000239*** 
 (0.00010) (0.000069) 
   
Patent-USPTO -0.0153*** -0.0153*** 
 (0.00016) (0.000158) 
   
DOCDB-USPTO 0.000827***  
 (0.00023)  
   
INPADOC-USPTO  -0.000282*** 
  (0.000075) 
   
Ln(Applt. size) -0.0239*** -0.0239*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
   
Co-patented 0.0228 0.0229 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
   
Applicant experience 0.00238*** 0.00238*** 
 (0.000092) (0.000092) 
   
Year dummies Yes Yes 
   
IPC3 dummies Yes Yes 
   
Sector dummies Yes Yes 
   
country dummies Yes Yes 
N 571816 571816 
Pseudo R2 0.007 0.007 
AIC 7506694 7506651 
Log-likelihood -3753141 -3753119 
 
We find support for the first hypothesis: the presence of patent family members 
in the same office decreases the chances of patent renewal. The associated 
coefficient is very significant for INPADOC patent family members, and 
insignificant for DOCDB patent family members.  
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The second hypothesis, which states that citations to these patent family 
members also decreases the chances a patent is renewed, is only confirmed 
for DOCDB patent family members. More citations to INPADOC patent family 
members are associated with an increased chance of renewal. This may 
indicate that patent citations are mainly a good method to gauge competition 
between patents that have the same technical content.  
In conclusion, we find that patents may have a reduced chance of being 
renewed if there are patent family members present in the same office. This 
finding reveals that patent owners consider the place of a patent in their 
portfolio, when they make decisions regarding patent maintenance. This is not 
commonly addressed in the patent literature and could provide an interesting 
avenue to better understand how portfolios are managed.    
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General conclusion 
 
This doctoral dissertation presented several ways to improve the patent citation 
indicator, and thereby improving the measurement of innovation. Chapters 1 
and 4 emphasize the importance of choosing a data source from which to 
extract the indicator. Chapter 2 details the necessity of a new functional form 
to relate patent citations to patent value. And finally, chapter 3 shows a new 
interpretation of patent citations, and why their correlation with patent value 
emerges. The research shown in all chapters provides guidance for those 
interested in using patent citations to approximate patent value. 
Researchers using patent citations should heed the results in this thesis, when 
creating patent indicators for their own purposes. As can be seen in chapter 1, 
not all citations are equal, and it is likely that different citations can produce 
markedly different results, even if they all correlate positively with patent value 
(see chapter 4). Furthermore, those wishing to compare the current or past 
innovative performances of economic actors (individuals, firms, nations, etc.) 
need to be aware that all citation indicators carry a bias towards applicants of 
certain countries (often the U.S.). Even citation indicators that account for 
global patent families are biased towards the U.S, albeit that this bias appears 
relatively minor compared to that of patent citations based on single USPTO 
documents.  
This thesis could also be of use for managers of intellectual property 
considering the framework presented in chapter 3. This chapter shows, for the 
first time ever, that patent citations may serve as a useful indicator of possible 
interest in intellectual property. Likewise, backward patent citations may also 
serve as a warning for potential litigation, and perhaps the need to find licensing 
agreements. For researchers interested into IP management, the network of 
patent citations may reveal the market structure of intellectual property. 
Nonetheless, for researchers willing to apply the results from this thesis, there 
is a major hurdle to be taken, which relates to the availability of patent data. 
Currently, there is only one patent database readily and freely available (i.e. 
the NBER patent database). This database only covers patents and citations 
from US patents. To create the family based indicators, referred to in this 
thesis, it is necessary to obtain a larger database, such as the PATSTAT 
database. The costs of the database itself are relatively minor, but the skill 
required to create correct indicators takes quite some time to acquire. 
Consequently, it is not trivial to expect every researcher to adopt family based 
citation indicators, even if they are proven to be superior on their dataset.  
There are two practical solutions to this problem. First, correct citation 
indicators could be made available on a centralized and easily accessible 
platform. This should not impose enormous difficulties, seeing as patent 
offices, such as the EPO, already calculate the forward citations per patent in 
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their online database: the only extra step would be to compile a few more 
indicators and make them available in an easily accessible table. If this is not 
possible, at least a table detailing which patents belong to which families can 
be made available. The results of chapter 1 suggest that researchers can 
aggregate patent citations at the patent family level, even when using patent 
information from a single office, since the resulting indicator will be reasonably 
similar to a patent family indicator which uses citation data from multiple offices. 
Making a simple table of patent family membership available would alleviate 
the issue substantially. 
The insights of this thesis could also affect the construction of other patent 
indicators. For instance, the Trajtenberg et al. (1997) generality indicator 
depends heavily on patent citations, and could be substantially altered if a 
family based citation indicator is used, instead of a patent citation indicator 
based on patents of a single office.  
Additionally, while patent citations often refer to the number of times a patent 
is cited, it may also be interesting to look at the sources cited by the patent. 
The patents that are cited in a patent document tend to lend themselves to 
various indicators of the citing patent such as: the Trajtenberg et al. (2007) 
originality indicator; the backward citations indicator (i.e. the count of patents 
cited); and the Verhoeven et al. (2016) new origins indicator. There are even 
indicators based on cited non-patent-literature. For instance, Van Looy et al. 
(2007) have found that academic sources cited by patents could indicate that 
the patent relies on more scientific knowledge. It would be an interesting 
endeavor to see if grouping these backward citations at the patent family level 
yields new, or better, insights. Furthermore, backward citations could also be 
grouped by the type of patent they cite, whether it belongs to the same owner, 
or if it is filed in the same patent office. Given the results presented in this 
dissertation, this could provide valuable insights in the position of the patent. 
Another future research direction would be to investigate the value of patent 
portfolios instead of single patent documents. Chapter 2 already introduces a 
simple portfolio indicator derived from the value of single patent documents, 
but this does not take all the characteristics of the portfolio into account. To 
arrive at a good portfolio indicator the results of this thesis should be combined 
with portfolio concepts, such as the diversity and strategic position of the 
portfolio. In addition, the overlap in the portfolio, which could be measured by 
the self-citations it contains, could prove an interesting indicator for the 
effective protection it lends against imitation of the technologies of the patent 
owner.  
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Another theme is present throughout this thesis, which is the concerns the 
proper validation of constructs and concepts when measuring innovation. Too 
often indicators are simply assumed to measure a construct purely based on a 
theoretical argument, but without any validation being provided. This thesis 
shows the possibility of a thorough validation as well as some of the surprising 
results that can be achieved by doing so. For instance, a priori, aggregating 
received citations on the level of the patent familym rather than the patent itself, 
could provide a better indication of the value of the patent, since more of the 
available information is used. However, the results presented in chapter 4 show 
that this is not always the case.  
In conclusion, this thesis shows that it is helpful to view patent citations for what 
they are: legal instruments that provide information for the citing patent. For 
example, chapter 3 shows that this conceptualization leads to interesting 
observations regarding the distinct types of value that can be represented by 
distinct types of citations. The other chapters show that our current use of 
patent citation indicators can and should be, improved. We can only hope that 
other scholars apply the lessons provided and arrive at a better understanding 
of patent citations, doing so will further the understanding of innovation and 
intellectual property. 
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